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Breaking Down Anonymity
DENNIS BROEDERS
Digital Surveillance of Irregular 
Migrants in Germany and 
the Netherlands
Because borders alone cannot stop irregular migration, the European Union is 
turning more and more to internal control measures. Through surveillance, member 
states aim to exclude irregular migrants from societal institutions, thereby discouraging 
their stay or deporting those who are apprehended. And yet, states cannot expel 
immigrants who remain anonymous. Identification has thus become key. Breaking 
Down Anonymity shows how digital surveillance is becoming a prime instrument of 
identification and exclusion policies towards irregular migrants. To support this 
claim, the study charts policy developments in Germany and the Netherlands. It 
analyses both countries’ labour market controls as well as their detention and 
expulsion practices. Also examined is the development of several new EU migration 
databases. Spanning the Continent, these information systems create a new European 
Union frontier – one that is digital, biometric and ever-strengthening.
 
Dennis Broeders is a researcher in the Department of Sociology at Erasmus University 
Rotterdam and a senior research fellow at the Dutch Scientific Council for Government 
Policy in The Hague.
“Using the tools developed in the burgeoning field of migration surveillance, this book insightfully explores the problem 
of the ‘internal’ control of irregular migration in Europe.  A strong contribution to the discussions in this area.”
John Torpey, The Graduate Center, The City University of New York
“This provoking and well-researched study of migration controls through digital surveillance documents the 
irrationality and helplessness of organising exclusion mechanisms in Fortress Europe. An uneasy must-read for all 
immigration and control authorities.”
Frank Bovenkerk, Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam
“This book opens a fresh and theory-oriented perspective on the study of irregular migration. It will certainly have 
some impact on future research in this field.” 
Michael Bommes, Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies, University of Osnabrück 
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1 Introduction and research questions
1.1 The irregular migrant as a policy problem
The presence of irregular migrants causes a tough problem for policy-
makers. Political and popular aversion to the presence of irregular mi-
grants has mounted in most Western European societies for years, yet
their presence remains. Their exact numbers are obviously unknown –
only estimates of various kinds and sources are available1 – making the
perceived magnitude of their ‘threat’ to the social order to a large ex-
tent a matter of political opinion. In recent years irregular migrants
have almost become a ‘public enemy’ in many countries of the Europe-
an Union. Television and newspaper images, such as those of irregular
migrants storming the barbwire fences of the Spanish enclave Ceuta in
2005, confirm both the image of irregular migrants desperate to reach
Europe’s shores as well as the image of Fortress Europe, a continent
desperate to keep them out. Especially since the 1990s, policy attention
for this category of immigrants has increased manifold, albeit with dis-
tinct differences in approach and intensity among the various EU
member states. National governments, especially in Northern Europe,
and the European Union have placed the fight against illegal immigra-
tion at the top of their political agenda.
Irregular migrants did not always have such a bad image in Western
Europe. Not so long ago, in the 1960s and 1970s, irregular immigra-
tion was seen as a ‘normal’ by-product of the guest worker schemes.
Many immigrants skipped the recruitment station, travelled on a tour-
ist visa to their chosen country of destination, sought and found work
and then applied for a work permit. In many labour-importing coun-
tries this was not an uncommon practice and the work permit was sel-
dom refused (Engbersen 1997; Sinn et al. 2005). The immigration of
guest workers was an important part of Europe’s post-war economic
growth through their contribution of scarce labour, especially in indus-
try. When the oil crisis and the restructuring of industry in Western
Europe echoed in the economic recession, the guest worker pro-
grammes were terminated throughout Europe. With the deterioration
of the economic climate, immigration passed from being a ‘solution’ to
becoming a ‘problem’ (Sciortino 2000). The problem was of course
that many of the ‘guests’ chose to stay and that immigration continued
through legal channels, such as asylum and family reunification and
formation, and through illegal entry. Against this background, irregular
immigrants gradually transformed from ‘adventurers’ into ‘vagabonds’
in the public and political eye (Bauman 1998).
Immigration policy since the 1970s, especially in the northern mem-
ber states of the EU, can be characterised by continuous attempts to
stop, curtail and limit legal and illegal immigration.2 At the same time,
the emerging scientific literature on immigration has pondered the
question of why it is so hard for liberal states to control migration pro-
cesses, pointing to the real and perceived inability of governments to
gain control over immigration (Cornelius et al. 2004; Castles 2004;
Joppke 1998; Sassen 1996). Despite strong rhetoric, hard political
choices and a plethora of new policy initiatives, immigration to Wes-
tern Europe increased steadily over those same years. This lack of pol-
icy results can’t be wholly ascribed to laxness or to politicians that failed
to put their money where their mouths are. Immigration policy has re-
ceived much political attention, has seen vast increases in funding and
staffing and has been at the centre of the cooperation in Justice and
Home Affairs,3 one of the most dynamic policy fields in the European
Union (Monar 2001; Mitsilegas et al. 2003; WRR 2003). The image of
a Fortress Europe was introduced – by those who oppose it – to de-
scribe a policy development aimed at keeping out legitimate and, espe-
cially, bogus asylum seekers, irregular immigrants and ‘unwanted’ im-
migrants overall. The external borders of the EU (including seaports
and airports) have been transformed into formidable boundaries. A sad
testimony to this development is the increase in migrant deaths along
certain parts of the Mediterranean borders (Carter & Merrill 2007;
Carling 2007). Borders have been strengthened with guards, watch-
towers, concrete walls and fences. They have also been equipped with
expensive state-of-the-art technology, such as infrared scanning devices,
motion detectors and video surveillance. Moreover, visa requirements
have been stepped up, and the visas themselves have been modernised,
becoming increasingly difficult to forge. And yet, despite funding and
political backing for the fight against illegal immigration and the
strengthening of borders and border control, the presence of irregular
migrants remains a fact of life for most EU countries.
1.2 Turning inwards: internal migration control
The gradual realisation that borders alone cannot halt irregular migra-
tion has led to a widening of the scope of immigration policy. Policy
moved away from the border to the international level, but it also turned
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inwards to the local level and the level of institutions (Guiraudon 2001;
Zolberg 2002; Lahav & Guiraudon 2006). States are now trying to shut
the doors to the welfare state as well as to work, housing, education and
other institutions of society. Access to public services has become an in-
strument of migration policy (Van der Leun 2003; Pluymen & Minder-
houd 2002). The central notion in the development of these policies on
irregular resident migrants is exclusion. Engbersen (2001: 242) suggests
that Fortress Europe may be turning into a Panopticon Europe:
in which not the guarding of physical borders is central, but far
more the guarding of public institutions and labour markets by
means of advanced identification and control systems. Panopticon
Europe guards the ‘system border’ of rich welfare states.
These policies of exclusion from work and welfare presuppose a gov-
ernment with a profound bureaucratic ‘grip’ on, and knowledge of, the
institutions of the welfare state and the legitimate or illegitimate use
thereof by irregular migrants. Information is a keyword in these inter-
nal exclusion policies. In more recent years, internal migration control
overall has become more and more closely linked with digital and tech-
nical surveillance. Within the blooming field of surveillance studies
there is an emergent group of researchers who combine insights from
the ‘surveillance literature’ with that from the literature of ‘migration
studies’ (for example Lyon 2007; Haggerty & Ericson 2006; Zureik &
Salter 2005; Caplan & Torpey 2001; Koslowski 2002; Torpey 2000).
These studies focus on different aspects of the relationship between
migration and surveillance (borders, identity documents, security) and
have different disciplinary backgrounds (history, law and social
sciences). However, most of these studies do not focus on the internal
migration control of irregular migrants (some exceptions are Vogel
2001 and Samers 2003) or only marginally deal with the issue. This
book will try to build on this new field of ‘migration surveillance’ both
theoretically and empirically.
Effective internal migration control implies that irregular migrants
have to be detected. The mist in which the presence of irregular mi-
grants is usually shrouded must be lifted in order to exert control. Sur-
veillance is thus linked with information and knowledge production.
Control systems depend on information to make society – in the words
of Scott (1990) – ‘legible’ so that the state can act and implement pol-
icy. In Engbersen’s Panopticon Europe it is enough for the gatekeepers
of the welfare state to know who does not belong. Controls of docu-
ments and government registers are routinely done to keep out those
who lack the proper documents and registrations. In this book it is ar-
gued that this logic of societal exclusion no longer suffices in the eyes
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of some European governments. These governments wish to take their
internal exclusion policies a crucial step further and are looking for
ways to make expulsion policies – the ultimate exclusion – more effec-
tive. Again, governments turn to modern systems of surveillance, but
this time not just to determine that someone ‘does not belong’, but to
determine who someone is. This is because expulsion is impossible to
execute without a correct and documented legal identity. The develop-
ment in which ‘older’ policies of societal and institutional exclusion of
irregular migrants are increasingly supplemented with policies aiming
to identify and expel irregular migrants is the core focus of this book.
To what extent do governments make this ‘turn’ in internal migration
policy, and what does it look like in day-to-day policy practice? These
two strands of internal migration control on irregular migrants, though
both focused on exclusion, make very different demands on the ways
governments organise their paper and digital surveillance systems. De-
nying access requires no other identification than a label of ‘not be-
longing’; expulsion requires full-fledged identification of the individual
and his background. For expulsion policies to be effective, the organisa-
tion of the state’s knowledge production will have to be thoroughly re-
organised. The story of the development of internal control on illegal
aliens should therefore be a story of organising and reorganising digi-
tal and human surveillance and the underlying ‘knowledge production’
that fuels the system of surveillance. In the current information age
where filing cabinets are rapidly replaced with searchable databases
and where technology simplifies interconnectivity and remote accessi-
bility, technological innovations will play a lead role.
1.3 Research questions: internal migration control at
crossroads?
The move towards internal migration control and the ongoing techno-
logical sophistication and use of surveillance systems in modern so-
ciety raise questions on how internal migration control will develop in
the future. How will West-European states organise the internal, do-
mestic counterpart of the ‘fight against illegal immigration’? External
migration control, both at the border and at the paper borders of visa
and passports, has seen the use of the latest technology to stay ahead
of immigrants and smuggling organisations that try to circumvent
states’ best efforts. Internal control will require increased surveillance
and surveillance powers and – if border policy is any indication – it is
likely that the rich welfare states found in the northwest of the EU, in
particular, will fund and use the latest technologies at their disposal.
While internal migration control is likely to display the latest
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development in its instruments and methodology, its goal is likely to
remain the same. Lyon (2004: 142) claims that surveillance, irrespec-
tive of new methods and technology, is always used for ‘social sorting’,
for the classification of populations as a precursor to differential treat-
ment. In the case of illegal aliens differential treatment will usually
amount to exclusion, which is the general underlying rationale of inter-
nal migration control. Internal surveillance of irregular migrants can,
however, take two forms: (1) an ‘established’ form of societal exclusion
and (2) a ‘new’ form focused on identification that ultimately leads to
expulsion, which is hypothesized to be on the horizon in certain EU
member states. Both require a different use of new surveillance tech-
nologies. Another likely factor of importance in the development of in-
ternal migration policy is the EU itself. In the case of external migra-
tion control, the EU and related cooperation schemes, such as the in-
tergovernmental Schengen agreements, were instrumental in the
development of new policy initiatives. Europeanisation was not only
important in the development of common EU policies, but also – and
perhaps especially – as a ‘policy laboratory’ where new concepts and in-
novations were developed for national implementation (Monar 2001).
As internal migration control develops at the national level in various
member states, it is most likely that some sort of counterpart will de-
velop at the level of the EU, either as a full-fledged EU policy or as a
supplementary and supporting framework and infrastructure. These
considerations lead to the formulation of the central research questions
for this study, which are as follows: How do national and EU-level poli-
cies of internal migration control aimed at the exclusion of irregular mi-
grants develop? Do states increasingly supplement more ‘established’ policies
of societal exclusion with policies of exclusion focused on identification and
expulsion? And what is the role of modern systems of information and sur-
veillance in the construction of these policies of exclusion and control?
1.4 Case selection: Germany and the Netherlands as ‘most
likely’ cases
This study will focus on two countries that can be regarded as ‘most
likely’ cases in view of the research questions. If we expect that internal
migration control on illegal aliens will grow and develop around ad-
vanced systems of information and control (surveillance) these coun-
tries should fit the profile best and first. To put it more bluntly: if inter-
nal surveillance of irregular immigrants doesn’t develop and evolve in
these countries, it is unlikely that it will surface in other EU member
states. The countries in this study are the Netherlands and Germany.
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These two countries constitute a most likely scenario because they
share a number of relevant characteristics, which are outlined below.
Firstly, they share a basic common political approach towards immi-
gration. Both countries do not wish to be seen as countries of immigra-
tion, have developed immigration policies geared to limiting or even
stopping immigration since the 1970s and face a popular opinion that
is by and large negative towards legal and illegal immigration. In re-
cent years, irregular immigration has become an important and politi-
cally sensitive topic. In their global comparison of immigration and im-
migration policies, Cornelius et al. (2004) group these countries to-
gether under the heading of ‘reluctant countries of immigration’. There
is, in other words, fertile political soil for the development of internal
migration control. Over the years, especially since the mid-1990s, their
immigration policies have become much stricter. Germany adopted
very strict asylum legislation after the ‘asylum compromise’ of 1993;
the Netherlands adopted stricter legislation in 1994 and, especially,
through the enactment of the Aliens Act 2000. Furthermore, during
the 1990s and 2000s, the legislation for family reunification and for-
mation was tuned up with new barriers and restrictions. Along the
way, the irregular migrant came to feature more and more in policy
documents and white papers. Irregular migration was an important is-
sue in the well-known German Su¨ssmuth report, while internal control
on irregular migrants became a spearhead in Dutch immigration pol-
icy in the early 2000s. Notwithstanding more recent political overtures
to attract highly skilled labour migrants, the general development of
immigration policy in these two countries is one of curtailing un-
wanted migration, both those who come through legal channels (asy-
lum, visa and family reunification and formation) as well as those who
come illegally.
A second common political feature is Germany and the Netherlands’
founding membership of both the EU and the Schengen group that ne-
gotiated the Schengen Agreement and Convention. In other words,
these countries share a long history of European political cooperation.
In general, this is seen in their EU membership, but also, more specifi-
cally, in matters of border control and immigration policy through the
multilateral negotiation of ‘Schengen’, related instruments such as the
Dublin Convention and, more recently, the Pru¨m treaty (already nick-
named ‘Schengen III’). The ‘fight against illegal migration’ has been
an important part of the Schengen cooperation and has featured at the
top of the EU’s agenda for Justice and Home Affairs for years now. Not
only does this breed a common understanding of certain cross-border
and supranational policy problems, it also provides a platform for poli-
ticians and bureaucrats to learn, discuss and copy each other’s policy
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innovations for domestic use (Guiraudon 2000; Monar 2001; Broeders
2009).
Germany and the Netherlands also share a number of economic fea-
tures that are relevant in relation to irregular migration. They can both
be characterised as advanced and affluent welfare states that are in
more or less permanent need of recalibrating and restructuring (Ferrera
& Hemerijck 2003; WRR 2006). In the debate on irregular migration
the welfare state often plays a key role. Popular belief often holds that
irregular migrants will ‘abuse’ the welfare state and its entitlements
and that this will undermine the sustainability of the system as a whole
in the long run. It is, however, doubtful that the availability of entitle-
ments is a powerful magnet for would-be unauthorised entrants them-
selves as compared to other demand pull factors (Cornelius et al. 2004;
WRR 2001). To irregular immigrants ‘the welfare state’ is probably
more an indication of general affluence and a certain level of social
stability, than a possible source of income. An economic characteristic
that is of greater importance to them is the size and structure of the in-
formal economy. For most irregular migrants it is this part of the econ-
omy where they hope to find employment. In Schneider and Ernste’s
overview of informal economies worldwide, the Netherlands and
Germany are grouped together. They estimate that the shadow econo-
my in these countries adds up to somewhere between 13 and 16 per
cent of GNP (Schneider & Ernste 2000: 81). According to Sciortino
(2004: 37), the degree to which states allow – or cannot avoid – the de-
velopment of a robust informal economy, is the main factor that makes
irregular migration and residence possible and feasible. The size of the
irregular migrant population in both countries is, for obvious reasons,
difficult to ascertain. In the Netherlands, counting the uncountable has
some degree of scientific sophistication. Various estimates based on dif-
ferent models and approaches put the number of irregular migrants in
the Netherlands somewhere between 46,000 and 116,000, according
to the Central Bureau of Statistics (Hoogteijling 2002: 49). Engbersen
et al. (2002: 62) put their number anywhere between 47,000 and
7,000 when counting the irregular migrant population excluding irreg-
ular Europeans, and between 112,000 and 163,000 including European
irregular migrants. For Germany, there are no scientific estimates of
the irregular migrant population available. Various ‘guestimates’ put
the irregular migrant population anywhere between an absolute bottom
of 100,000 (based on the police statistics for suspects with irregular re-
sidence) up to one million migrants with irregular residence (Kreien-
brink & Sinn 2006: 27).
A fourth common feature is the size and level of professionalism of
the countries’ respective bureaucracies. Both have a sizable, profes-
sional bureaucracy in which corruption does not play a major role. The
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government has a certain grip on the major institutions of society
(such as the labour market, education, welfare state provision, etc.)
through a dense system of regulations, controls and oversight. Public
provisions are, as a rule, only accessible through bureaucratic proce-
dures that require individuals to identify themselves with legal docu-
ments or detailed registrations and involve routine cross-checking be-
tween various public and semi-public authorities, making policies of
societal and institutional exclusion a realistic option (Vogel 2001; Van
der Leun 2003). They are also modern bureaucracies, in the sense that
computerisation and the use of other new technologies are considered
important parts of the working process. This goes for the use of data
systems and ICT in public services to facilitate the interaction between
governments and citizens, but also for the use of modern technology
and data systems for the ‘coercive’ parts of the state apparatus, such as
the police, intelligence agencies and, increasingly, the authorities deal-
ing with immigration issues.
These four characteristics make Germany and the Netherlands most
likely cases for the expected developments outlined above. To state the
obvious: these are of course selected similarities and common features
at a high level of abstraction. If one were to look below this level of
comparison, or were to emphasise other, more divergent, characteris-
tics, it would be possible to draw another picture. One could, for exam-
ple, draw on the literature on bureaucratic styles and traditions that
awards a different label to the countries in this study. In this typology,
Germany is considered legalistic and the Netherlands, pragmatic (cf.
Van Waarden 1999: 339). Also, the polities vary considerably. The Ger-
man Federal structure in which the La¨nder have much legislative
autonomy contrasts with the Dutch decentralised unitary state that
combines centralism with some autonomy and quite some discretion-
ary power for lower levels of government, most notably the municipal
level. These differences are real and may produce different outcomes,
even when the intent of policy is the same (Scharpf 2000). Through-
out the study, differences such as these play a role, a significant one in
some instances. Wherever this is the case, such a role will be dis-
cussed, though emphasis remains on the broader question of changes
within policy development and its implementation. Though differences
like these may provide interesting explanations for some of the find-
ings, it is the general direction of the policy development that is the
subject of this study. At this general level, the shared characteristics de-
scribed above constitute a most likely setting for the expected
developments.
Choosing a selection of most likely cases means choosing for the
homogenisation of the sample of countries on key aspects considered
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important for the development of surveillance and internal control on
irregular migrants. It would also have been possible to choose contrast-
ing cases – i.e. a ‘most different’ system design – instead of selecting
countries on the basis of their shared characteristics. A more varied
spread of cases might have included a Nordic or a Mediterranean coun-
try. A country such as Italy, with a large population of irregular immi-
grants, a tradition of periodic regularisations and a bureaucracy with a
looser grip on a more ‘informal’ society and economy, would provide a
contrasting yet hardly interesting case. It would be a ‘least likely case’,
a country that would not provide much insight into the buildup of in-
ternal surveillance. The primary reason for not choosing a ‘most differ-
ent’ approach is that the developments under scrutiny are relatively
new. Both the political sense of urgency on the issue of illegally resi-
dent immigrants and the technical possibilities to implement internal
surveillance on a grand scale with modern means are fairly recent. The
history of control of immigration and asylum in Europe has shown
that the two countries included in this study have usually been at the
forefront of policy development, while countries such as Italy (or
Spain, Portugal and Greece, for that matter) trail at a distance and/or
often have a different outlook and interests. For one thing, these coun-
tries have only recently shifted from being countries of emigration to
countries of immigration (Cornelius et al. 2004). The aim of the study
is to see whether a structure of surveillance of irregular migrants is
emerging and developing. Research on Italy is likely to reveal that this
is not – or is only very recently – the case. Even though the new Berlus-
coni government enacts strict anti-irregular immigration policies, these
policies are unlikely to display much use of sophisticated surveillance
technology in the internal migration control on irregular migrants. A
Mediterranean case would not add much to the knowledge on the
structure and potentialities of the digital surveillance of irregular mi-
grants, nor would it mean that it is not being developed in other mem-
ber states of the EU. Obviously, Germany and the Netherlands are not
the only countries that are likely to display the signs of this develop-
ment. Other, equally interesting cases could have been selected, such
as Denmark, France or Sweden. Pragmatic reasons such as the state of
research on the issue of irregular migration in other countries have led
to a restriction to the Dutch and German cases. Germany and the
Netherlands are seen as ‘representatives’ of a number of countries that
are most likely to provide insight in the development, use, potential
and imperfections of internal surveillance of irregular migrants.
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1.5 Outline of the study
The political and legal developments in the internal migration control
on irregular migrants will be analysed in the Netherlands and Ger-
many in two broadly defined ‘policy sectors’: that of ‘guarding the ac-
cess to the labour market’ and that of ‘police surveillance, detention
and expulsion’. The developments in the EU’s ‘fight on illegal migra-
tion’ will also be analysed, focusing on those developments that are of
value to Dutch and German domestic policies of internal migration
control. The analysis will deal with both policymaking and the imple-
mentation of policy by executive bodies of the state. The selection of
the ‘policy domains’ is based on highlighting the importance of knowl-
edge production and identification in the development of policy aimed
at controlling irregular immigrants. They are what might be called pan-
opticon sectors par excellence. The buildup of a system of information
and control on irregular migrants aiming at their exclusion will most
likely manifest itself first in these domains. They are also policies that
highlight the state as a coercive actor. The central questions of this
book are about the development of control. Though control may take
many forms, the prime interest here is in the policies the state devel-
ops in taking an active and forcible control of migration processes.
Considering that irregular migrants usually have taken great pains to
reach the countries of the EU and are therefore not easily persuaded to
leave, this usually means forcible exclusion and forcible removal. This
emphasis on the coercive side of the state is also in line with a growing
literature that maintains that the nation state seeks to reassert itself
through control policies in a time when globalisation challenges its
dominant position (see for example Schinkel 2009; Wacquant 2009;
Bauman 2004; Lyon 2003). The ‘penal state’, the ‘security state’ and
the ‘surveillance state’ all point in the direction of states trying to gain
control over processes and populations that are volatile and unpredict-
able. In the migration literature ‘control’ is a general theme. And as
will be analysed in the following chapters the ‘migration control state’
owes a lot of its policy ideas and instruments to developments in secur-
ity, the penal system and the ‘surveillance state’ – and vice versa.
1.5.1 Chapters
Chapter two outlines the general theoretical framework of this study. It
combines insights from the migration control literature with those of
surveillance studies, especially the ‘branches’ that deal with state sur-
veillance and the surveillance of mobility. In this chapter a vital distinc-
tion is made between two essentially contradictory logics of exclusion
that emphasise a different use of registration and identification
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systems. The first logic of exclusion relates to societal and institutional
exclusion, meaning that documentation and registration are only used
to determine ‘belonging’ and thus access or, in the case of irregular mi-
grants, denial of access. The second logic of exclusion relates to the ul-
timate aim of expulsion and requires documentation and registration
systems that are able to identify individual irregular migrants in order
to make expulsion possible. The term ‘logic’ refers not only to a politi-
cal policy choice, but also to an organisational and operational logic
that derives from it. The radically different demands these logics ask of
bureaucratic organisation, digital surveillance and surveillance, in gen-
eral, weave a central thread through the empirical chapters. The gener-
al question of whether Germany and the Netherlands are shifting to-
wards an internal migration policy in which societal exclusion policies
are increasingly supplemented with policies of identification and expul-
sion is inextricably entwined with the question of whether their bu-
reaucracies and their digital infrastructure are able to instrumentalise
the second logic of exclusion. In the empirical chapters that follow the
general theoretical framework of chapter two will be supplemented and
combined with theoretical insights that are more directly related to the
specific subject that is dealt with in the empirical chapters. Additional
insights from the fields of political economy, criminology and EU stu-
dies will be used, respectively, in the chapters on the labour market,
‘police surveillance, detention and expulsion’ and on EU developments.
Chapter three deals with the issue of guarding access to the labour
market. Generally, irregular migrants are trying to better their lives
and the main method to do this is through work. Exclusion from the
labour market, both formal and informal, is therefore a prime target in
any policy trying to discourage irregular settlement. Erecting paper
walls around the labour market, through all sorts of work permits and
identification requirements, has been going on for quite some years.
Elaborate networks of (often interconnected) registers and databases
have been set up in Germany to close off the labour market to irregular
migrants (see for example Vogel 2001). The fact that the labour market
is traditionally densely regulated and documented, combined with the
growing emphasis Western governments have placed on shielding it
off to irregular migrants, leads to the expectation that it becomes a
workshop for new systems of information gathering and knowledge
production. The question remains: is this traditional site of the societal
and institutional exclusion of irregular migrants also turning towards
the second logic of exclusion aimed at identification and expulsion?
Chapter four focuses on a chain of government agencies that consti-
tutes the core of the coercive state when it comes to internal migration
control: the police, the detention system and the immigration authori-
ties responsible for expulsion. Police surveillance is the day-to-day
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control on irregular residence. The apprehension of irregular migrants
is perhaps the most elementary form of organising internal migration
control. Residing illegally is not permitted – and in some countries a
criminal offence – and control seems to be intensifying. Compulsory
identification (carrying of identity cards), though not always introduced
within the framework of the fight against illegal immigration, is
spreading through Europe and is making internal control easier. All
police work is based on accumulating, accessing and exchanging infor-
mation, and internal migration control is no different. However, popu-
lar and political demand on the police is high across the board. For sur-
veillance of irregular migrants to be effective, the issue has be politi-
cally prioritised and backed by resources. The detention system is
dependent on the police for the ‘supply’ of irregular migrants and de-
pends on police and immigration authorities to provide the necessary
identification and documentation to release irregular detainees into ex-
pulsion. Without identification, expulsion is impossible; this makes
new methods, systems and procedures to obtain this information vital
for this ultimate mechanism of internal migration control. The second
logic of exclusion then requires the detention system to function as a
‘factory of identification’. The question thus is: if and to what extent
can the Dutch and German detention systems fulfil this role?
Chapter five focuses on the contribution of European schemes, poli-
cies and instruments to the domestic policies of internal migration
control in the Netherlands and Germany. In a unified Europe, internal
migration control means that national states also have to turn to the
European level to construct the tools necessary for their policies of ex-
clusion. Joint policies on return and the use of the EU’s political
weight to put pressure on countries of origin reluctant to take back
their own citizens are part of this strategy, but the main European con-
tribution is through the provision of new instruments of digital surveil-
lance. The member states of the EU are currently developing a network
of databases in the field of immigration. The Schengen Information
System (II), the EURODAC database and the Visa Information System
are vast databases, often including biometric data, aimed at controlling
migration flows and identifying and sorting legal and irregular mi-
grants. These systems are able to ‘re-identify’ parts of the population of
irregular migrants on the basis of digital traces of their migration his-
tory and are therefore a major – and growing – contribution to the ef-
forts of those member states developing surveillance systems that are
operating, in particular, under the second logic of exclusion. The new
digital borders of the EU are, in a very real sense, legal external borders
that are patrolled at the national level.
Chapter six will conclude and reflect on the findings of the research
and will answer the research questions.
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1.5.2 A note on data and statistics
Like most studies, this book builds on the work of numerous scholars
who have researched various aspects of migration – regular and irregu-
lar – government policy and surveillance. Again, like most studies
though, this book could not be pieced together on the basis of existing
scientific studies; sources thus also include ‘grey’ literature, studies
conducted by NGOs and studies commissioned by government agen-
cies and ministries. Interviews with policymakers and officials of the
various Dutch and German government agencies enforcing policies of
internal migration control would have been a valuable contribution to
this book but proved difficult to incorporate into the research design.
The wide scope and number of the agencies involved, problems of ac-
cessibility and willingness to cooperate and Germany’s division of la-
bour between the federal authorities and the authorities of the La¨nder
made it problematic to get an even handed set of interviews within the
timeframe available for this research project. Though this is unfortu-
nate, the material that was available did allow me to document the
changes and developments in Dutch and German policies that I set
out to research in a convincing manner. In the empirical chapters the
various ‘types’ of sources are clearly indicated in the text and refer-
ences. Seeing as policy development is the prime interest of this study,
the information and data that the Dutch and German government pro-
vide often comes into play, particularly when the scientific literature
does not offer a ‘peer-reviewed’ source. Therefore, in terms of data and
statistics, this study relies for a large part on the data that government
agencies make available to the public. That means that the statistics
used should be handled with care and a good degree of ‘healthy suspi-
cion’. Care and suspicion are warranted because government statistics
always also serve political priorities and are meant to justify political
programmes and the policy alternatives that were chosen. However,
considering the general accountability of the Dutch and German bu-
reaucracies there is also no need to view government statistics in the
light of Winston Churchill’s dictum that he ‘only believes the statistics
that he forged himself’. In addition to a healthy suspicion of the offi-
cial statistics, it should be realised that this study tries to ascertain pol-
icy developments in internal migration control, which has a target po-
pulation of ‘uncountable’ irregular migrants. Given the government-
supplied data and the elusive target population of the policies analysed,
allowance must be made for some degree of shadow dancing. Conclu-
sions in this study will therefore not reach the level of certainties (an
odd scientific claim to begin with) or claim to have settled matters once
and for all. The material allows for the analysis of trends, shifts in pol-
icy thinking and the implementation thereof. It can comment on the
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direction the ship of state is moving in, but ultimately not on the ‘effec-
tiveness’ of policies. The data simply come with too many restrictions.
So, it is not just governments that have to make ends meet. When it
comes to sources and data, researchers also have to make choices un-
der the restriction of available information. However, in light of the
central theme of this book, we should perhaps also be glad with some
of the research material’s limitations. A brave new world that has gov-
ernment data on all aspects of social life is not necessarily a society in
which free research thrives.
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2 The state, surveillance and irregular migrants:
theoretical perspectives
2.1 Introduction
‘The border is everywhere,’ wrote Lyon in 2005. We are accustomed to
think of the border in terms of territorial lines dividing the world into
countries. While these traditional territorial lines originate in politico-
legal international agreements (often codifying the outcomes of war
and civil strife), they have also been translated into legal documentary
requirements, which, in turn have been translated into prerequisites
for rights, obligations and entitlements for those ‘belonging’ to a speci-
fic side of those ‘territorial’ lines. In other words, the border has been
translated into a myriad of smaller belongings and memberships that
in everyday life determine rights and limitations. And if the border is
everywhere, than logic dictates that it can also crossed – legally and il-
legally – everywhere.
Over the years, many authors have debated the changing nature of
the border and its significance for migration control. In paragraph 2.2
these debates are analysed along the lines of a number of often used
metaphors. The metaphor of Fortress Europe, coined by those who op-
pose it, draws attention to border and migration policies by the EU and
its member states to guard Europe against unwanted immigrants. The
metaphor of the panopticon has been used to describe the shift to in-
ternal control on irregular migrants and to stress the importance of
surveillance. The debate now seems to be in a post-panoptic phase, in
which the ‘surveillance state’ is a central theme. Paragraph 2.3 analyses
the development of the surveillance state and its growing link with the
development of internal migration control on irregular migrants. Para-
graph 2.4 describes the limits of the state surveillance. Some limita-
tions are part of the realm of the state itself – such as legal restrictions
– while others are the result of strategic behaviour of irregular mi-
grants and illegitimate organisations that frustrate the state’s efforts,
sometimes with minimal resources. Paragraph 2.5 sums up the central
expectations that result from this theoretical chapter for the analysis of
the empirical material in the chapters that follow.
2.2 The changing nature of European borders: a story in
metaphors
Many have observed that Western states in recent decades have not
been able to stop unwanted immigration in spite of the outspoken poli-
tical wish to do just that. The widespread declaration of ‘zero-immigra-
tion’ policies by West-European governments, after the termination of
the guest worker programmes, went hand in hand with rising num-
bers of immigrants through the channels of asylum, family reunifica-
tion and family formation. The problems that these channels of legal
entry posed for these ‘reluctant countries of immigration’ were supple-
mented with the rise of illegal immigration and other methods result-
ing in illegal residence, such as overstaying on legal tourist visa (Corne-
lius et al. 2004). The fact that liberal states of the West have been see-
mingly unsuccessful, for the most part, in stopping unwanted
immigration has spurred public and academic debates on the question
of whether or not states have ‘lost control’ on immigration (see for ex-
ample Sassen 1996; Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Joppke 1998, 1999;
Freeman 1998; Lahav & Guiraudon 2000; Guiraudon 2001; Cornelius
et al. 2004). Some saw the era of the nation state and ‘hard’ national
borders drawing to a close as a result of globalisation. This pressure on
the nation state results either from economic globalisation (a free flow
of goods and capital will be followed by at least some degree of free
movement of people) or from an emerging global legal culture of
human rights that awards rights to individuals irrespective of state
membership. Others questioned the notion of lost control, pointing to
the increased capacity and resources being directed at the issue of im-
migration and immigration control. From a more historical perspec-
tive, it was put forward that the absolute physical control of frontiers
by states was always a myth and will remain so (Anderson & Bigo
2002; Andreas 2000).
Though the debate is by no means closed, there does seem to be
broad agreement on the notion that immigration and immigration pol-
itics have shifted from the realms of ‘low’ politics to that of ‘high’ poli-
tics. Definitions of security and security threats in relation to borders
have significantly shifted. Borders have become less about fighting
wars and more about fighting crime as well as new security threats
such as terrorism and irregular immigration (Andreas 2000; Bigo
2000). Immigration control has reached the top of the political agenda
and the public unease in Western Europe fuels the resolve of politi-
cians to dedicate more manpower and resources to the agencies in-
volved. Germany and the Netherlands, having been at the forefront of
‘policy innovations’ in both national and European migration control,
are a case in point. Meanwhile the border itself is changing. The
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border as a concept and the practical organisation of the border are
transforming in response to the many – and sometimes – conflicting
challenges of economic globalisation, international migration and Eu-
ropeanisation. In Europe, the development of the border has often
been captured in metaphors, starting with the vivid image of a Fortress
Europe that was coined by those who opposed the ‘closing of Europe’.
Needless to say, one metaphor for all of the European Union clouds re-
levant differences between its member states, such as the north-south
divide that is especially relevant in matters of immigration. Nonethe-
less, metaphors can quickly take us through the border’s development
and its changing nature and location as well as lead us to the central
role that surveillance plays in managing present-day migration, wanted
or not. These metaphors are of course also ‘programmatic’. They point
to the essence of the ‘policy paradigm’ that is in operation at a particu-
lar time and haunts the minds of politicians and policymakers. As
such, they might be seen as a ‘policy frame’. Rein and Scho¨n (1993:
146) described framing as ‘(…) a way of selecting, organizing, interpret-
ing, and making sense of a complex reality to provide guide posts for
knowing, analyzing, persuading and acting’. Specific frames and meta-
phors highlight certain parts of the policy problems at hand and thus
produce fast tracks to certain policy solutions. Conversely, they also un-
dervalue and stray attention away from other options, as the following
metaphoric ‘history’ of European migration control illustrates.
2.2.1 Fortress Europe
The metaphor of Fortress Europe has often been used to describe the
development of immigration and border policies at the level of mem-
ber states and, subsequently, of the EU itself. This rather grim meta-
phor draws attention to the fact that borders and immigration policy
have become a line of defence against immigrants who are perceived
to be laying siege to the fortress. Since the late 1980s, national policies
for immigration and asylum have developed along the rationale of de-
nying, or at the very least, limiting access for most immigrants. The in-
vitation policies and guest worker programmes were over and immi-
gration should have grinded to a halt. When it didn’t, public and politi-
cal opinion of immigration and immigrants began to change. Against
a background of rising unemployment, restructuring of welfare states
and a continuous high level of immigration, public opinion and main-
stream politics began to perceive immigrants by and large as uninvited
and unwanted. From the mid-1980s and all through the 1990s, asylum
migration dominated public sentiment and immigration policy in Eu-
rope. Northern EU member states in particular had enormous political
and administrative difficulties coping with the large numbers of
THE STATE, SURVEILLANCE AND IRREGULAR MIGRANTS 29
refugees. Germany even functioned as Europe’s ‘magnet’ with the
number of asylum applications peaking at the staggering number of
418,191 applications in 1992 (Broeders 2004). The image of asylum
seekers gradually changed from politically persecuted and help-deser-
ving individuals to ‘floods of bogus-asylum seekers’, from which a few
‘deserving genuine’ refugees could be filtered – at great costs. In the
late 1990s, irregular immigrants became a new prime category of un-
wanted immigrants. As the number of irregular immigrants rose, the
‘fight’ against irregular immigration was also stepped up. In the pro-
cess, immigrants coming to Western Europe for economic reasons,
such as ‘bogus asylum seekers’ and irregular migrants, became cate-
gorised as ‘enemies of the state’ (Engbersen 1996; Schinkel 2005).
The development of immigration policy at the level of the EU fol-
lowed suit. As the issue of borders is intimately tied up with national
sovereignty, the member states were very reluctant to yield control to
the institutions of the EU in matters of immigration and border con-
trol. ‘Common policies’ were developed in the intergovernmental third
pillar of the EU, and some major initiatives, such as the Schengen
agreements, were negotiated outside the framework of the EU alto-
gether. The political sensitivity of immigration and asylum in Europe
was one of the reasons that development of EU policies in this area –
Justice and Home Affairs – became firmly embedded in a discourse of
safety and security (Kostakoupoulou 1998; Peers 2000; Mitsilegas,
Monar & Rees 2003). National sensitivities about sovereignty and se-
crecy did not, however, add up to disagreement about finding new ways
to close the borders, improve control and harmonise visa policy. Visa
policy was essential for controlling access to an internally borderless
Schengen zone. The construction of ‘the fortress’ took off in earnest
during the 1990s. Physically, the dropping of internal borders between
the Schengen member states led to the reinforcement of the new joint
external borders. Gates, concrete, fences and watchtowers are the most
visible icons of the fortress. Some parts of the border and certain noto-
rious backdoor entry points to the EU, such as the Spanish enclaves
Ceuta and Melilla on the coast of Morocco, have been turned into for-
tresses in a most literal sense (Broeders 2002) and now look like mili-
tary strongholds. This is not just a European phenomenon. Parts of the
border between the United States and Mexico have undergone a simi-
lar transformation under militaristic slogans such as ‘Operation Gate-
keeper’, ‘Operation Hold-the-Line’ and ‘Operation Hard Line’ (Andreas
2000). However, both the European border and the US-Mexico border
are simply too long to control – let alone seal off. For example, Ger-
many shared an external Schengen border with Poland (454 km) and
with the Czech Republic (810 km) that even the generously staffed
Bundesgrenzschutz could not patrol effectively and/or continuously
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(Asbeek Brusse & Griffiths 2004). Since 21 December 2007, Germa-
ny’s neighbours to the east are full-fledged Schengen members, mean-
ing that the burden of external control shifted to them with new and
even longer external Schengen borders in the east. Due to the long bor-
ders, Fortress Europe is not all steel and concrete. In the modern age,
immigration control has widened. Border control is ‘moving away from
the border and outside the state’ (Lahav & Guiraudon 2000), or is be-
coming ‘remote control’ (Zolberg 2002) or is moving ‘upwards, down-
wards and outwards’ (Guiraudon 2001). Classical border control, char-
acterised by gates and guards, is changing as Anderson and Bigo
(2002: 19) describe it:
The control of movement of persons is changing – the Member
State borders are less and less important. The control of move-
ment begins in the country of origin, at the consulate for people
coming from most countries in the world, it continues at the point
of departure with travel agents and airlines, subject to carrier liabi-
lity, exercising controls on travellers’ documentation and, for sur-
face travellers at the land borders of the EU neighbouring coun-
tries who will not admit them if they suspect they intend to at-
tempt to enter the EU without proper documents. People arrive at
the EU borders in large numbers, but many have already been de-
terred or prevented from reaching them. At the external EU bor-
der, if undocumented or suspect persons arrive by air, they will be
held in an international zone of airports and entry to the EU is
very difficult. By contrast, the external land borders of the EU are
relatively easy to cross. The requirements of the market economy
and the necessity of rapid circulation of goods explain why the
government does not go too far ‘sealing’ off the borders in a way
that would prevent undocumented immigration.
In other words, territorial borders are, in spite of huge investments,
still permeable borders. One reason for this is that borders have a dou-
ble function. The smooth functioning of the modern economy requires
an easy passage for some people and goods. Businessmen and cargo
should pass the border with minimum delay. On the flipside, the bor-
der is meant to filter out contraband, terrorists and irregular migrants.
Border officials thus face the challenge of restricting irregular border
crossings while facilitating and encouraging the rising volume of legal
crossings. They have to filter out the ‘undesirable’ from the ‘desirable’
crossings (Andreas 2003) and they must be quick about it. In his work
on globalisation, Bauman (1998) saw a new border developing between
the first world and (a new) second world. This new border divides the
global population into: ‘tourists and vagabonds’ and ‘globals and locals’.
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In other words, international mobility may be part and parcel of what
we call globalisation, but it is the privilege of the few. Guiraudon and
Joppke (2001) call this the paradoxical union of ‘open’ economies and
‘closed’ national states in the age of globalisation. Another reason for
the permeability of the border is a matter of capacity. There is simply
too much border in relation to the capacity the state can muster to
guard it. The fact that a totally ‘sealed’ border is neither possible, nor
politically and economically, desirable has led to a new shift in policy
to counter irregular migration.
2.2.2 Panopticon Europe
In recent years, policies to counter irregular migration have increas-
ingly turned inwards. Border controls remain important, but, in light
of their ‘structural flaws’, have to be supplemented with policies of dis-
couraging those unwanted aliens who pass the border. The goal of dis-
couraging irregular migrants has led to a shift towards internal migra-
tion control, which comprises a wide array of policy measures such as
employer sanctions, amnesties, exclusion from public services and sur-
veillance by the police (Van der Leun 2003; Cornelius et al. 2004). Im-
migration policy is usually equated with the territorial dimension of
the state, but internal migration control reminds us that states are at
once territorial and membership associations. When it comes to internal
migration control, these two interrelated dimensions pose different
challenges for the state, as Torpey (2000: 33) describes:
The first dimension, territorial access, chiefly raises questions
about the capacity of states to identify citizens, distinguish them
from non-citizens, and regulate their movement in keeping with
policy objectives. The second dimension, establishment, concerns
the extent to which states may be able to exclude noncitizens from
opportunities for work, social services, or simply unperturbed exis-
tence once they have already entered the territory.
In the future, internal borders may become even more important than
state borders, than is already the case. Engbersen (2001: 242) suggests
that Fortress Europe may be turning into a Panopticon Europe
in which not the guarding of physical borders is central, but far
more the guarding of public institutions and labour markets by
means of advanced identification and control systems. Panopticon
Europe guards the ‘system border’ of rich welfare states.
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The Dutch Linking Act that entered into force in 1998 is perhaps the
quintessential example of panoptic shielding of the welfare state. This
act makes the entitlement of immigrants to a whole range of public
and semi-public provisions such as social benefits, health care, housing
and education systematically conditional on having a regular residence
status (Bernini & Engbersen 1996; Van der Leun 2003: 115).
The metaphor of the panopticon comes from the work of Foucault
(1995, org. 1977), who borrowed the term from Bentham’s design for a
prison. Bentham’s panoptic prison design, in which individual prison-
ers could be seen at all times by a centrally located guard who was invi-
sible to them, has become a dramatic symbol for the modern society in
which surveillance plays such an important role. The panopticon has
become a central metaphor in the literature on surveillance, which
deals with all sorts of gathering of personal information for analysis
and the exertion of control. When it comes to surveillance by the state
the gathering of information on citizens and their behaviour is seen as
a constitutive element of the power of the state over its subjects. Fou-
cault’s emphasis on the intimate connection between power and
knowledge and on the crucial importance of individual surveillance in
modern administrative systems has proven enormously suggestive
(Torpey 1998: 248; see also Dandeker 1990). According to Foucault’s
theory, the constant surveillance and visibility in the panoptic prison
are meant to do more than just control the inmates. The ultimate aim
is to discipline the individual under surveillance. The idea is that pris-
oners under a perpetually watchful eye will experience a process of dis-
ciplining in which they lose the opportunity, capacity and will to
deviate:
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate
a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the auto-
matic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveil-
lance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its
action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its ac-
tual exercise unnecessary… (Foucault 1995, org. 1977: 201)
In other words, the operation of power should become cheaper, easier
and more effective as the inmates ‘internalize the gaze’ of power
(Gilliom 2001: 130). The exclusion of irregular migrants through pan-
opticism will be less precise as it is bound to the much more ‘fleeting’
institutions of the welfare state, instead of spatially confined institu-
tions such as the prison and the school. The aim is to sift out anyone
who lacks the proper documentation. Being undocumented bars access
to public institutions and services and the underlying policy
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assumption is that this exclusion will discourage irregular migrants
from lengthening their stay.
Many researchers have taken the panopticon metaphor out of the
realm of the prison and used it to describe other policies in which the
state tries to control and influence social behaviour. The modern wel-
fare state, and the control on its beneficiaries, has been compared to a
panopticon (see for example Gilliom 2003), as has the introduction of
cameras in public places for the purpose of public surveillance (see for
example Yar 2003). In all cases, information is gathered with the inten-
tion to improve control. Information serves as a power base for the
state. In the modern state, information and communication technology
plays an important role in widening the possibilities to document, codi-
fy and store information on the activities of subjects and citizens.
2.2.3 Migration control in a ‘state of surveillance’
In the recent academic literature on surveillance there is a debate on
the loosening of bonds between the panoptic metaphor and the study of
surveillance. Within the broader field of surveillance studies, the pan-
optic metaphor has been questioned on many accounts (see for example
Boyne 2000; Haggerty & Ericson 2000; Yar 2003; Lyon 2007). In rela-
tion to the question of internal migration control on irregular migrants,
the metaphor comes under strain on three specific counts: (1) the ob-
jects of surveillance are mobile and not bound to classical panoptic in-
stitutions, (2) surveillance is used for social sorting, rather than control-
ling the ‘socially sorted’ and (3) the aim of surveillance is exclusion
rather than correction.
Firstly, as Bauman (1998) indicated, international mobility is one of
the key defining characteristics of globalisation. For the elite it is a pri-
vilege, bordering on an obligation. The ‘vagabond’, by contrast, hopes
to achieve his international mobility despite the policies that the richer
countries implement to prevent it. The element of mobility doesn’t sit
well with the institutional emphasis in Foucault’s panopticon. Instead
of closed institutions such prisons, factories, schools and hospitals in
which people are ‘kept’ under a watchful eye, surveillance is now
aimed at moving populations. This requires a control on populations
rather than on territories or populations in a fixed location. Territorial
and institutional borders will have to be supplemented with a more ‘li-
quid’ border that is able to trace and survey the immigrant population.
The power derived from panoptic surveillance has become increasingly
extraterritorial and is no longer necessarily fixed to a place (Bauman
2000; Deleuze 2002; Bigo & Guild 2005). This does not mean that
the institutional context has become irrelevant for the surveillance of
unwanted immigrants. Far from it. Considering the fact that
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undocumented immigrants try to hide and submerge in Western Euro-
pean societies, it is institutions, such as the labour market, social secur-
ity and health care institutions, where they emerge and may become
visible to the state. Mostly, irregular migrants come into contact with
these institutions on a temporary basis as contact with official institu-
tions and public officials is preferably shunned. Their ‘close encounters
with the welfare state’ (Van der Leun 2003: 115) differ from the fixed lo-
calities and fixed populations of the panopticon. So the locus of control
has become less predictable and has to follow the movements of the
population under surveillance.
Secondly, surveillance of populations is primarily aimed at social
sorting, defined by Lyon (2004: 142) as the classification of populations
as a precursor to differential treatment. The population is therefore not
a priori known and classified, as is the case in a prison or school. A
prison or a school, one might say, starts with a sorted population of
prisoners and students. Bigo introduced the alternative metaphor of
the ‘Ban-opticon’ noting that
(…) the social practices of surveillance and control sort out, filter
and serialize who needs to be controlled and who is free from that
control, because he is ‘normalized’. It is more a Ban than a Pan-
opticon. (Bigo & Guild 2005: 3; Bigo 2004)
In other words, surveillance aims to divide the mainstream of the mo-
bile population into separate subpopulations, which are to be treated
differently. The Dutch and German asylum procedures are prime ex-
amples of the art of subdivision. These procedures have made various
subdivisions within the broad category of eligible refugees, meaning
those applicants who cannot be sent away due to humanitarian rea-
sons. Most of those who are not refused protection are channelled to-
wards some form of temporary and auxiliary status with fewer legal
rights than the UN refugee status. This means that most of them lack
the strong rights of the refugee status, leaving the option of return at a
later point in time open. Scanning and selecting certain groups from
within the masses is a different function than the panoptic control of a
selected and classified group. Gary Marx (2005: 13) points out how
many forms of surveillance can be usefully viewed as techniques
of boundary maintenance. Surveillance serves to sustain borders
through defining the grounds for exclusion and inclusion –
whether to physical places, opportunities or moral categories.
Thirdly, panoptic surveillance in Europe of undocumented, or more
generally unwanted, migrants has made exclusion an explicit policy
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objective. The system under construction is meant to gain knowledge
of the actions and movements of irregular migrants, but not with the
ultimate aim of structuring and moulding their behaviour in line with
socially accepted standards – defined by the state – as the panopticon
does. The aim is not to get them in line, but to get them out. The ele-
ment of correction, of the ‘internalisation of the gaze’, is not a central
element of the panopticon that the member states of the EU are con-
structing.4 Engbersen (2001), borrowing from Bauman’s analysis of
modern American prisons, claims that the aim is not correction, but
exclusion.
Panopticon Europe is not a ‘factory of correction’. Its aim is not
disciplining and correcting undesirable migrants. Panopticon Eu-
rope is designed as a ‘factory of exclusion and of people habituated
to their status of the excluded’. (Engbersen 2001: 242)
In other words, the state gathers information on the doings and where-
abouts of irregular immigrants with the explicit aim to exclude them
from both its territorial and membership associations. Post-panopti-
cism then brings us to the realm of the surveillance state. The interac-
tion between the advent of the surveillance state and the internal migra-
tion control on irregular migrants will be discussed in paragraph 2.3.
2.2.4 Metaphors on power and the power of metaphors
Even though metaphors are useful analytical concepts they are not
without flaws or drawbacks. They structure our view of the world by
highlighting certain elements of a phenomenon and omitting what can
be ‘left out’ of the picture. The images they invoke are meant to con-
vince but should also encourage reflection. They should be an invita-
tion to reflect on the core characteristics of the phenomenon that is
captured by the metaphor. However, they also run the risk of becoming
cliche´s: weak metaphors that no longer invoke reflection but, rather,
reflexes (Witteveen 2000: 43). Or phrased even stronger: ‘cliche´s can
be easily consumed because they do not require cognitive reflection’
(Zijderveld 1979: 12). However, the fact that they no longer invoke re-
flection does not mean that cliche´s do not have a social function. They
are important in structuring social behaviour but, as Zijderveld (1979)
puts it, their meaning has been superseded by function. Powerful
images such as the fortress and the panopticon have both advantages
and drawbacks for the study of internal control on irregular migration.
They should not be allowed to turn into cliche´s that no longer require
reflection. These metaphors capture the nature and character of politi-
cal and policy developments in a broad sense, and stress those
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elements that help us to understand the essence of the type of surveil-
lance under scrutiny. Fortress Europe and the panoptic metaphor draw
our attention to the power of the state and the enormous capacity it
has built up in the ‘fight against illegal immigration’. It highlights the
actions, choices and developments within the power container of the
state. The concept of the ‘surveillance state’, furthermore, channels our
attention to technology and technological innovations. It highlights in-
novation in surveillance techniques, such as the current debate on bio-
metrics, and its use for the government’s control on populations, be
they mobile or otherwise. The choices and policies of the state are the
central focus of this book and much of the ‘metaphorically inspired’ lit-
erature helps to highlight the relevant trends and leave side issues at
the side. Paragraph 2.3 therefore focuses on ‘the’ state and the state
perspective.
But metaphors are obviously ideal types. Therein lies a problem, as
social scientists often have to note that – to use another cliche´ – the
devil is in the detail. Bennet (2005: 133), having conducted a detailed
inquiry into what actually happens – in terms of surveillance – when
you buy an airline ticket, points to the risks of relying too much on
metaphors:
Surveillance is, therefore, highly contingent. If social scientists are
to get beyond totalizing metaphors and broad abstractions, it is ab-
solutely necessary to understand these contingencies. Social and
individual risk is governed by a complicated set of organizational,
cultural, technological, political and legal factors. The crucial ques-
tions are therefore distributional ones: why do some people get
more ‘surveillance’ than others?
This points to realities both inside and outside the power container of
the state that are at odds with metaphoric clarity and lack of ambiguity.
Power always meets resistance. Sometimes the state is openly chal-
lenged; sometimes opposition is covert and small-scale. Sometimes re-
sistance is a matter of the subjects of surveillance, while in other cases
it is within the state itself that resistance or obstruction takes place.
Too much emphasis on state power therefore entails the risk of block-
ing out counter-movements that are relevant to the analysis of state
surveillance of irregular migrants. Even though this study concerns it-
self with the developments of the state’s capacities and the choices it
makes in the internal control on irregular migrants, it is important to
note and, where possible, evaluate these countermoves and strategies.
Paragraph 2.4 therefore deals with the literature that maps the limita-
tions of state power and its control on irregular migration.
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2.3 The surveillance state and internal migration control
The history of surveillance is closely entwined with the history of the
modern bureaucratic state. In fact, it is hard to imagine the first with-
out the second. Bureaucracy depends on registration and classification
to implement policies varying from collecting taxes and distributing
benefits and allowances to controlling and policing the population.
This paragraph will therefore start with a brief historical account of the
connection between the rise of the modern bureaucracy and the rise of
surveillance as an instrument of state power (2.3.1). Early on in the pro-
cess of state formation, surveillance was directed to the question of in-
ternational mobility. Passports were an early form of subdividing popu-
lations into those who could legally pass the border and those who
could not. The state drew territorial and legal borders by means of re-
gistration and documentation, thus classifying those who travelled
without documents as ‘illegals’ or ‘trespassers’. Paragraph 2.3.2 will
deal with the link between surveillance and international mobility. The
computer age has altered the face of the modern bureaucratic state on
many fronts, but has been a revolution in terms of the information
density of modern surveillance. Surveillance is rapidly being compu-
terised, networked and internationalised and is strengthening its focus
on international mobility, whether regular or not (paragraph 2.3.3.).
Though it is tempting to equate surveillance with technology, this para-
graph should make clear that surveillance can and often is both ‘face to
face and/or technologically mediated’, even though in ‘today’s world
the latter is growing fast’ (Lyon 2007: 1).
2.3.1 The rise of bureaucratic power and surveillance
Accumulating information on citizens and inhabitants has been de-
scribed as a central aspect of state formation. The historical rise of cen-
tralised nation states is closely entwined with the gathering of informa-
tion on the population on a large scale. Scott (1998) describes this
process as one in which the state makes its people ‘legible’ by gather-
ing information on its subjects in the various roles they play in society.
This legibility served to increase the state’s ability to govern and control
its population. Caplan and Torpey (2001: 1) in similar vein stress the
role of ‘documenting individual identity’ in the rise of modern govern-
ment: ‘Establishing the identity of individual people – as workers, tax-
payers, conscripts, travellers, criminal suspects – is increasingly recog-
nised as fundamental to the many operations of the state’. In order to
enhance its grip on society, the state increased the accumulation of in-
formation on its inhabitants through registration and documentation.
Information, legibility and documenting identities can of course be
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applied to various state tasks. It is vital for both the control of the popu-
lation (with totalitarian control as its extreme form) but also for eman-
cipatory goals and redistribution of scarce resources in light of the op-
erations of the welfare state. Surveillance always moves somewhere on
a continuum between care and control (Lyon 2007: 3). Both the welfare
state and the control state require elaborate bureaucracies to run their
operations.
The rise of the bureaucratic state went hand in hand with increasing
possibilities, and desires, to control the population through informa-
tion. Information and bureaucracy can almost be seen as two sides of
the same coin. Authors such as Weber, Foucault and Giddens analysed
bureaucracy as a highly rationalised mode of information gathering
and administrative control. They discussed the administrative logic of
modernity in terms of the growth of ‘surveillance’, understood as an ex-
pansion of the supervisory and information-gathering capacities of the
organisations of modern society and especially of the modern state and
business enterprise (Dandeker 1990: 2). Surveillance in these views is
one of the prime instruments at the disposal of the state to monitor
and control its population and society. Often this line of reasoning has
focused on the nightmarish extremes of state power and totalitarian-
ism. Both fiction – Orwell’s all-seeing Big Brother – and history – the
highly organised bureaucratic power of the German Third Reich – have
provided vivid images of the power of surveillance when it is not mo-
rally or legally restrained. The intimate connection between bureau-
cracy and surveillance cannot be explained by just using images of a
power-hungry government seeking means to control and subject its po-
pulation. Bureaucratic surveillance is two-faced: it can be seen from
both the perspective of social control or from that of social participa-
tion. Lyon (1994: 31) argues that:
The administrative machinery constructed during the nineteenth
century can be understood both as a negative phenomenon
– Weber’s ‘iron cage’ of bureaucratic rationality or Foucault’s ‘dis-
ciplinary society’ – or, more positively, as a means of ensuring that
equal treatment is meted out to all citizens.
Both functions depend on the surveillance capacity of the state. It can
be argued that the control function of surveillance came first in a his-
torical sense. After all, registration and administration were originally
designed to award duties and responsibilities to citizens, such as taxa-
tion and conscription (Scott 1998). As European states gradually devel-
oped into welfare states the duties of the citizens towards the state
were supplemented with all sorts of rights and redistributions (see for
an historical account De Swaan 1993). Gary Marx notes that the state’s
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reasons for collecting and using identification have broadened signifi-
cantly over time.
In the twentieth century its traditional claimed needs to identify
for reasons of internal security, the draft, to protect borders, and
for taxation, were supplemented by regulatory needs and the de-
sire to do good (as defined by those with power) via the welfare
state. (Marx 2001: 326)
This is where the other face of surveillance, the face of social redistri-
bution and equal treatment of citizens, comes to the fore.
The function of internal surveillance and control is, more and more,
to separate the ‘ins’ from the ‘outs’. Solidarity and redistribution are, by
definition, limited to a clearly demarcated group. Especially in rich wel-
fare states there is a paradox of solidarity and exclusion: maintenance
of national, institutionalised forms of solidarity for the benefit of native
citizens and denizens (legally residing aliens) requires a rigorous exclu-
sion of outsiders from the welfare state’s social entitlements (Teulings
1995; Entzinger & Van der Meer 2004; Engbersen 2004). Identifica-
tion and surveillance of the population is therefore also an instrument
to determine eligibility. Both Germany and the Netherlands fit neatly
into this representation of bureaucratic development. They are both
elaborate welfare states with a high level of social protection, which re-
quires a keen eye for matters of eligibility. Most sectors of public and
semi-public life are highly regulated and subject to registration and
documentary requirements by a professional and well-staffed bureau-
cracy. However, the actual implementation of policy is executed in the
offices and practices of the ‘street-level bureaucracy’, where there usual-
ly is room for some (formal and informal5) discretion in decisions over
benefits and sanctions (see Van der Leun 2003; Cyrus & Vogel 2003).
2.3.2 Surveillance and the control on ‘legitimate movement’
In an age of globalisation, separating the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’ has also
become a matter of migration and immigration policy. Migration policy
itself is a tool to divide the population of the ‘globally mobile’ into a
part that is considered ‘legal’ and a part considered ‘illegal’. Torpey
(1998, 2000) argued that modern states – and the formation of the in-
ternational system of nation states in which they are embedded – have
monopolised the ‘legitimate means of movement’. He saw a develop-
ment similar to Weber’s notion of ‘monopolisation of the legitimate
use of physical force’, in which the state took the legitimate use of vio-
lence out of the private sphere. Likewise, the state has taken the right
to move across land and borders out of the private sphere:
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The result of this process has been to deprive people of the free-
dom to move across certain spaces and to render them dependent
on the state and the state system for the authorization to do so –
an authority widely held in private hands theretofore. (Torpey
1998: 239)
This monopolisation was, to a large extent, executed through the intro-
duction of the passport. The passport connected an individual with a
written identity that can only be issued by the state and this document
became the prerequisite for moving across the border. Identification,
and thus identity, became formalised and documented. The issue of
enforcement was of even greater importance. Identifying and docu-
menting new subdivisions in society meant very little, if the state could
not enforce its policies and regulate the movement of its subjects.
The successful monopolization of the legitimate means of move-
ment had to await the creation of elaborate bureaucracies and
technologies that only gradually came into existence, a trend that
intensified dramatically toward the end of nineteenth century.
(Torpey 2000: 35)
Surveillance and international mobility thus became closely entwined.
As Boyne (2000: 287) puts it: ‘The prime function of surveillance in
the contemporary era is border control. We do not care who is out
there or what they are doing. We want to see only those who are en-
titled to enter’. Yet, this short quote outlines the problematic coherence
between irregular migration, surveillance and exclusion in a nutshell.
The fact that you only want to see those who are entitled to enter
means that you have to care who is out there and what they are doing.
Once irregular migrants have crossed the border it takes information
and documentation on who they are and what they are doing to effec-
tively exclude them. That goes especially for the successful implemen-
tation of expulsion policies. The practical organisation of exclusion is a
labour- and information-intensive process. Torpey has argued that the
modern state’s capacity to intervene in social processes depends on its
ability to embrace society. As states grow larger and more administra-
tively adept, they can only penetrate society effectively if they embrace
society first. As Torpey has said: ‘Individuals who remain beyond the
embrace of the state necessarily represent a limit on its penetration’
(1998: 244). Irregular migrants are of course both likely – they are
after all ‘irregular’ because they do not fit into any legal administrative
category – and eager to stay beyond the embrace of the state. Internal
migration control is aimed at embracing them and the institutions and
circles in which they move in order to exclude them.
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Information and identification are vital for the control of populations
and, because of a general lack of registration, this goes double for the
irregular population. The keywords for the internal control on irregular
migrants are surveillance and identification. In a modern welfare state
exclusion is dependent on documentation and/or the registration of
identity and legal status. Marx (2001) describes seven types of ‘identity
knowledge’. Of these, three types are especially important for the goal
of internal control on irregular migrants. The first is ‘legal name’.
Identification requires that a person can be linked to a unique legal
name. In short: who are you? Authorities have to invest a lot of time in
this basic question of identity. Linking an irregular migrant to a legal
identity is a prerequisite for further action such as expulsion. The sec-
ond type of identity knowledge is ‘locatability’. In short, this refers to
the question: where are you? This involves the ‘ability to locate and
take various forms of action, such as blocking, granting access, deliver-
ing or picking up, charging, penalizing, rewarding or apprehending’
(Marx 2001: 313). Locatability is one of the main links between capacity
and enforcement. If the state does not know where to go, policy will
remain a dead letter. In the case of ‘liquid’ populations (compare
Bauman 2000) moving through society by stealth – such as irregular
migrants – borders will have to follow and have to be placed at the
places where irregular migrants interact with the institutional world.
Moreover, many irregular migrants will not wait for the immigration
authorities to show up at the door when they have been given notice to
leave the country, but go deeper underground. So from the state’s per-
spective the use of detention as a preparation for expulsion is another
aspect of locatability. The third type is described as ‘symbols of eligibil-
ity/non-eligibility’. This concerns the manner in which an identity is
coupled with a set of rights. This can be done in the form of documen-
tation (passport, social security card) or in the form of registration (le-
gal status, eligibility, etc.).
2.3.3 Surveillance and irregular migrants: two separate logics of exclusion
The link between the exclusion of irregular immigrants and policies of
surveillance can follow two separate, and essentially contradictory, lo-
gics. The first may be captured under the notion of ‘exclusion from
documentation’ and the second under the notion of ‘exclusion through
– or by means of – documentation and registration’. Policies operating
under the first logic exclude irregular migrants from documentation
and registration in order to exclude them, while policies operating the
second logic aim to register and document the individual irregular mi-
grant himself in order to exclude him in the ultimate sense of
expulsion.
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Exclusion from documentation and registration
First, surveillance may be deployed to exclude irregular immigrants
from key institutions of society, such as the labour market and the
housing market and even from informal networks of fellow countrymen
and family. This is the Panopticon Europe as described by Engbersen
(2001), in which the state raises a protective wall of legal and docu-
mentary requirements around the key institutions of the welfare state
and ‘patrols’ it with advanced identification and control systems. The
first logic of exclusion reads as follows: irregular migrants are formally
excluded from legal documentation and registration, and are thus ex-
cluded from the institutions themselves while it is exactly these docu-
ments and registrations that allow access to the institutions. One might
say that the state’s embrace in this perspective is aimed at the institu-
tions and networks irregular immigrants use and need for their daily
lives. It is a strategy of exclusion through the delegitimisation and
criminalisation of all those who may be employing, housing and aiding
irregular immigrants. Seen from this perspective, the panopticon does
contain some elements of correction and discipline as it aims to disci-
pline, first of all, public and semi-public institutions and, secondly, the
social networks and institutional surroundings of irregular migrants.
These strategies are prominent in both the Netherlands and Germany
where registration is routinely used to exclude irregular migrants from
public and semi-public institutions and the labour market. Targeting
the ring of ‘social’ networks and institutions, such as the crackdown on
legal and not-so-legal temp agencies in the Netherlands, is a more re-
cent phenomenon.
Exclusion through documentation and registration
In the second type of logic, the state aims to embrace irregular immi-
grants themselves. The state follows the strategy of developing detec-
tion and identification tools aimed at exclusion. Embrace of illegal
aliens is necessary for detection, but especially for expulsion, as states
have gradually found out that ‘unidentifiable immigrants are constitu-
tionally rather invulnerable to expulsion’ (Van der Leun 2003: 108).
The expulsion of illegal aliens can only function when identity, nation-
ality and, preferably, migration history can be established. If not, extra-
dition is likely to be resisted from within (by lawyers and judges) and
from abroad (by countries of transit and origin) in addition to personal
resistance from illegal aliens themselves. It is therefore vital for the
state to be able to connect illegal aliens with their ‘true’ identities. The
second logic of exclusion then reads as follows: documentation and re-
gistration is aimed at the irregular migrant himself, in his capacity as
an irregular migrant. Documentation and registration have to establish:
(a) the irregular status of the migrant and (b) establish and connect the
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irregular migrant with his legal identity. In other words, registration is
used to identify or even re-identify irregular migrants (see Broeders
2007). This, in turn, is needed in order to facilitate exclusion in the ul-
timate sense: expulsion from the state. This strategy is dominant in
the advanced welfare states of Northern Europe (Engbersen 2003;
Levinson 2005; Van Kalmthout et al. 2007). Since the 1990s, Germany
and the Netherlands have been increasing their detention capacity for
irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers with the aim of facili-
tating expulsion (Jesuit Refugee Service 2005; Welch & Schuster
2005). Both countries have also been investing heavily in database sys-
tems that are able to register, track and identify the resident migrant
population. They are also leading advocates of organising and equip-
ping data exchange at the European level in matters of migration man-
agement (see for example Aus 2003, 2006; Broeders 2007). In South-
ern Europe, the Italian, Spanish and Greek governments have, in re-
cent years, particularly pursued a strategy of selective inclusion, which
also requires documenting and registering irregular migrants.6 This
latter strategy, though important, is outside of the focus of this study.
2.3.4 Surveillance in the digital age: tracking and identifying mobile
populations
The introduction of the computer to the modern bureaucracy has no
doubt been a quantitative and a qualitative leap for its capacity. Gilliom
(2001: 129) simply states that ‘the turn to the computerization of sur-
veillance and administration represents a revolutionary shift in admin-
istrative power of the state system’. Filing cabinets and card indexes
have been, or are being, transformed into searchable digital databases.
Information and communication technology has made it possible to
link various databases and to create networks between them. Commu-
nication technology has also detached registrations and administrations
from fixed places and locations because they are often remotely search-
able. This interconnectivity and accessibility of information makes
cross-referencing, potentially, a matter of seconds. Computerisation, in-
terconnectivity and remote accessibility are an enormous boost for the
state’s ability to execute the first logic of exclusion from documentation
and registration. The verification of non-registration or the checking of
suspect documents becomes easier and faster. From a purely technolo-
gical perspective, the limit may indeed be approaching the sky.
Whether or not governments connect and combine different bodies
of information will increasingly become a matter of legal constraints,
as the technological constraints are losing their relevance quickly. Com-
puters and modern surveillance techniques are spreading rapidly in
modern society. Moreover, it is not just governments that are stepping
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up their surveillance activities. Big Brother is joined by big business.
Corporate actors are interested in all sorts of information on citizens
(often pertaining to their role as consumers) and some forms of sur-
veillance are in the hands of private parties, such as video surveillance
in stores and other semi-public spaces. Haggerty and Ericson (2000:
609) see the development of a ‘surveillant assemblage’, in which sur-
veillance becomes an inescapable feature of modern society. They paint
a somewhat fatalistic and dramatic picture, in which there is no escape
from the coming future:
In the face of multiple connections across myriad technologies
and practices, struggles against particular manifestations of sur-
veillance, as important as they might be, are akin to efforts to keep
the ocean’s tide back with a broom – a frantic focus on a particular
unpalatable technology or practice while the general tide of sur-
veillance washes over us all.
This ‘surveillant assemblage’, spreads much wider than the systems of
knowledge production of the state itself and should not just be viewed
as a top-down system in which the few monitor the many. The avail-
ability of surveillance systems and the rapid spread of their use have
‘democratised’ the chances of becoming the object of surveillance.
Haggerty and Ericson (2000: 614) use the metaphor of rhizomatic ex-
pansion for this development. Rhizomes are plants, which grow in sur-
face extensions through interconnected vertical root systems. Or put
more simply: they grow like weeds. The rhizome metaphor accentuates
two characteristics of the surveillant assemblage: its phenomenal
growth through expanding uses and its levelling effects on hierarchies.
Though the phrase is usually reserved for paranoia, it can almost be
said that surveillance is everywhere. For Haggerty and Ericson (2000:
619) this development marks ‘the progressive ‘disappearance of disap-
pearance’ – a process whereby it is increasingly difficult for individuals
to maintain their anonymity, or to escape the monitoring of social insti-
tutions’. For irregular migrants the ‘disappearance of disappearance’
would be truly bad news.
Digital surveillance has thus become an integral part of everyday life.
Whereas in earlier days there was a limited number of records on an
individual – usually locally stored and printed documents – the digital
tracks of modern man are everywhere. Most of it is generated with citi-
zens’ consent or under conditions of their indifference. Lyon (2003:
152) rightfully reminds us that: ‘Compliance with surveillance is com-
monplace. Most of the time, and for many reasons, people go along
with surveillance’. The result is a circulation of various representations
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of an individual in databases, which Gary Marx calls digital shadows.
‘(…) now, with so many new ways of collecting personal data and the
growth of data banks, we see the rise of a shadow self based on images
in distant, often networked computers’ (Marx 2005: 23). Haggerty and
Ericson (2000: 613) point to roughly the same phenomenon when they
speak of ‘data doubles’ that ‘(…) circulate in a host of different centres
of calculation and serve as markers for access to resources, services
and power in ways which are often unknown to its referent’. The
growth of surveillance and the digital storage of data on individuals are
paralleled by a growing interconnectedness between systems of surveil-
lance. Here we enter the realm of the second logic of exclusion, the ex-
clusion through documentation and registration. When applied to the
case of irregular migrants this would entail all efforts to ‘embrace’ and
register them – i.e. create data doubles – in order to re-identify them at
a later stage when they come into contact with state officials. The fast
developments in computer technology and the diminishing costs con-
nected with computer registration make policies of ‘encompassing re-
gistration’ in order to control a relatively small population increasingly
a viable option.
As such, in the case of irregular migration, the state more and more
turns to modern surveillance techniques to achieve the double goal of
identification and exclusion. Digitalised databases and biometric identi-
fiers, two relatively new innovations, are being combined and seem to
become the ‘technique of choice’ for governments wanting to restrict
and control irregular migration. Databases are used for pre-emptive
surveillance that aims to anticipate unwanted behaviour by means of
classification and profiling (Salter 2005: 43) and for the identification
and re-identification of terrorists, criminals and, increasingly, irregular
migrants. In border policy there is a long-standing practice of pre-emp-
tion, for example, in visa policy. The citizens of some countries need to
apply for visa and other countries are even blacklisted. Databases facili-
tate this mechanism and may also make it easier to blacklist groups of
people or even known individuals. As migration policies rely heavily on
legal documentation and identification – not least when trying to expel
irregular migrants – it is vital for the state to connect the dots between
an irregular migrant and his or her legal identity. Or, as Salter elo-
quently puts it ‘Linking the mobile body to stable or reliable informa-
tion is a crucial technique of risk management’ (Salter 2005: 47).
The steadily growing reliance on databases and profiling also affects
the development of bureaucracy itself. Aas (2004) has argued that the
reliance on databases leads bureaucracies in the direction of more for-
malised decision-making procedures in which the formats and electro-
nic forms themselves increasingly determine how professionals should
think and act. Individual cases are processed according to procedure
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and the ultimate decision is embedded in the algorithms and decision
trees of the software. Once all the required boxes have been filled in
the computer ‘dictates’ the appropriate action to be taken. The indivi-
dual subject is increasingly standardised and de-contextualised, while
the individual bureaucrat is losing elements of its discretionary space.
Bovens and Zouridis (2002: 180) have described the introduction and
use of ICT in some sectors of the bureaucracy as the onset of a devel-
opment in which street-level bureaucracy (cf. Lipsky 1980) develops
into ‘system level bureaucracy’. In this transformation the role of ICT
is no longer supportive but decisive and its function for the bureau-
cratic organisation moves from ‘data registration’ to ‘execution, control
and external communication’. Even though their analysis is based on
and is only applicable to what they call ‘decision-making factories’,
such as the Dutch organisation that handles student grants and loans,
the logic of this development – that it limits the human factor in both
bureaucrat (by limiting his discretion) and the subject (by codifying
him) – is more than relevant for the case at hand. The more dependent
the migration policy process becomes on the digital decision-making
and databases, the more the interaction between the migrant and the
immigration official will be characterised by this ‘double depersonaliza-
tion’ (Broeders 2009b).
Given the fact that ‘identities’ are now centre stage in matters of mi-
gration and deportation, states are searching for the undisputable link
between person and identity. In doing so, they have brought the body
into the equation. The buzzword in matters of surveillance and migra-
tion is ‘biometrics’, i.e. the use of data extracted from the body, such as
an iris scan, digital facial image or a fingerprint. Biometrics primarily
serve the purpose of the verification of identities, on the assumption
that truly unique identifiers are found on the body (Lyon 2003: 68;
Van der Ploeg 2005; Lodge 2007). With the widespread use of bio-
metric technologies, the body has become a password authenticating
people and authorising or disqualifying their behaviour accordingly.
On some airports there are now fast-track procedures for frequent
flyers on the basis of an iris scan. Gaining access to offices and govern-
ment buildings is sometimes dependent on a fingerprint scan. In most
other cases it is usually bad news if a fingerprint is matched against
previously stored prints. A print that is matched against the records of
the police or the immigration authorities will often result in an arrest,
a refusal for entry or in an expulsion procedure. Muller (2004) calls
this the transformation of citizenship into ‘identity management’.
Identity management also highlights the link between biometrics
and the expanding system of databases that supports it. The use of bio-
metrics is an important part in the development of what Mark Salter
calls ‘hyper-documentation’ by which he means that ‘each piece of data
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is linked to other data, and ultimately to a risk profile: body-biometrics-
file-profile’ (Salter 2005: 47). Biometrics are – at the very least in the
eyes of the governments and government agencies that are promoting
them – very useful for the tracking and sorting of internationally mo-
bile populations. Especially in the post-9/11 era, the political support
for the use of biometrics in matters of security and migration has been
virtually unwavering (see for example Lyon 2003; Muller 2005; Balzacq
2008). Politicians are introducing or contemplating the use of bio-
metrics in passports, ID cards, visas and all sorts of databases related
to immigration policy and security policies. Both immigration and na-
tional security issues such as terrorism are global phenomena and
groups of states have strong incentives to work together where it is mu-
tually advantageous (see also Broeders 2009). According to Lyon
(2004: 139), the ‘infrastructural basis of contemporary surveillance’
makes it a potentially international phenomenon. Transnational crime,
international terrorism and international migration have pushed the
search for effective policies and remedies beyond national borders. The
government regulation of the ‘legitimate means of movement’ has ta-
ken on a grander scale than just the national state. A relatively new
phenomenon is that states are starting to cooperate, share information
and, in some cases, are even setting up joint surveillance systems. In
the field of immigration policy, the member states of the EU have been
working on an interconnected surveillance system of their own for
quite some time. It started with the Schengen Information System
(SIS) that lists persons – primarily irregular migrants – and missing
objects such as identity documents. It is now supplemented with the
EURODAC database that registers asylum applicants, including their
fingerprints, and will be expanded with the Visa Information System
(VIS), which will register fingerprints and the application details of
anyone who requests an EU visa. These are vast databases that can be
accessed throughout the EU and, in the case of the (not yet opera-
tional) VIS, even outside of it in consular offices. When these systems
are used in the context of the ‘fight against illegal migration’ and the
internal control on irregular migrants they are vital tools for the exclu-
sion through registration, as their principal function is to re-identify ir-
regular migrants (Broeders 2007). Member states such as Germany
and the Netherlands, especially, have been pushing for the rolling out
of this network of databases in the context of the Schengen and wider
EU fora.
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2.4 The limits of state surveillance
Much research has been devoted to the question of why immigration
policy has not been able to control immigration. Why is the liberal
state, despite political determination and vast resources, ‘losing control’
of immigration? Why is there a ‘significant and persistent gap between
official immigration policies and actual policy outcomes’ (Cornelius et
al. 2004: 4)? This ‘policy gap hypothesis’ is, in the view of Cornelius,
Martin and Hollifield who coined the phrase in the first edition of their
book Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, not even a real hy-
pothesis. They stress that it is perhaps misleading to refer to the gap
hypothesis as a true hypothesis since it is an empirical fact that few la-
bour-importing countries have immigration control policies that are
perfectly implemented or do not result in unintended consequences.
In other words: policy gaps are a given. The new identification, infor-
mation and control mechanisms that the state is setting up, will also
have their flaws and will most likely produce new policy gaps.
The policy gap, however, does have a specific anatomy. Research has
shown there are various sources of this policy gap and that their rela-
tive importance varies from country to country. For example, client pol-
itics and the active and professional lobbying of politicians are an inte-
gral part of the American political system. Given the presence of large,
and sometimes politically influential, groups of immigrants, there is a
substantive lobby and popular movements on behalf of legal and illegal
immigrants that influences policy even against popular sentiments of
limiting immigration (Freeman 1998). As most European countries
lack a tradition of political lobbying ‘American style’, there is much less
organised pressure on governments in this style. Other ‘sources’ of the
gap better fit the profile of northern member states of the EU, such as
the Netherlands and Germany. In this paragraph the sources of the
policy gap are organised in two clusters.
One cluster centres on sources of the policy gap within the state
(par. 2.4.1.). Different levels of government and different branches of
the government produce restraints on the intentions and actions of the
executive branch of government. But even within the realm of the ex-
ecutive different logics, political or otherwise, may be at work simulta-
neously, thus producing policy gaps. Gaps may be the result of conflict-
ing political considerations at the national and the local level and may
also result from legal constraints or from practical and technological
limitations. The second cluster centres on the irregular migrant and
his institutional and social surroundings. Irregular migrants produce
restraints on policy through the use of social networks and legal, semi-
legal and informal institutions (par. 2.4.2) or through their own indivi-
dual actions (par. 2.4.3). Individual actions sometimes carry more
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weight than might be expected, given the relatively weak position of ir-
regular migrants. The restraints found in the sphere of the irregular
migrants and his institutional surroundings can be captured under the
notion of ‘foggy social structures’: social structures that emerge from
efforts by individuals and organisations to avoid the production of
knowledge about their activities by making them either unobservable
or indeterminable; or, put another way, the strategic production of fog
(Bommes & Kolb 2003: 5). Both the Dutch and German state and so-
ciety offer many examples of internal restraints on the state (emanating
from local government, state agencies and the judicial branch of gov-
ernment, for example). Both countries also show examples of institu-
tional ‘innovations’ on behalf of irregular migrants – though these are
by no means benevolent institutions, per se – and possibilities for indi-
vidual strategic behaviour.
2.4.1 The state and ‘self-restraint’
Policy gaps may be the result of political choices. Sometimes officially
declared immigration policy is quite different from the ‘real’ intention
of policymakers (Cornelius et al. 2004; Castles 2004; Cornelius 2005).
Some policies remain unimplemented intentionally because ‘turning a
blind eye’ is the politically and/or economically more sensible option.
For the United States, Cornelius (2005) has shown the huge gap be-
tween the rhetoric and funding of the patrolling of the US-Mexico bor-
der and the virtual non-existence of internal controls on the labour
market (i.e. control on employers). But this also holds true for the
southern member states of the EU. Castles (2004: 223) even claims
that the resulting paradox is in fact the real, yet undeclared, object of
state policy. In his view, irregularisation can be seen as ‘(…) an attempt
to create a transnational working class, stratified not only by skill and
ethnicity, but also by legal status’. It may also mean that certain poli-
cies are, for a large part, intended to give the impression that the gov-
ernment is handling the problem, while it is fully aware that it is not.
In Germany and the Netherlands, this may well take the form of a gap
between political rhetoric and a lack of political priority for policy im-
plementation. Another version may result from investing heavily in
very visible ‘solutions’ in the full knowledge that the investment
amounts to the proverbial drop in the ocean, and not much more. For
the US, Andreas (2000) described the enormous investments in the
guarding of the US-Mexico border in terms of an ‘escalation of policy’.
In his view, this escalation of border control had to be seen as a re-
sponse to the powerful narrative of the loss-of-control theme. The esca-
lation did sort effect in actual border control, but its main purpose was
symbolic and clearly aimed at the domestic public.
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Yet policing methods that are suboptimal from the perspective of
a means-ends calculus of deterrence can be optimal from the poli-
tical perspective of constructing an image of state authority and
communicating moral resolve. (Andreas 2000: 9)
Phrased slightly more provocatively: stupid policies can sometimes
make smart politics.
Political rhetoric may also be harsher than the official policy practice
for reasons of self-interest. Though it is certainly not something that
governments often publicly admit to, irregular migrants are as a rule
not excluded from urgent medical care. In the Netherlands, the entry
into force of the Linkage Act was accompanied with the installation of
the Linkage Fund. Medical professionals can draw from this govern-
ment fund when they treat uninsured irregular migrants. In part, this
fund is the result of obligations under international law, but a secon-
dary reason is the protection of wider society against the spread of dis-
ease and epidemics. Historically, exclusion of the ‘unwanted’ has been
limited by a mixture of humanitarian considerations and considera-
tions of fear and safety. De Swaan (1989) has shown that the evolution
of welfare and healthcare was, to a large extent, built on the self-inter-
ests of the elite who feared that the disease and poverty of the unfortu-
nate might turn against them. A similar train of thought underlies
some of the limits on the exclusion of irregular migrants nowadays.
In the US and other classical immigration countries, policies have
been watered down or hardly implemented under the influence of
pressure groups such as employers and other pro-immigration lobbies
(see for example Cornelius 2005). In Europe, domestic restraints
usually take another form. Potentially effective but draconian control
measures are likely to be challenged and even overturned by courts that
brand such measures unconstitutional or in violation of rights that can-
not be withheld from various categories of regular and irregular mi-
grants. High courts such as the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and
the Dutch Hoge Raad performed this role in earlier stages of the devel-
opment of immigration policy. Courts intervened in the development
of government policies and policy proposals on issues such as illegal
expulsions and withholding certain rights and entitlements from long-
term immigrants. For example, in two famous cases in 1973 and 1978,
the German Bundesverfassungsgericht first curtailed the executive’s
nearly unlimited discretion to expel aliens and then codified the notion
that the rights of legal immigrants should grow incrementally over
time and should ultimately approach the rights of the citizen (Joppke
1999b; Broeders 2001: 62-63). Joppke (1998) calls this the ‘self-limited
sovereignty that explains why liberal states accept unwanted immi-
grants’. This national ‘channelling’ of international legal norms and
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human rights, has a more prominent effect on policy development
than international pressure or international law itself.
Other gaps may be the result of a lack of capacity at the level of the
implementation or may result from differences of opinion among dif-
ferent agencies or levels of government. As Cornelius et al. (2004: 15)
state:
If local authorities do not share the same policy objectives and in-
terests of the national government (or they are not given sufficient
resources) they may become lax in enforcement or simply not
comply.
Sometimes gaps may occur at the local level because of political differ-
ences between national and local authorities. More often, however, it is
the local level of government that is confronted with the results of na-
tional policies and has to deal with issues of social order, public health
and safety as they emerge in local practice (see for example Van der
Leun 2003). Strict exclusion policies are then watered down at the local
level by municipalities and private and semi-private organisations,
though their means are limited and they can often only give temporary
relief (see for some Dutch examples Rusˇinovic´ et al. 2002). The local
level of government often faces the challenge of drawing a socially ac-
ceptable border between inclusion and exclusion, which sometimes re-
sults in defying national laws and policies or even taking legal action
against the national state.
The prominence of information and information technology is
usually an asset for the state, but it can also be a restraint on policy.
The centrality of what Bommes and Kolb (2003: 5) call ‘knowledge pro-
duction’ also leads to vulnerabilities. Knowledge production may be vi-
tal to exert control in a modern society.
Yet societies and their states operate on the basis of insecurity,
concerns about gaps in knowledge, doubt about the reliability and
validity of various forms of constructed knowledge and the incom-
patibilities of a range of forms of knowledge.
Scott (1998) turns this line of reasoning up a notch. He argues that
modern states must produce knowledge and information in order to
execute their various policies. The process of knowledge production,
however, requires simplification of a complex social reality. Reality has
to be rewritten in order to make social reality ‘fit’ into the categories
and terms in which the policies are formulated. This is basically the
flipside of the development from ‘street level-bureaucracy’ to ‘system-
level bureaucracy’ as described in paragraph 2.3.3. Shifting control
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from the bureaucrat towards the bureaucratic database limits the hu-
man factor in bureaucratic operation. Sometimes this may be an ad-
vantage for bureaucratic procedures as it increases equal treatment.
However, a greater dependence on databases may also increase blind
spots in the panoptic gaze. Databases are, after all, never ‘street-smart’,
nor do they possess the professional and tacit knowledge of an experi-
enced professional.
2.4.2 Restraints on the state: public protest, social capital and ‘bastard
institutions’
Just as illegal aliens are ‘illegal’ because they do not fit into any legal
category, they are also a group because they are labelled as such by pol-
icy. They are not a group by choice and are seldom truly organised,
especially in Europe. Moreover, public protest is unlikely to sort much
effect as the general public attitude towards immigration in Western
Europe is hardly favourable. In particular, illegal aliens, who lack all
but the most basis set of rights, do not seem to have very vocal defen-
ders or, for that matter, many of them. In the past, groups such as the
White Illegals Movement (Witte Illegalen) in the Netherlands, the still
very active German Jesuit Refugee Service, and the churches did target
public opinion to improve their legal and social situation. Nowadays, it
seems that resistance against policy has been ‘replaced’ with assistance
to irregular migrants. Various groups and organisations play a role in
helping irregular immigrants getting by on a day-to-day basis, thus
weaving a sort of social safety net, albeit with limited capacity (Rusˇino-
vic´ et al. 2002). Public opinion and civil rights groups are set even
farther in the background when it comes to the growing surveillance of
irregular immigrants. The application of new information technology
in the fight against illegal immigration is relatively unknown to the
general public, and is unlikely to muster much popular resistance.
Even when it concerns citizens and legal inhabitants themselves, the
use of modern surveillance systems hardly stirs up popular unrest. See-
mingly applicable to Western Europe as well is Gilliom’s (2001: 124)
observation for the US: ‘Our nation is adopting widespread policies of
surveillance and control with a barely stifled yawn or even muted
applause.’
In order to remain out of sight, irregular migrants steer clear of for-
mal institutions that increasingly require registration and official docu-
mentation. Just as many irregular migrants depend on the shadow
economy for work, they increasingly rely on informal ‘shadow’ markets
in the spheres of work, housing, relations and documents. These infor-
mal markets can be classified as bastard institutions (Hughes 1994) or
parallel institutions (Mahler 1995). They are illegitimate institutions in
THE STATE, SURVEILLANCE AND IRREGULAR MIGRANTS 53
which we can see the same ongoing social processes that are to be
found in the legitimate institutions (Hughes 1994: 193-194). These
bastard institutions are developed by irregular migrants, regular mi-
grants and native citizens in response to the demand that is created by
restrictive legislation and the large demand for cheap labour force, ille-
gal housing, real and forged documents, partners, etc. Bastard institu-
tions are essential for the travel and residence opportunities of irregu-
lar migrants and very hard for the central state to gain control over:
state instruments of surveillance and identification have difficulty pe-
netrating them. As such, they are typical examples of ‘foggy social
structures’.
In addition to bastard institutions that enable them to escape from
formal patterns of registration, irregular migrants make strategic use
of informal migration networks. These also help them to avoid detec-
tion by the state. The transnational social capital of irregular migrants
makes it possible for them to follow in the footsteps of compatriots le-
gally residing in Europe and remain in the shadow of ethnic commu-
nities (Engbersen 2001). Whereas bastard institutions are difficult to
control by the state because of their illegitimate character, this social ca-
pital is hard to control because of its legitimate character. After all, regu-
lar migrants are allowed to travel freely (and may secretly take some-
one along in their car) and may also have their compatriots come over
on tourist visas and then help them to stay in the country illegally
(Broeders & Engbersen 2007).
2.4.3 Restraints on the state: the importance of not being earnest
Just like other socially weak groups, the resistance of illegal aliens is
unlikely to be open, organised or confrontational. A demonstration is
hardly a wise strategy if you wish to remain unseen. Scott (1985) has
shown that the resistance of socially weak groups is usually silent and
individual. They are a ‘form of individual self-help; and they typically
avoid any direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite
norms’ (Scott 1985: 29). Everyday forms of resistance are the weapons
of the weak that may prove to be very effective in the frustration of pol-
icy. Simple strategies can sometimes seriously undermine all the might
and computer power that the modern state has at its disposal. As Gary
Marx noted
Humans are wonderfully inventive at finding ways to beat control
systems and to avoid observation. Most surveillance systems have
inherent contradictions, ambiguities, gaps, blind spots and limita-
tions, whether structural or cultural, and if they do not, they are
likely to be connected to systems that do. (Marx 2003: 372)
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Gilliom showed the limitations of surveillance on welfare systems of
social security.
The surveillance system seeks to gauge truth and compliance by
using officially reordered sources of income in a data set which is
awesome in its capacity to measure recorded events anywhere in
the nation, but laughable in its blindness to unrecorded income,
barter and trade. (Gilliom 2001: 132)
Those who do not wish to be seen can either hide or try to obscure the
vision of those watching by purposefully producing ‘foggy social struc-
tures’. Illegal aliens are no fools and often anticipate the state’s action
or use their knowledge about policies, procedures and loopholes to stay
out of sight or to frustrate implementation of policy (see for example
Engbersen 2001; Van der Leun 2003; Sciortino 2004; Broeders &
Engbersen 2007). Manipulation of their personal identity is one of the
major strategies adopted by illegal aliens who want to prevent detection
by the state. Irregular migrants often do not have the possibility to live
and work under their personal identity in the public sphere (and some-
times neither in the private sphere), given the risk of apprehension
and deportation. Irregular migrants therefore develop various strategies
to change and mask their personal identity and illegal status. There are
three main variants (Engbersen 2001). First of all, there is the structur-
al or situational adoption of a false identity. A widespread practice is
the acquisition of false papers or legitimate documents – such as pass-
ports, social security numbers and medical insurance cards – from le-
gitimate others. Irregular migrants also use a false identity as a major
strategy to ensure that they can stay in the EU in case the police arrest
them. The relatively high number of Algerians among irregular mi-
grants apprehended in the Netherlands, for example, may be explained
by the fact that many Moroccans assume an Algerian identity. As the
Algerian authorities are generally uncooperative when it comes to im-
plementing deportations, it makes them more difficult to deport (Van
der Leun 2003). Secondly, they obliterate their legal identity – more
particularly, their nationality – vis-a`-vis the authorities. Thus, irregular
migrants can prevent and obstruct deportation by destroying their iden-
tification papers (such as their passports). Unidentifiable irregular mi-
grants are the ‘unmanageable’ cases that the immigration authorities
have difficulty coping with and they are seldom deported. Thirdly, they
conceal their irregular status from others, such as employers, public of-
ficials and members of their own ethnic community. They do so out of
fear of repercussions, but also because knowledge of their status may
lead to an inferior position in their own community. These identity
strategies highlight the importance of lying for irregular immigrants.
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When there is no documented proof of identity, the agents of the state
are powerless without the information provided by the individual.
2.4.4 Restraints on the state in Germany and the Netherlands
There are, in short, many possible restraints on the politics and poli-
cies of the state. That being said, it should be pointed out here that the
empirical core of this research project concerns itself with the inten-
tions, politics, policies and instruments that the Dutch and the Ger-
man states bring into play for the internal migration control on irregu-
lar migrants. Though it is clear there are restraints that result from the
various sources described above, they are not a central part of the anal-
ysis made in the following chapters. Policy gaps coming from these
sources will appear and reappear throughout the analysis, but the focus
is on the state and development of state policies and not on the irregu-
lar migrant and his social and institutional environment. For both the
German and the Dutch cases, there have been research projects that do
take the position of the irregular migrant as the starting point and fo-
cus for empirical research.7 Nonetheless, some of the restraints are
more relevant than others in this study, especially if one differentiates
between the policy sectors that will be analysed. Not every source of
policy gaps will be of major importance in the policy domains of the
following chapters. Each policy domain ‘favours’ a certain type – or
types – of restraint on the state as a result of the institutional setting
and relative power positions within that setting. For example, access to
the labour market, which is a major lifeline for irregular migrants, is
bound to produce policy gaps as a result of strategic, risk-calculating
behaviour of individuals and of intermediary, often informal, institu-
tions. Market forces do not necessarily stop at legal requirements and
boundaries, especially when the balance between risk and profits tips
in favour of the latter. Internal surveillance by the police will most
likely find its policy gaps within the realm of the state itself. The line
between national political priorities and the priorities of police officers
on the beat is a long one, along which priorities may be watered down
for various reasons. Detention and expulsion will most likely meet re-
sistance from the individual migrant who has a lot to gain from non-
cooperation and shielding off his legal identity.
However, the development of internal migration control and the
drive towards applying more and more technical means to detect, iden-
tify and exclude irregular migrants is at least partly driven by the fact
that in time policy instruments are often evaded and even rendered
useless by the counteractions and evasions that irregular migrants and
institutions, both formal and informal, come up with. Policy innova-
tions provoke counter-innovations that aim to neutralise policy effects,
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and this may ultimately result in a stalemate. In other words, there is
an important element of action and reaction in the interaction between
the state and the irregular migrant, though this would be hard to mea-
sure given the lack of hard facts and figures on the developments with-
in the population of irregular migrants. The differences in power posi-
tions are also striking. Even though irregular migrants and ‘their’ insti-
tutions are far from powerless, they remain the ‘little people’ that have
to rely on the weapons of the weak. Caplan and Torpey (2001: 7) see it
thus:
In short, states and their subjects/citizens routinely play cat-and-
mouse with individual identification requirements. Yet even if, as
these examples suggest, the game is never entirely decided in ad-
vance, it still seems realistic to concede that so far the cat has held
the better cards.
On the other hand, some of the examples above suggest that modest
means, such as a simple lie, are sometimes extremely effective.
2.5 A new regime of internal migration control?
This book is primarily about states, not about irregular migrants. More
precisely, it is about the question of whether there is a development in
state policies towards irregular migrants in certain countries of the EU
where policies of societal exclusion (the first logic) are supplemented
with policies of exclusion focused on identification and expulsion (the
second logic). In that sense, its main focus is not even on the two case
studies, Germany and the Netherlands. The development itself is the
prime focus of research. Germany and the Netherlands are the empiri-
cal cases that are studied to seek an answer to the question whether
this development is taking place and, if so, to what extent and in what
form. This hypothesised development of state behaviour vis-a`-vis irreg-
ular migrants consists of a number of core elements.
– Internal migration policy on irregular migrants is intensifying in
countries where their presence is considered a social and political
problem
– Internal migration policy on irregular migrants is dominated by the
policy goal of exclusion.
– This exclusion follows two distinct logics:
(a) exclusion from formal institutions, in which the irregular mi-
grant’s access to registration and documentation is barred and is
therefore excluded from the institutions. Recognising irregular mi-
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grants as ‘not belonging’ is sufficient in this more traditional logic
of internal migration control.
(b) exclusion in the sense of expulsion, in which case exclusion re-
quires an extensive documentation, registration and identification
of the irregular migrant himself. In this logic, identification is in-
dispensible for effective exclusion (paradoxically, this exclusion of-
ten initially requires a radical embrace of irregular migrants).
– Exclusion is increasingly executed through a system of digitalised
bureaucratic registration and surveillance. A technical and compu-
terised approach will become increasingly dominant. Internal mi-
gration control is a matter of the surveillance state.
– The almost oppositional demands the two logics of exclusion make
on the organisation of bureaucratic documentation and registration
make a shift towards the supplementary use of the second logic also
a shift in the organisation of the instruments and procedures of mi-
gration control. A reorganisation is needed to enable the identifica-
tion and tracking of irregular migrants instead of just shielding off
institutions.
– Identification and the breaking down of irregular migrant anonym-
ity – and all the organisation and systems needed for that – increas-
ingly becomes a central notion in the development of the internal
migration control on irregular migrants at both the national and
the EU level.
Empirically, Germany and the Netherlands are taken together on the
explicit assumption that they are comparable cases when it comes to
this expected development in internal migration control. The interest is
in the development of state surveillance of irregular migrants, not in
comparing the two cases, per se. Obvious differences between the two
countries – the unique federal structure of relatively independent La¨n-
der versus the more centralised but layered structure of Dutch govern-
ment is a classic example – also influence state behaviour and will of
course be taken into account where it is inevitable and appropriate. But
the choice is for a focus on the similarities in relation to the issue of in-
ternal migration control. The three empirical chapters that follow are
chosen with a view to detecting the expected changes in the internal
migration control on irregular migrants. Guarding access to the labour
market (chapter three) is probably the most classic site for internal mi-
gration control following especially the first logic of societal and institu-
tional exclusion. In the heavily regulated Dutch and German labour
markets public and semi-public authorities routinely conduct checks of
registrations and documents that shield off the labour market to those
without papers. The question here is if labour market policies and the
authorities implementing them are also turning towards the second
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logic of identification and exclusion, especially considering the de-
mands that entails for a very different use and organisation of registra-
tion and documentation systems. In chapter four on police surveil-
lance, detention and expulsion, the second logic is much more domi-
nant, even though competing claims on the police are to be expected.
The question here is how this chain of government agencies that is
charged with the organisation of the expulsion process fares with the
implementation of the second logic of exclusion. Is there a significant
intensification in policies, budgets and staffing to increase the number
of identifications and expulsions and what obstacles does it encounter?
The third empirical chapter takes the issue of the domestic control on
irregular migrants to the level of the EU. In a ‘borderless’ Europe, in-
struments must be found to create and patrol new borders that will en-
able its member states to separate the ins from the outs. The EU mem-
ber states will primarily look to the European level to find new solu-
tions that will strengthen and instrumentalise the second logic of
exclusion. After all, expulsion in a unified Europe is ideally expulsion
from the EU, or at least from the Schengen area. The potential traces
of migrant identities all over Europe in the files and databases of its
member states are a temptingly valuable source of information for
those member states that seek to construct effective expulsion policies.
Organising those into a new European digital border may be the ulti-
mate instrument to break down the anonymity of irregular migrants.
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3 Guarding the access to the labour market
3.1 Setting the scene: political mindsets and policy frameworks
In August 1849, the first Dutch aliens act entered into force. This was
a fairly liberal law that stipulated that all aliens, except political trouble-
makers and vagrants, were welcome in the Netherlands. The main wor-
ry of the authorities was political agitation and migrants becoming a
burden on the costly poor-relief system. According to Lucassen (2001:
246), the spirit of the law was that:
Trustworthy and industrious immigrants were not to be hindered,
even when they did not have a passport or if they had no means
of identification at all. Only dangerous and (above all) poor aliens
had to be kept out or expelled.
Two things are interesting about this 1849 law from a contemporary
point of view. In the first place, labour migration was perceived to be
totally unproblematic. In the second place, documentation and identifi-
cation were already playing an important part in the internal control
on aliens, especially with a view to expulsion. Lucassen (2001) points
out that the authorities stimulated various forms of identification. Mi-
grants also welcomed them, because documentation served as an ‘in-
surance policy’ against official harassment by the authorities. The
authorities, in turn, needed documentation to ascertain to which coun-
try a destitute migrant should be expelled and it ‘greatly increased the
chances that the authorities of that state would accept such a person’
(Lucassen 2001: 247-8). Germany drafted its first aliens law in the
same period, but made a turn towards restrictions for labour migrants
much earlier. Particularly after the 1870s, the authorities began to wor-
ry about undocumented poor labour migrants. According to Lucassen,
this is probably explained by the fact that the German state assumed re-
sponsibility for the poor relief much earlier than the Dutch. But impe-
rial Germany was also early to organize the recruitment of foreigners
for employment in agriculture.
Eventually, bilateral accords were signed to regulate seasonal agri-
cultural employment. Some foreign workers, however, violated the
terms of their entry. Deportation was the punishment. Yet employ-
ers who hired the unauthorized foreigners were also culpable. By
the interwar period, when international migration in Europe gen-
erally ebbed, German labour law included sanctions for unauthor-
ized employment of aliens. (Miller 2001: 321)
In other words, the concepts of migrant labour, legal access to labour
(thus making irregular labour participation a distinct possibility), docu-
mentation and identification of labour migrants and the penalisation
of employers have deep roots in European history. At the same time,
there is also a history of liberal laws, selective enforcement of labour
laws and controls and a pragmatic approach to labour migrants that
hinged primarily on the prevention of a migrants becoming a burden
on the institutions of the poor relief. In the post-war period, a number
of these instruments and arguments – and, in particular, the shifts be-
tween them – come to the fore again. During the time of the recruit-
ment policies of guest workers, from the late 1950s until the mid-
1970s, irregular migration was not much of an issue in Germany or
the Netherlands. In these post-war years of economic expansion, immi-
gration was first and foremost a matter of labour market needs and in
some countries, such as France, of demographic considerations to re-
plenish war losses (Money 1999). Migration was almost exclusively
seen as a matter of economic policy (Boswell 2003: 10-11). On the
fringes of the official recruitment channels there was also a flow of ir-
regular migration. Some labour migrants simply skipped the formal
channels and procedures of the labour recruitment agreements and
migrated on their own accord. They looked for work, usually found it
and then presented themselves to the authorities requesting formalisa-
tion of their status as a guest worker. The political and public percep-
tion of this phenomenon in the Netherlands was generally favourable;
they were called ‘spontaneous labour migrants’ and were often re-
garded as adventurers in the positive sense (see Engbersen 1997). In
Germany, this phenomenon was also widespread and was generally ac-
cepted, although not looked upon favourably, per se (Sinn et al. 2005).
3.1.1 The political rebirth of the illegal alien in Germany and the
Netherlands
The economic recession that was echoed in by the oil crisis in the early
1970s turned the tables on both regular and irregular labour migration.
Labour recruitment was terminated and, in political eyes, the image of
the irregular labour migrants underwent a paradigmatic transformation
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from ‘spontaneous labour migrant’ into the ‘irregular migrant’. The
first measures to curb labour migration were taken in the 1970s in the
field of employer sanctions. The primary aim then was to ‘demagnetise’
the labour market (Martin 2004). In other words, sanctions and policy
were directed first and foremost at domestic employers while the irreg-
ular migrant himself was less ‘in the picture’.
According to Engbersen and Burgers (2000), this first phase in the
development of a policy approach on irregular migrants is charac-
terised by both a general lack of policy as well as public debate in the
Netherlands and is followed by two phases. The second phase runs
roughly to 1991 and is characterised by an increasingly strict regulation
of entry through immigration law and policy and a simultaneous lax
approach towards irregular residence and irregular work. Those were
the days when many government policies in the Netherlands were
characterised by the principle of gedogen – roughly translated as ‘tolera-
tion’ in English – meaning that the implementation of policy, notwith-
standing formal legal frameworks, is intentionally weak or reserved
(Buruma 2007). Irregular migrants, once established, are able to find
work even in the formal labour market. They can still obtain Social-
Fiscal numbers (so-called SoFi numbers), which allow them to hold
tax-paying jobs. The enforcement regime on irregular labour is lax and
in a number of sectors such as agriculture and horticulture, where de-
spite the high unemployment figures employers find it difficult to fill
the vacancies, the authorities often turned a blind eye. In the early
1990s, this policy approach changed. The start of the third phase is
marked by publication of the Commission Zeevalking’s 1989 report,
which advised the government to construct a coherent policy of inter-
nal migration control and stressed the importance of cooperation be-
tween separate state departments and authorities and the need for an
effective expulsion policy. The 1990s saw the development of a policy
on irregular migrants, consisting of a number of legislative measures
and administrative operations (Van der Leun 2003: 17-18; Pluymen &
Minderhoud 2002). One of the more recent chords in Dutch policy on
irregular migrant was the publication of the government’s white paper
on irregular migrants (Illegalennota) in 2004. In the 2004 white paper,
the labour market was declared a major policy priority. The Minister
for Aliens Affairs and Integration wrote that this is needed because ‘…
illegal employment makes it possible for an illegally residing alien to
finance and perpetuate his existence in the Netherlands’ and it must
also be considered ‘ …a serious threat to the economic and social order’
(Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 2004: 22). In con-
trast to earlier periods, much emphasis was placed on the implementa-
tion of policy and the intensification of labour market controls.
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During the days of guest labour recruitment, the German authorities
had a loose approach towards ‘spontaneous’ labour migrants that was
similar to the Dutch approach. Scho¨nwa¨lder, Vogel and Sciortino
(2006: 38) point to recent archive based studies that document that in
the 1960s the formally illegal entry of non-national job-seekers was
widely accepted and their residence and employment were often retro-
spectively legalised. The oil crisis put a stop to this practice and led to
the termination of legal labour migration programmes. In the years fol-
lowing the recruitment stop, German politics focussed its attention on
the restriction of access to other – increasingly crowded – legal path-
ways into Germany such as family reunification and asylum migration.
In Germany, as in the Netherlands, political attention to the phenom-
enon of illegal migration and residence started in earnest in the early
1990s (Scho¨nwa¨lder, Vogel & Sciortino 2006; Cyrus & Vogel 2005).
Prior to that, from the 1980s until the first years of the 1990s, the Ger-
man Republic had bigger issues at hand. The end of the cold war and
German reunification – which implied great migratory movements of
ethnic Aussiedler towards the former West Germany – and the excep-
tionally large numbers of asylum seekers coming to Germany in the
late 1980s and early 1990s took up the brunt of the political attention.
This combination of migration flows constituted what could be called a
veritable ‘migration crisis’ in German politics, which could only be re-
solved with a broad and intensely debated political ‘asylum compro-
mise’ in 1993. The compromise amended the German Basic Law
(Grundgesetz) in order to curtail the number of asylum applicants
(Joppke 1999; Broeders 2001; Boswell 2003). In the mid-1990s, when
Germany and the Netherlands were both past the peak of the asylum
crisis, attention began to shift towards irregular migration. Since 1989,
fighting irregular migration in Germany has initially, and much more
than in the Dutch case, been a matter of controlling its long and po-
rous ‘green’ border in the east of Germany (a ‘hard’ external border of
the Schengen group). At a later stage, German politics increasingly
turned its attention to internal migration control on irregular migrants.
The Kohl government, in particular, began to draw linkages between
unemployment and illegal labour in the run-up to the 1998 elections
(Boswell 2003: 63-64). In Germany, the internal control on irregular
migrants is mainly implemented through a system of residence per-
mits, work permits and registrations that was already in place when
the political attention shifted towards this issue. Hailbronner, Martin
and Motamura (1998: 205) stress how Germany already had a highly
developed system of registration and surveillance in which different
agencies could access each other’s databases. Moreover, there is a cen-
tral register for non-nationals that can be used to detect irregular sta-
tus. Vogel (2001) points out that even in corporatist Germany, with
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many non- or semi-state organisations playing a role in the regulation
of the labour market, and in federal Germany with its real political dif-
ference between the La¨nder, active cooperation seems to be the norm
(Vogel 2001: 343). Cyrus and Vogel (2005: 14) maintain that the more
recent legal reforms in the field of internal control on irregular mi-
grants have placed more emphasis on law enforcement. Irregular mi-
grants and irregular migrant workers are now listed prominently on
the political agenda. The new coalition of CDU, CSU and SPD declared
the shadow economy as one of its priorities in their coalition agree-
ment of 2005:
Schwarzarbeit, illegale Bescha¨ftigung und Schattenwirtschaft sind
keine Kavaliersdelikte, sondern schaden unserem Land. (…) Unser Ziel
ist es, den gesamten Bereich der Schattenwirtschaft zuru¨ckzudra¨ngen.
(in Vogel 2006: 1)
3.1.2 Aim and structure of the chapter
Engbersen and Burgers (2000) characterised the development of the
political outlook on irregular migration in the Netherlands as a trans-
formation from ‘spontaneous guest worker’ in the first phase, to a ne-
cessary and ‘tolerated’ source of labour in the second phase and, ulti-
mately, into an ‘unwanted illegal alien’ who is to be excluded in the
third phase. Germany may be said to have followed a similar trail, al-
beit with a less pronounced second phase of toleration. The result is
that both countries now share roughly the same political outlook on ir-
regular migrant labour: the phenomenon is considered harmful to
economy and society and irregular migrants are considered unwanted.
In short, irregular migrants must be barred from the labour market
both legally and, more recently and importantly, in practice through
the implementation of controls. This chapter analyses how these coun-
tries try to translate and organise this changed political view of exclu-
sion into practical policies. Paragraph 3.2 first looks into the political
economy of the labour market and irregular migrant labour from a the-
oretical point of view. How is the role of the state in matters of labour
market regulation and surveillance viewed in the relevant theoretical
debates? How do the parameters of the welfare state, on the one hand,
and the demands of the capitalist economy, on the other, affect the sta-
te’s options in internal migration control on the labour market? Para-
graph 3.3 then develops an analytical typology for labour market sur-
veillance in the Netherlands and Germany, based on the two logics of
exclusion that were introduced in chapter two. The typology serves as a
‘blueprint’ for the empirical paragraphs 3.4 and 3.5 that document de-
velopments in the Netherlands and Germany and illustrate the way
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these countries develop policies and instruments that operate under
the two logics of exclusion. Paragraph 3.4 describes the logic of ‘exclu-
sion from documentation’ – the more ‘classical’ approach to labour
market fraud – and paragraph 3.5 describes the policies operating un-
der the logic of ‘exclusion through documentation’ – a more novel ap-
proach in internal migration policy. Conclusions and discussion are
presented in paragraph 3.6.
3.2 Political economies of irregular migrant workers
3.2.1 The double movement of the state
The relation between the economy and irregular immigration is often
presented as a ‘simple’ matter of supply and demand. In a world with-
out borders, the supply of labour would be potentially unlimited. If em-
ployers in advanced capitalist economies had unrestricted access to that
labour, it would radically alter the face and function of national labour
markets, as we know them today. Economic supply and demand are,
however, mitigated by the interventions of governments. Markets
emerge and function within social and political contexts. The labour
market is not just the domain and study object of the economic
sciences, but also, and perhaps even more so, the domain of the politi-
cal economy. After all, even Adam Smith who introduced the notion of
the free market – as the outcome of ‘individuals pursuing their own
gain led by an invisible hand’ – did not mean to suggest that there was
no role for governments in market economies. Quite the contrary: the
‘free’ market needs the state, just as the state needs the market. Karl
Polanyi also pointed out the fact that state and market need each other
if ‘catastrophe’ is to be avoided. In his view, the relation between state
and market should be governed by the concept of ‘embeddedness’, be-
cause economic actions become destructive when they are ‘disem-
bedded’, meaning that they are not governed by social or non-economic
authorities (see Schwedberg 2003: 28). The fact that markets are em-
bedded in a socio-political system does not necessarily mean that they
are governed in an effective or ‘just’ way. Their mutual relations vary
over time and in different contexts. In the words of Block and Evans
(2005: 507): ‘There can be both positive and negative consequences of
any specific form of embeddedness’. Historically, the state and capital-
ist enterprises have often been ‘running mates’. Political and economic
goals and ambitions often overlap, making ‘government’ and ‘business’
natural allies.8 At other times, governments and business have found
themselves in opposite corners, for example when the needs of the
capitalist economy – cheap labour, long hours and weeks, no unions,
etc. – clashes with responsibilities of the state other than economic
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growth, such as the prevention of social unrest and safeguarding public
health. Borrowing again from Polanyi (2001), the position of govern-
ments may be characterised as a ‘double movement’. Market societies
are shaped and reshaped by a movement for laissez-faire and market
expansion, at one end of the spectrum, and movements for social pro-
tection and market force limitations, at the other. In real political life,
these ideal types do not just clash, but they mix and sometimes even
reinforce each other (cf. Block & Evans 2005). Governments have had
to balance between the needs and demands of employers and, increas-
ingly, those of employees, especially since the days when the latter be-
came a political force to be reckoned with.
The history of the welfare state is a history of slowly improving the
social and legal status of workers vis-a`-vis employers. The construction
of the welfare state entailed granting rights to workers (such as the
right to form a union) and implementing restrictions on the wishes of
industry, such as introducing a minimum age for factory work, com-
pulsory six-day workweeks, etc. The welfare state also entailed a pro-
cess of decommodification of labour when it sheltered workers from
market forces through social systems and unemployment benefits
(Esping-Andersen 1990). Social protection, and thus decommodifica-
tion, is reserved for full citizens and is to a large degree extended to le-
gal aliens (denizens) in modern welfare states. Only a legal status gives
access to social protection. Thus, irregular migrants still depend heavily
– but not exclusively – on their ability to work and opportunities to sell
their labour as a commodity.
The history of the capitalist state is a history of seeking new innova-
tions and advantages that would improve the production process and
increase profits, sometimes aided and sometimes hindered by govern-
ment. In this history governments come to the aid of business in var-
ious ways: resisting the rise of trade unions, passing labour and con-
tract laws favourable for business, protecting the interest of national
enterprises (by diplomatic support or protectionist policies) and by sti-
mulating the ‘supply’ of cheap labour – for example through regular
and irregular labour migration. These two histories have laid compe-
ting claims on the priorities and resources of the government. Nowa-
days, they still do.
3.2.2 Immigrant labour: between market and welfare state
Immigration is a subject of tension when seen through the ‘opposi-
tional’ perspectives of the capitalist state and the welfare state. From a
capitalist perspective, immigration is either a source of innovation and
competitive advantage (‘importing’ the best and the brightest) or it is a
source of cheap labour, especially when compared to domestic labour.
GUARDING THE ACCESS TO THE LABOUR MARKET 67
Either way, immigration is sought after because it increases profits. In
recent years, labour migration and recruitment has been reinstated in
many European countries at the top end of the – now global – labour
market. European governments have been competing amongst them-
selves and with the rest of the industrialised world for IT specialists
and other highly trained professionals (Boswell 2003). Germany
launched a green card initiative for IT specialists in 2000 and devel-
oped a broader policy framework after the widely debated report of the
Commission Su¨ssmuth (2001). In the Netherlands, the government’s
2006 white paper presented its plans to attract more international pro-
fessionals ‘towards a modern migration policy’ (Minister voor Vreem-
delingenzaken en Integratie 2006). In an ideal capitalist world, the
state would always facilitate employers’ wishes for migration policies.
Above all, that means flexibility: hiring immigrant workers in times of
labour scarcity and firing immigrant workers when the economic tide
turns. The guest worker period in Germany and the Netherlands is an
illustration of the state facilitating both elements of labour migration
flexibility.
Seen from a welfare state perspective, however, immigration is often
considered a threat. Cheap immigrant labour will jostle domestic la-
bour, wages will drop and the institutions of the welfare state will be
overloaded. The welfare state perspective on immigration centres on
crucial questions of inclusion and exclusion of immigrants. Paradoxi-
cally, the protection of those within the welfare state requires a radical
exclusion of those who are outside the welfare state (Teulings 1995;
Entzinger & Van der Meer 2004). A certain level of welfare can only be
sustained if there are limits to the number of people who are eligible
for benefits and if those who are taxed to provide the funds are not
overtaxed. Overtaxation can be both understood in a literal, financial
sense, and in a symbolic sense, meaning that in order for welfare sys-
tems to be sustained and seen as legitimate it should not become a
matter of ‘us versus them’ (Van Oorschot 2006; WRR 2006). Or, as
Christian Joppke (1999: 6) put it, ‘because rights are costly they cannot
be for everyone’. Cheap immigrant labour raises difficult issues about
wage differentials and unfair competition with domestic labour. In the
long run, when guest labour turns into settlement, it raises questions
of equal treatment, as the aftermath of the guest labour programmes
in Europe has shown (Joppke 1999). Settlement also raises the compli-
cated issue of immigrant integration, poverty and welfare dependence,
which has become an increasingly thorny issue in Western Europe.
These experiences are the foundation of the Dutch and German defen-
sive stance towards immigration in general and their reputation of
being ‘reluctant countries of immigration’ (cf. Cornelius et al. 2004).
Considerations of protecting domestic workers and the welfare state
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are felt even sharper in the case of irregular migrant labour: workers
lacking even the status of denizens. This defensive stance of the Dutch
and the German governments is also attributed to some of the shared
characteristics of the welfare state itself. Within the different worlds of
‘welfare capitalism’ in Europe, the German and Dutch welfare states
are usually grouped together under the heading of the so-called conti-
nental model (Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera et al. 2000; Ferrera &
Hemerijck 2003). Both countries have rich economies, elaborate and
redistributive welfare states and tightly regulated formal labour mar-
kets. To put it bluntly: both countries are rich and redistributive welfare
states. The fact that there is much to be redistributed makes the para-
dox of inclusion and exclusion more substantial, both in reality and
perhaps especially in terms of public and political perception.
So the state has a double agenda. Obviously, the state encourages
economic growth, which would imply support for the labour migration
agenda of the business community. But there are also considerations
emanating from the welfare state that favour the exclusion of irregular
and, to some extent, even regular migrant workers to keep the system
functioning and legitimised. A number of theoretical perspectives on
the political economy of irregular migration seek to explain the pres-
ence of irregular migrant workers and the role that the state plays in
managing its double movement.
3.2.3 Theoretical notes on migrant labour in modern welfare states
When the economies of Western Europe recovered from the devasta-
tions of the Second World War, France entered its trente glorieuses and
Germany became a wirtschaftswunder. In those days, immigration was
considered a logical answer to labour market shortages in certain sec-
tors of the economy (Joppke 1999; Broeders 2001). Migrants were con-
sidered a means of greasing the wheels of trade and industry. Marxist
theorists, especially, made the case that the labour migrants of the
post-war era were in fact an industrial ‘reserve army’ in the service and
at the disposal of a booming capitalist economy (see for an overview
Samers 2003: 556-558). Because of their temporary stay, they had lim-
ited rights and a weak legal status in the countries where they were
working. As such, they were an abundant, cheap and flexible source of
labour. The role of the state in this Marxist perspective is that of an ally
of industry or, in explicit reference to The Communist Manifesto (Marx
& Engels 1990/1888), as the ‘executive committee of the bourgeoisie’.9
In other words, labour migrants were portrayed as a new and im-
ported, rather than domestic, proletarian workforce to be exploited for
capitalist gains and the state played its part by supporting and execut-
ing the capitalist agenda. As many of Europe’s temporary labour
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migrants chose to stay after the termination of the guest worker period
and gradually improved their socio-economic position and their legal
and political status, the comparison with a proletarian workforce loses
strength. Irregular migrants, lacking any legal status, are now often
considered the successors to their weak position on the labour market.
From this point of view, they might be considered the new reserve
army of workers for the capitalist economy (Calavita 2003; Castles
2004; Cornelius 2005). In this perspective, the state is still the facilita-
tor of employers aiming to grease the wheels of industry by openly or
secretly allowing irregular migrant labour.
Segmented labour market theory starts from the structure of the mod-
ern Western economy itself. In this perspective, there is a structural
imbalance in the economies of Western states that fuels the need for
regular and irregular migrant labour. This theory stresses the imbal-
ance between the structural demand for entry-level workers and the
limited domestic supply of such workers – partially the result of the so-
cial protection to citizens and denizens provide by the welfare state –
which has generated a structural demand for immigrants in developed
countries (Massey et al. 2005: 33). In an age of globalisation, this mis-
match is often corrected by means of relocating certain industries to
low wage countries. Capital is, in most cases, far more mobile than la-
bour. However, many of the sectors in which irregular migrants are ty-
pically concentrated – such as agriculture, horticulture, tourism, food
processing, some segments of the textile industry, low level services
(hotel, catering, caring and domestic work) and prostitution – ‘must be
considered as industries which cannot be outsourced to low wage coun-
tries. Instead low wage labour is taken in’ (Du¨vell 2006: 32). Analysts
of globalisation and migration, such as Saskia Sassen (2001: 293), have
stressed the ‘need’ of big business for cheap and docile labour. Firms
profit from migrant workers because they are cheap and above all flex-
ible workers that can be hired and fired according to their needs. Or, in
Calavita’s (2003: 400) words:
It is not particularly original to point out that undocumented
workers provide capitalist economies with a source of labour that
lacks the power of domestic labour to exact concessions from em-
ployers.
The demand for immigrant labour seems to become a structural fea-
ture of globalised economies, especially in the large ‘global’ cities,
where the labour market polarises (Stalker 2000: 133; Sassen 1991).
Marcuse (1989) calls this the ‘hourglass economy’, in which the lower
and top ends of the economy grow at the expense of the middle.
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Burgers and Engbersen (1996: 624) maintain that ‘opportunities’ for
irregular migrants in the global city tend to concentrate in two eco-
nomic spheres. In the first place, they find employment in the tradi-
tional sectors of industry that ‘survived’ the various waves of deindus-
trialisation. These industries often rely on minimising their labour
costs to make ends meet by making use of cheap immigrant labour, or
even cheaper, irregular immigrant labour. The second economic sphere
is found in the expanding services sector. The growth of high-end ser-
vices has been accompanied by a growth in the lower strata of the ser-
vices economy: low status jobs that are poorly paid and physically de-
manding also tend to be filled by migrant labour. In more elaborate
welfare states, these job are often taken by irregular migrant labourers.
The lower strata of the Dutch and German economies – the ‘shadow’,
‘underground’ or ‘informal’ economies – are roughly in the same
league in terms of size. Schneider and Ernste (2000, 2002: 35-36) esti-
mate that, between the years 1989 and 1993, the informal economy
ranged from 11.8 to 13.5 per cent of official GNP for the Netherlands
and from 10.5 to 15.2 per cent of official GNP for Germany. However,
there are also other methodologies and estimates that show larger var-
iation or even very divergent figures for the same country (see Samers
2004: 203-7; see also Portes & Haller 2005: 413-418 for various meth-
ods of measurements). Still, by most accounts, both countries have a
sizeable informal economy that is likely to provide jobs for irregular
migrants. Obviously, the informal economy and irregular migration
should not be seen as fully overlapping phenomena. Even though the
informal economy is of vital importance to irregular migrants, it is first
and foremost a ‘domestic’ affair. Many legal inhabitants, citizens and
denizens alike, engage in social security fraud, unreported labour, un-
reported self-employment and barter. The labour market participation
of irregular migrants is but one component of the shadow economy
(Van der Leun 2003: 36; Van der Leun & Kloosterman 2006: 62).
A third cluster of theoretical explanations does not start from the
state’s intentions (as do the Marxists) or from the pressures from the
structural features and changes of the economy (as segmented labour
market theory does), but from political pragmatism and structural
flaws of state control itself. These perspectives all start from the so-
called policy gap between official immigration policy aims and actual
policy outcomes that, according to Cornelius and Tsuda (2004), is in-
evitable. In other words, states may produce laws and rhetoric about
curtailing immigration all they want, but the policy result will never-
theless fail to live up to the stated aims of immigration policy. A num-
ber of reasons are often put forward. Some have to do with the benefits
that businesses reap from employing irregular migrant workers as
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described above. Others have to do with matters of political conveni-
ence, as some battles are easier fought in politics than others. Many
authors have pointed out that states may issue harsh statements on ir-
regular migration and implement tough border policies while turning
a blind when it comes to the irregular migrant work force. In the US,
the employment of irregular migrants is pretty much a public secret.
According to Cornelius (2005: 777), US policies on irregular migrants
address only the supply side. Large sums of money are invested in bor-
der management in an effort to reduce the flow of irregular migrants,
but the US does nothing serious to reduce employer demand for irreg-
ular migrant labour. This explanation seems at odds with the cases of
the Netherlands and Germany that have developed substantial internal
migration policies. The general notion of turning a blind eye may of
course have specific Dutch and German translations. For example, gi-
ven a tradition of protection of the private sphere in both countries
work in private households, such as domestic work and care work, is
likely to be a blind spot. Both the public’s resentment of governments
controlling what happens behind closed doors and a small expected ‘re-
turn’ on the inspections makes private households a relatively expen-
sive and unattractive site for labour market controls. Freeman (1998)
has pointed out the clientelist nature of immigration politics in the
US. When benefits are concentrated and costs are diffuse – as is often
the case with immigration policies – clientelist politics are more likely
to develop (see also Hollifield 2000: 145). Unsurprisingly, clientelism
finds more fertile ground in political systems that have a tradition of
professional lobbying in mainstream politics, as is the case in the US.
In Germany and the Netherlands, which lack such a tradition, this line
of reasoning may follow the track of electoral politics, rather than clien-
telist politics pur sang. Still, lobbies on behalf of big industries or their
unionised counterparts (for example, the union of the construction in-
dustry) may influence policy. Even though political and business elites
may look favourably on globalisation and labour migration, a large part
of the workforce and the electorate regard it as threatening. So there
are important electoral reasons for governments to block immigration
and protect the domestic workforce and population. Or, more pragmati-
cally, the government should not be seen to harm the workers’ interests
in favour of the agenda of business and industry. This pragmatism also
applies to the employers. Boswell and Straubhaar (2003) point out that
hiring irregular workers saves employers the trouble of making public
pleas for immigrant labour, which are often politically sensitive in the
eyes of the domestic labour force and electorate. Irregular migrants
give employers access to low-cost, flexible labour without the problem
of having to ‘fight the issue out in a highly politicized public arena’
(Boswell & Straubhaar 2003: 1).
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Most of the theoretical notions discussed above suggest, if not assume,
that irregular migrant labour is a structural feature of rich and ad-
vanced welfare states. Interestingly, it is also often suggested that the
state does not seem very troubled by this feature of its economy. Rich
global countries tolerate irregular migrants because of their vital role
in the smooth running of the economy (especially at the fringes) or out
of political pragmatism, either pacifying the demands of employers or
pacifying the state’s own disability to implement effective external and
internal migration controls. However, in recent years advanced welfare
states such as Germany and the Netherlands have become increasingly
adamant in their political resolve to banish irregular migration and ir-
regular migrant labour from their societies. Although most EU coun-
tries are equal in their public rejection of irregular migrants, there is
ample evidence suggesting that some countries are more equal than
others in this respect. Boswell and Straubhaar (2004: 5) suggest that a
number of governments are increasingly taking the ‘combat of illegal
foreign labour’ seriously: ‘Germany, the Netherlands and France all
have tough legislation, and have stepped up efforts at enforcement
since the early 1990s’. In his analyses of irregular immigration and the
underground economy Michael Samers (2004: 242) notes ‘… there is
also considerable evidence that at least Northern European govern-
ments are doing everything but ignoring it’. In other words, these
countries go against the theoretical grain by developing an approach of
the problem of irregular migration that is characterised by tough legis-
lation and increasingly tough implementation and perhaps even chal-
lenge the inevitability of the policy gap. This raises two lines of ques-
tions. The first results mainly from the theoretical framework pre-
sented in chapter two and concerns the question of whether and, to
what extent, Germany and the Netherlands are developing internal sur-
veillance policies on the labour market that follow the two logics of ex-
clusion and the different demands they have on surveillance technolo-
gies of documentation and registration. The second line of questions
results from the theoretical notions set out in this chapter, concerning
the role of the state in balancing between the double movement of ‘ca-
pitalism’ and ‘welfare’, on the one hand, and capacity and control, on
the other. This will be analysed with a typology for labour market sur-
veillance in the Netherlands and Germany based on the two logics of
exclusion that were introduced in chapter two.
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3.3 Labour market surveillance in Germany and the
Netherlands: a typology
Advanced welfare states, such as the Netherlands and Germany, that
are serious about countering and discouraging the residence of irregu-
lar migrants, will focus their attention first and foremost on the vital
institution of the labour market. To a large extent, labour market sur-
veillance is meant to discourage the various actors in the field: discour-
age employers to make use of irregular migrant labour, discourage
criminal elements to facilitate the supply and demand for irregular la-
bour, discourage civil servants and other authorities to bend or ‘loosely
interpret’ the rules and ultimately, to discourage irregular migrants to
try their luck on the Dutch or German labour market.
As set out in chapter two, both countries are expected to develop a
policy programme of exclusion of irregular migrants that is increas-
ingly operated through the management of information, registration
and identification. Controlling access to the labour market and exclud-
ing irregular migrants from it is likely to require the operation of both
logics of exclusion, as set out in the previous chapter. The two logics
combined aim to make the presence of irregular migrants in the formal
and informal labour market as limited as possible. Policies operating
under the first logic of exclusion – exclusion from documentation – are
primarily aimed at institutions (especially employers, but also other in-
stitutional ‘providers’). Policies operating under the second logic of ex-
clusion (exclusion through documentation) are aimed at the irregular
migrant himself.
The two logics of exclusion are combined with two basic policy
methods that are used in labour market surveillance. The first of these
is the concept of ‘deputation’. The idea of the ‘sheriff’s deputy’ was
used by both Torpey (2000: 36) and Lahav and Guiraudon (2000: 57)
to indicate that governments are ‘enlisting’ third parties in order to
make migration policy more effective (see also Garland’s (2001: 124)
similar notion of responsabilisation strategy). When governments shift
responsibilities to private parties (especially employers, subcontractors,
and temp agencies) they turn them into ‘deputy sheriffs’ by making
them responsible for a part of the regulation of access to the formal la-
bour market. Governments are then ‘outsourcing’ some, or maybe even
many, of its registration and verification responsibilities to private par-
ties or lower levels of government. The second is the more traditional
policy approach of ‘control and punishment’. Deputation only works
with those willing to be deputised – no matter how grudgingly – or
those who have been given enough incentives to comply with rules and
regulations. Employers that do not intend to ‘play by the rules’ and ille-
gal or even criminal organisations functioning in the informal
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economy cannot be effectively deputised. Controls and punishments
(fines, imprisonment) are needed to exert direct control on the labour
market. More importantly, the existence of a credible threat (a risk of
getting caught) may be the most important lever that turns ‘undeputa-
ble’ employers into ‘deputable’ ones. This framework for the exclusion
of irregular migrants from the labour market is summarised in table
3.1 below.
Table 3.1 The exclusion of irregular migrants from the labour market:
discouragementby deputation and control
Exclusion from documentation Exclusion through documentation
Deputation 1. Deputising employers
– administrative requirements
– authentification of ID
documents
2. Instrumentalising discontent
– industrial self-restraint
– private snitching
3. Limiting discretionary powers
1. Organising inter-agency
cooperation
2. Linking database systems
(labour, residence, social
security and migration, etc.)
3. Mandatory cross-checking of
data
Targeting
the
‘deputable
’!
targeting
the
‘undeputable
’
Control and
punishment
1. Controls and fines (increasing
the perceived risk of getting
caught)
1. Controls (not fines!)
2. Identification is integral part of
control system
3. Chain approach in control
system (control, detection,
identification, incarceration,
deportation)
Targeting institutions! targeting irregular migrants
The first logic of exclusion – exclusion from documentation and regis-
tration – is aimed at blocking the access to the formal entry tickets to
the labour market. These policies target the gatekeepers to the formal
labour market. The policy subject, one might say, is not the individual
irregular migrant himself, but all the institutions – in a very broad
sense – he needs to gain entry to the formal labour market. These in-
stitutions may include government institutions (such as the work per-
mits office), but are primarily private parties such as employers, sub-
contractors and temp agencies. Deputation is possible in a number of
cases. The central government can limit the discretionary room to
manoeuvre for lower level or decentralised state authorities – those is-
suing permits, for example – that deal with the labour market. In these
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cases, central governments limit the discretionary movement of street-
level bureaucrats even though these are already formally deputised.
Employers are obviously the prime targets for deputisation as they are
the de facto gatekeepers of the labour market. Their role can take var-
ious forms. Administrative requirements may scare off irregular mi-
grants lacking the proper papers, and an obligation to report informa-
tion on workers to the authorities helps detection and may also scare
off migrants. Making employers responsible for checking documents
and verifying their authenticity turns them almost into deputy immi-
gration officials. A third possibility is that the state organises the dis-
content of employers and employees, or even the general public, into
an advantage and a source of information for state policies. Employers
jealous of the competition or feeling cheated by colleagues who bend
the rules (and, in so doing, increase their margin of profit) can become
a source of information on irregular practices. However, there are lim-
its to deputation as it relies on self-restraint, law-abiding behaviour on
the part of the employer and a willingness to fulfil certain obligations.
It is therefore primarily suitable for formal institutions and organisa-
tions that will play by the rules. Whether or not employers and street-
level bureaucrats play by the rules is, among other factors, a matter of
balancing profits against the chance of getting caught for employers
and intermediary organisations. In the case of street-level bureaucrats,
it may also be a matter of balancing the discretionary room to man-
oeuvre against the chance of being reprimanded or worse.
He who cannot be deputised must be controlled. By controlling and
fining employers, the state raises the stakes, but only if it manages to
increase the chance of getting caught and – more importantly – the
perceived risk of getting caught. So it is not just a matter of increasing
control, more important is the increase in a credible threat of control.
Often, it is not the ‘balance of power’ that regulates the actors’ choices
and behaviour, but the ‘balance of threat’, an argument made in an in-
ternational relations theory by Walt (1985). In this way, bona fide em-
ployers and institutions may be coerced into compliance and may be-
come deputable. However, when the government is dealing with irreg-
ular migrants working in the shadow economy, it is likely to be
confronted with shady or even criminal institutions, organisations and
individuals that cannot be ‘deputised’ at all. Furthermore, some em-
ployers, who are usually not so shady, have hardly any fear of control.
In many countries, employing domestic workers for cleaning, childcare
and care of the elderly is commonplace and the often middle-class em-
ployers feel relatively certain that they will not be controlled by the
authorities. For these diverse groups, controls are the only means to in-
fluence behaviour. Increasing the real and perceived chance of getting
caught and being heavily fined is vital here as well: it is the only way of
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ending their business, making them go out of business or choosing an-
other business.
Policies targeting the individual irregular migrant himself, operating
under the second logic of exclusion, have an even greater need for
identification. It is no longer sufficient to establish that an individual
worker does not belong (and fine the employer) but it becomes neces-
sary to identify the irregular migrant himself. Under the first logic, the
aim is to block access to the labour market by using a system of paper
and digital gatekeepers, the second logic requires a database system
that can identify or re-identify irregular migrants. This makes deputa-
tion much more an affair of organising procedures within the govern-
ment. In essence, it requires new policies that change procedures and
routines within certain government institutions, shifting tasks from
‘mere’ exclusion of irregular migrants to contributing to the detection,
and identification of, irregular migrants. Sometimes it will mean new
tasks and procedures and sometimes it will entail a limitation of discre-
tionary room to manoeuvre. It requires the organisation of interagency
cooperation and, in particular, interconnection of the databases they
have at their disposal. It also requires an active policy of connecting
and crosschecking data between the various systems of information –
this time not to refuse access to certain institutions but to investigate
and verify status and identity. Governments that seriously intend to
limit the presence of irregular migrants in the labour market, and even
within the borders of the country, will have to adopt policy measures
that penetrate, rather than shield off, certain institutions. Registration
and documentation should be aimed at identification and actual re-
moval, rather than at refusing entry and discouragement. Needless to
say, the second logic requires a much more hands-on approach, mak-
ing surveillance and control even more important. Policies aimed at
immigrants, instead of employers, require a different mode of opera-
tion for the authorities involved. Controls are vital, but are only effec-
tive if apprehension and identification become an integral part of the
control procedures: first to detect illegal status and then turning irregu-
lar migrants over to the authorities that will establish their identity. Dif-
ferent authorities will have to cooperate as they all have different
sources and data systems that can be used for investigation and identi-
fication. And finally, a chain approach is necessary to make this an ef-
fective strategy resulting in the return of the irregular migrant to his
country of origin. Investing in control systems like this is only mean-
ingful if the whole chain – of control, detection, identification, incar-
ceration, deportation (see also chapter four on this issue) – is staffed,
funded and followed through by the authorities responsible for each
part of the chain. And of course, as the cliche´ will have it, a chain is
only as strong as its weakest link. Operating a control system like this
GUARDING THE ACCESS TO THE LABOUR MARKET 77
is labour-intensive, which also implies that the state has to be more se-
lective and choose its interventions well. The following paragraphs will
analyse how the policy approach and instruments to deal with irregular
migrants on the labour market that have been developed in Germany
and the Netherlands relate to these two logics of exclusion.
3.4 Exclusion from documentation
Entering the labour market in Germany and the Netherlands is a mat-
ter of paperwork, registration and cross-checking. Anyone – natives
and legal aliens alike – must fill out forms, hand over documents and
be ‘recognised’ by the proper systems and authorities. Anyone who
lacks the proper papers or is not registered where he or she should be
registered is a suspect employee in the eyes of Dutch and German la-
bour law. Over the years, a dense web of restrictions has developed:
regulations and registrations that together have formed paper and,
more and more, digital walls around the labour market. This network
can be used to shield the labour market and to identify irregular immi-
grants. Closing off the labour market through documents and registra-
tions is the ‘classic’ way of discouraging irregular migrants in both the
Netherlands and Germany. The exclusion also serves to prevent irregu-
lar migrants from holding tax-paying jobs on which they can build a
claim for regularisation at a later stage. As can be seen in the typology
described in the previous paragraph, ‘exclusion from documentation’
comprises two sections. The first is ‘databases and deputation’, i.e. the
digital wall around the labour market mentioned above. The second is
‘control and punishment’ indicating that this form of exclusion is also
in need of a more hands on approach of exclusion. Those who cannot
be deputised or those who were able to circumvent the digital wall can
only be reached and excluded through a credible system of controls.
3.4.1 Deputation and databases
Both in Germany and the Netherlands, the exclusion of irregular mi-
grants from documents and registration, and hence from the formal la-
bour market itself, is an interplay between government authorities and
employers. Authorities issue documents – or refuse to do so – and
employers are, to some extent, responsible for checking certain docu-
ments and legal requirements. Employers are increasingly responsible
for the ‘legality’ of their employees as a result of deputation by the
government.
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In Germany, a maze of bureaucratic institutions and registrations
impede access to the labour market. Vogel (2001: 329-335) describes
the obstacles through the example of two fictional ‘irregular migrants’
(with a different migration history) looking for work. Both Carol – a
Pole who entered on a tourist visa – and Maria – a Zairian woman who
entered illegally and is now an asylum claimant – are shown to have
virtually no chance of getting a job in the formal economy as a result
of the ‘dense jungle of German documentation, registration and data
management practices’ (Vogel 2001: 329). In Germany, employers are
obligated by law to ask for a prospective employee’s social security card
and the income tax card before hiring him (Sinn et al. 2005: 46). To
take up a job in the regular economy, this means that migrants must
possess both cards, which are impossible to get if they are not regis-
tered in the local registration office (Einwohnermeldebehorde) – as in the
case of Carol – or registered with restrictions for work – in the case of
Maria. In any case, both Carol and Maria would need a work permit.
For Carol, this is impossible due to his illegal residence. For Maria, this
is extremely difficult because her prospective employers would first
have to consider prioritised unemployed candidates suitable for the
job. If Maria could find an employer to hire her, she would be able to
get hold of a legal social security card, as the employer would apply for
the card and the authorities would send it without cross-checking.
However, she would still lack a tax card and a work permit, without
which few employers would hire her. The chances of getting either
would be slim. If either Carol or Maria were to use falsified papers,
they would probably be detected at a later stage, as their employers
would send the statutory health insurance provider the documents,
which would be cross-checked by a computer programme. As Vogel
(2001: 333) explains: ‘This verification procedure is made possible by
the fact that the last two numbers of any social security number are
calculated from the other numbers’. A slightly more effective strategy
would be to borrow papers from another person, but the cross-check-
ing of the health insurance provider is likely to result in notifying the
local branch of the federal labour office, which would investigate on
the basis of local files and other registrations and would contact the
employer for clarification on missing data and documents. Data cross-
checking will filter out many attempts by irregular migrants to secure
a legitimate job. Vogel (2001: 334) points out that these procedures will
not normally lead to much more than a warning letter to employers,
but ‘as a general rule will prevent the inadvertent hiring of undocu-
mented immigrants in the regular economy’. In other words, the sys-
tem in operation at the time of writing was both well-equipped as a
means of blocking access to the formal labour for irregular migrants as
well as a means to discourage employers from hiring them. Vogel
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(2001) suggests that employers may even suspect that there is a much
more efficient system of data crosschecking that the one that actually
exists. There is, in other words, an elaborate system of verification in
place that will alert authorities when ‘mismatches’ occur and has a dis-
couraging effect on employers.
In the Netherlands, an irregular migrant bounces off a similar wall of
registrations, documents and crosschecks. Most importantly an irregu-
lar migrant will not be able to legally obtain a social-fiscal number (SoFi
number), which is the main pre-condition and entry ticket when apply-
ing for a legal tax-paid job. A SoFi number, which is issued by the tax
authorities, can only be obtained on the basis of a valid residence permit
that is issued by the immigration authorities (IND) and a registration in
the population register, or the Municipal Basic Administration (Gemeen-
telijke Basisadministratie – GBA). For obvious reasons, this is not possi-
ble for irregular migrants. Irregular migrants can always try to work on
the SoFi number of a legal compatriot or obtained otherwise. There
have been cases of groups of people that were all working on one and
the same SoFi number. By now, though, the tax authorities have in-
serted in their database an ‘alert’ that is triggered if more than one
contract is registered on a single SoFi number. In principle, it is now
impossible for a group of people to work on one number (Barents &
Eijkelenboom 2006: 69). In November 2007, a ‘new’ identification
number, the so-called Citizen’s Service Number (Burger Service Num-
mer), replaced the SoFi number. The idea behind this change is that all
citizens and denizens would only have one number in their dealings
with various government agencies and administrations, instead of the
many that were in use before. This is, in other words, a centralisation of
‘identity management’ and an opportunity to streamline the connection
and interoperability of various databases, if they may be legally linked.
Exchange of information about one person is now made easier for gov-
ernment authorities. The municipalities issue the Citizen’s Service
Number when people register themselves in the Municipal Basic Ad-
ministration. Ironically, this produces a decentralisation vis-a`-vis the
limited number of tax offices that could once issue a SoFi number, and
may increase the possibilities for gaining fraudulent access to a Citizen’s
Service Number.10 Prins (2006) has argued that a single number may
be more attractive for swindlers and criminals (one number, multiple
access to various systems) and may thus increase the chance of identity
fraud.
In addition to the SoFi number, there is the general requirement
that employees must be able to identify themselves as a result of the
1994 Compulsory Identification Act. This is an important linchpin for
the deputation of employers. Employers have always been responsible
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for the ‘administrative legality’ of their employees, but in 2000 a new
article 15 was inserted into the Aliens Employment Act (WAV) that ob-
ligates employers to check the identity of employers and to keep a copy
of their identification on file. This was a reaction to the growing use of
subcontractors. At the same time, a new article 16 enabled the Labour
Inspectorate to exchange information with other authorities. So cur-
rently, employers are legally obliged to check the identity papers of
their employees, to keep copies of them in their administration and to
make sure that employees will be able to produce identity papers if
called upon by the authorities during an inspection. In its 2006 year
plan, the Dutch Labour Inspectorate added extra weight to employer’s
responsibilities when it announced that employers not cooperating in
establishing the identity of employees will no longer be guilty of a mis-
demeanour but of a criminal offence and fined accordingly. This is a
strong form of deputation that raises questions on the limits, and the
extent of, the employers’ responsibility for the ‘legality’ of their work-
force, especially in an age in which ‘identity fraud’ is taking on a wide-
spread character (Barensen & Eijkelenboom 2006: 62). Against a back-
drop of intensified controls and much higher fines in recent years (see
paragraph 3.4.2), the incentive for employers to increase their efforts
on the matter of the control of documents has become bigger. The gov-
ernment also tries to facilitate this process. In 2003 the Labour Inspec-
torate sent a brochure out to 700,000 employers, detailing how to veri-
fy the identity of their employees. A number of CWI offices (employ-
ment agency/social security services) have started with a pilot with so-
called verification and information points. At these points employers
can have the identification documents of their employees checked
(Barensen & Eijkelenboom 2006). This is a government service, but it
will not necessarily remain so. Furthermore, if this system will be
spread out, it will put extra pressure on employers to make use of it
(‘You could have known…’ may be the accusation). The tax authorities
were looking into something similar for the link between identity docu-
ments and the SoFi number (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en
Integratie 2004: 26). Another recent innovation that draws employers
deeper into the labour market control system is the introduction of the
First Day Notification (Eerstedagmeldding). The government introduced
a compulsory notification to the tax authorities prior to the actual first
workday of new employees. This way, when an employer is being in-
vestigated and irregular workers are found, employers cannot use the
classic pretence that an irregular worker only started working the day
prior to the inspection (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integra-
tie 2004: 23; Barensen & Eijkelenboom 2006: 69).
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In both countries employers – in a broad sense – are encouraged to
function as gatekeepers to the institution of the labour market. They
are encouraged not only by the direct deputation of employers, but also
by stimulating self-regulation at the level of industries and employers’
federations. This holds true especially for those sectors in which irregu-
lar migrant labour is a common phenomenon, sectors that are well-
organised at industry level and which have also been highlighted by
the government as prime sectors for labour market controls (see also
paragraph 3.4.2). So it is especially ‘notorious’ sectors such as construc-
tion (in both countries, but particularly Germany), commercial temp
agencies and agriculture and horticulture (particularly in the Nether-
lands) that start up projects to counter undeclared labour and irregular
migrant labour. Unsurprisingly, governments are more than willing to
lend a hand. In Germany, the Finance Ministry is setting up joint cam-
paigns with the construction sector and the transport sector under ral-
lying cries such as ‘Schwarzarbeit. Nicht mit mir!’ and ‘Illegal ist unso-
zial’ (see also Sinn et al. 2005: 50). In the Dutch construction sector,
employer federations and unions jointly introduced an agency for com-
pliance in the construction sector (Bureau Naleving Bouwnijverheid) that
gathers information and tips from sector workers and employers and
exchanges this information with the controlling authorities (Podium
2006: 1). The employers’ federation for agriculture and horticulture
(LTO Nederland) runs a special programme to certify specialised temp
agencies for the sector to ensure they won’t send irregular migrant
workers to the employers using these agencies for flex workers.11 This
form of deputation at the meso-level of industries has its own logic.
Employer federations want to be responsible partners of the govern-
ment and also have to look out for their members, whose interests
may be shifting from non-compliance to labour laws, to compliance as
controls and fines increase. Unions also have important incentives to
stand against irregular migrant labour, as they ‘threaten’ the legal work-
ers by undercutting prices and offering greater flexibility than their le-
gal co-workers. However, in sectors where irregular labour is rife, these
initiatives are unlikely to turn the tables on the phenomenon of irregu-
lar migrant labour. On the other hand, deputation doesn’t stop at the
level of industries and unions. In fact, control authorities, such as the
Labour Inspectorate or the German custom authorities, get much of
the information that guides their controls from the general public in
the form of tips and information about ‘suspicious’ workplaces or
workers. Citizens, employers (jealous or wary of unfair competition)
and legal co-workers often point the authorities in the direction of ir-
regular migrant workers, their employers and the places they work. In
the Netherlands, a significant number of controls and investigations by
the authorities are based on tips (Arbeidsinspectie 2007). For
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Germany, Sinn et al. (2005: 47) and Stobbe (2004: 101) maintain that
external controls are triggered by two sources of information. First,
they are conducted on the basis of information and analyses by the
authorities themselves (both those directly responsible for labour mar-
ket control, and other authorities such as the police, social insurance
agencies, etc.). Secondly, controls are initiated because of information
and tips received from the general public (business competitors, neigh-
bours, trade unions and regular employees).
Lastly, deputation can also apply to those who already are formally
deputies, i.e. the public and semi-public authorities that control the
registrations and issue the documents that irregular migrants need to
get access to the labour market. To make exclusion work, these agen-
cies will have to improve their information exchange to increase the
control on ineligibilities. Secondly, the central government will want to
limit discretionary powers that may result in cracks in the paper or di-
gital walls. In the Netherlands, especially, the existing maze of bureau-
cratic requirements was not originally set up to exclude irregular mi-
grants. Over time, it has been made to function as such, as laws to that
effect were introduced during the 1990s. Van der Leun (2003: 170)
showed that the exclusion of irregular migrants by various authorities
has become stricter over the years. Especially in those sectors where
workers have a lower level of professionalisation, there is tendency to
comply with the new laws, which results in thicker digital or paper
walls that effectively shut out irregular migrants. This legalistic ap-
proach is also found in Germany – perhaps even more so. The Dutch’s
more lenient approach, grounded in a tradition of gedogen (‘toleration’),
is hardly a part of German ‘bureaucratic history’. In 2001, Cyrus and
Vogel (2003) conducted in-depth research on the German Federal La-
bour Office (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit), which, among many other tasks,
is responsible for decisions on work permits and the combat of illegal
employment. The latter task has been centralised at the Customs
authorities in 2004. Their research focused on the decision-making
procedures in granting or refusing work permits and on the level of
discretion of street-level bureaucrats. The research concludes that these
important gatekeepers of the labour market have a legalistic, profes-
sional attitude in which regulations from higher levels within the hier-
archy are closely followed. Employment relations are hierarchical, and
employees are aware that their decisions will be subject to scrutiny by
higher levels of the organisation. As a result, they try to solve cases
face-to-face within their level of hierarchy and in accordance with writ-
ten norms, such as regulations, decrees and operating instructions is-
sued at the level of the German Federation and the refinements at the
level of the La¨nder (Cyrus & Vogel 2003: 253). The fact that Germany
does not have a linking act may be explained by the fact that it does
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not seem to need it. According to Vogel (2001), a practice of cross-
checking and exchanging data between the various agencies that are re-
sponsible for labour market access has developed.
Identification procedures in the German labour market are charac-
terized by organizational decentralization and fragmentation, on
the one hand, and cooperation and central databases on the other.
(Vogel 2001: 340)
Obviously, crosschecking databases, curtailing street-level bureaucrat’s
room to manoeuvre and deputising employers can only attribute to the
exclusion of irregular migrants from the labour market inasfar as em-
ployers and irregular migrants have some connection with the formal
labour market. Not all employers are ‘deputable’ and not all irregular
migrants seek access to legal documentation. Employers determined to
make use of irregular labour and/or irregular migrant workers can only
be approached through more active policies of control and punishment.
3.4.2 Control and punishment
The proof of the pudding is always in the eating. When governments
reach the limits of what they can achieve through regulations (what is
and isn’t allowed, according to the law) and through deputation (out-
sourcing control to employers and other actors), they must turn to
more active policies if they want to intensify internal migration control
further. In both countries, successive governments have tried to in-
crease their grip on labour market fraud, tried to curtail irregular mi-
grant access to the labour market and consequently have stepped up di-
rect controls on the labour market. Vogel (2006) summed up the re-
cent developments in labour market control in Germany under the
heading: ‘ho¨her – schneller – weiter!’. This has resulted in higher fines,
speedier controls as a result of computerisation and innovations such
as chip cards and more means and personnel for the control authori-
ties. As the following pages will show ‘higher, faster and more’ is also
an apt slogan for recent Dutch policy developments. The aim of labour
market controls is primarily a matter of raising the stakes for employ-
ers, irregular migrants and intermediaries. Entering the labour market
will become more difficult if the chance of being controlled increases.
Recruiting irregular migrant workers is much less attractive if the
chance of getting caught –or even the perceived chance of getting
caught – increases. In other words, the primary aim of controls is still
discouragement, also in recognition of the fact that it is simply impossi-
ble to subject all employers to controls. A number of trends stand out
in both countries: increases in manpower and controls, a more
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restrictive policy framework and higher fines and a more targeted ap-
proach, often organised in special control teams, consisting of various
enforcement authorities.
Organisation and manpower
In 1999, the Netherlands Court of Audit established that the Labour
Inspectorate (Arbeidsinspectie) employed approximately 80 inspectors
responsible for inspections under the Aliens Employment Act (WAV)
(Algemene Rekenkamer 1999: 9). The report notes that this consti-
tutes a significant increase compared to 1993, but no specific numbers
are mentioned. Institutional and organisational changes in labour mar-
ket control system also influenced the numbers of inspectors. In 2000,
the Dutch government decided to create a new agency, the Social Intel-
ligence and Research Unit (SIOD), a new investigative unit with the
broad task of investigating cases on all matters concerning the Ministry
of Social Affairs and Employment. The launch of the SIOD in 2002
entailed a new division of labour and responsibilities between the La-
bour Inspectorate and the SIOD. The Labour Inspectorate is responsi-
ble for the less complicated investigative tasks under the Aliens Em-
ployment Act, while the SIOD takes care of the heavy cases involving
criminal organisations and requiring an inter-sectoral approach
(Arbeidsinspectie 2002: 48). The creation of the SIOD entailed the
transfer of a significant part of the Labour Inspectorate’s capacity to
the SIOD. A large number of inspectors (35FTE) were transferred to
the SIOD and the Labour Inspectorate aimed to be back at normal
strength (100FTE) in 2004 (Arbeidsinspectie 2002: 50). However,
since then the political priority for labour market surveillance and the
fight against the employment of irregular migrants has been intensi-
fied almost every year, resulting in a significant rise in the number of
inspectors after the Labour Inspectorate’s ‘losses’ to the SIOD had been
replenished. In 2003, the number of inspectors stood at 91, rising to
131 in 2004, 170 in 2006 and coming to a provisional halt at 180 in-
spectors in 2006. In short, the number of inspectors dealing with ir-
regular migrant labour was more than doubled and, in addition to that,
large-scale fraud involving irregular migrants is now being investigated
by the SIOD, the new investigative branch of labour market control.
The German numbers dwarf those in the Netherlands, even when
compensated for the obvious differences between the two countries.
The 1981 law on the control of illegal employment (Gesetz zur Beka¨mp-
fung der illegalen Bescha¨ftigung) introduced new measures on informa-
tion exchange among agencies, heightened the fines and deputised
transport companies by obliging them to cooperate with migration con-
trols. In addition to the development of the legal instruments and in-
tensification of sanctions, the number of staff involved in workplace
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controls at the Federal German Labour office (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit)
was continually increased (Scho¨nwa¨lder et al. 2006: 72). External con-
trols used to be a task of the German labour offices and the Custom Ad-
ministration (Hauptzolla¨mter). Since the last major reform of the legal
framework in 2004, the responsibility for labour market controls has
been centralised. Since the entry into force of the new law (Schwarz-
arbeitsbeka¨mfungsgesetz), it is the federal customs organisation and,
more specifically the Department for Financial control of irregular em-
ployment (Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit – FKS) in Cologne that holds
the exclusive mandate. According to Cyrus, Du¨vell and Vogel (2004:
55), the number of inspectors at the Labour Offices increased from 50
to 2,450 in the years between 1982 and 1998. Since then numbers
have risen both autonomously and as a result of the centralisation of
responsibilities at the Customs office that entailed a transfer of staff
from the labour offices to the Customs office. In the early 2000s, there
were 5,200 customs officials fighting against undeclared work and ille-
gal employment and according to the Federal Ministry of Finance, this
figure will rise to 7,000 officials in the course of the year 2005, the en-
suing personnel costs amounting to about E 250 million (Sinn et al.
2005: 75-76).
Increasing controls and rising fines
With the rising numbers of inspectors the Dutch Labour Inspectorate
has significantly stepped up its controls. In the years 2001-2003 the
number of inspections dropped, but this was largely due to the ‘trans-
fer’ of inspection capacity to the newly founded SIOD. Obviously the
loss of capacity to the SIOD is not a full loss as these inspectors are for
a large part also working on cases that involve the employment of ir-
regular migrants. After that, the increase in labour market inspectors
translates into a rapidly increasing number of labour market inspec-
tions (see table 3.2).
With the increase of the inspections, the number of fined employers
has also risen substantially (from 783 fined employers in 1999 to 3,197
in 2006). However, the main reason for the recent steep increase in
the number of reports of offence and fines has been the introduction
of the administrative fine in January 2005. In fact, the administrative
fine has been a proverbial ‘giant leap’ for the Labour Inspectorate. Prior
to 2005 the procedure for fining employers that violated the Aliens
Employment Act was a lengthy and somewhat cumbersome procedure.
The Labour Inspectorate drew up a report after an inspection revealed
that an employer illegally employed irregular migrants and other work-
ers and sent its report of offence to the public prosecution department
(OM). The public prosecutor then determined the height of the fine. In
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1999, the public prosecution department set a fine of 2,000-5,000
Dutch guilders per illegally employed person in the case of a first of-
fence as a general guideline. However, in practice the Court of Audit
found in 1999 that the fines were usually equal to, or below, the mini-
mum fine of 2,000 guilders (Algemene Rekenkamer 1999). The pub-
lic prosecution department argued that it was a lack of information in
the reports of the Labour Inspectorate that was the bottleneck of the
whole procedure and, hence, the root of the relatively low fines. In
2004, the Court of Audit looked into the matter again and concluded
that the fines that the Public Prosecutor imposed were still too low to
have a deterring effect on employers. This lack of deterrence had much
to do with the fact that fines had only risen 10 per cent over the years
coming to an average amount of E 980 per illegally employed person
(Algemene Rekenkamer 2004). The introduction of the administrative
fine made life a lot easier for the Labour Inspectorate, as it could now
fine employers directly, instead of through the channel of the public
prosecutor. The procedure is faster and administratively less complex,
but above all, the fines have been raised substantially. Since 2005, an
employer is fined E 8,000 per illegally employed worker; if the em-
ployer is a repeat offender, the fine goes up to E 12,000. In the case of
a private person as an employer, the fine is set at E 4,000 and at
E 6,000 for repeat offenders. If the labour inspectors find administra-
tive deficiencies concerning the hiring, contracting and subcontracting
of alien workers, employers are fined E 1,500 per deficiency. The De-
partment for Social Affairs and Employment considers the administra-
tive fine a very successful tool in the fight against the illegal employ-
ment of irregular migrants (Staatssecretaris van Sociale Zaken en
Werkgelegenheid 2006).
In Germany, the large number of inspectors also translates into high
numbers of controls. Sinn et al. (2005: 48) state:
Due to the relatively large number of checks and the intensive co-
operation and data-technological interconnection, the frequency
and intensity of checks can be regarded as high, in comparison to
other industrial countries.
However, keeping track of statistics concerning controls and fines is
even harder than in the Dutch case. The recent transfer of responsibil-
ities from the labour offices to the federal customs authorities compli-
cate matters further. Statistics until 2003 by the labour offices give
some insight into the development in the control system (see table 3.3).
Between 1992 and 2003, the number of warnings and fines has gener-
ally decreased while the number of reports of offence (the start of legal
proceedings) has increased over time. For the period 2000-2003, the
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numbers of the employees that are warned, fined or prosecuted are
available separately. However, the statistics do not distinguish between
legal foreigners workers irregularly and irregular migrants working ir-
regularly (Kreienbrink & Sinn 2006: 24).
Table 3.3 Warnings, fines and reports of offence resulting from labour market
controls, employers and employees, Germany, 1992-2003
Year Warnings and fines Reports of offence
Employers and
employees
Of which foreigners
working irregularly
Employers and
employees
Of which foreigners
working irregularly
1992 18,928 4,131
1993 30,736 5,884
1994 36,876 5,281
1995 42,402 6,486
1996 46,160 9,147
1997 43,157 11,484
1998 37,740 10,597
1999 42,881 9,919
2000 41,255 17,445 11,374 5,165
2001 30,486 12,591 10,409 5,411
2002 31,342 12,881 13,728 6,611
2003 27,670 11,052 13,931 6,355
Source: Kreienbrink & Sinn 2006: 23-24
In Germany, at least until 2003, legal procedures were gaining in im-
portance when compared to fines. Even so, the height of the fines was
upped in 2000 and in 2002. Since 2002, employers who employ ille-
gal aliens (or, who irregularly employ aliens) are no longer subject to a
fine of maximum E 250,000, but are liable for double that amount
(E 500,000). Since 2004, social security fraud by employers can be
punished with prison sentences up to five years (Vogel 2006; see also
Sinn et al. 2005: 49). The actual height of the fines and the length of
the terms of imprisonment depend on the seriousness of the violations
of the labour law, the number of illegal aliens employed and the condi-
tions of their employment. Employees can also be fined up to E 5,000
for working without a permit. The German authorities seem to have a
similar problem as the Dutch authorities with enforcing the system of
fines and imprisonment that hinges on the role of the prosecutors and
the courts. Sinn et al. (2005: 49) point out that courts are inclined to
lower the fines because of lack of evidence, often resulting from the re-
luctance of employees to testify against employers. They observe that
there is ample room for the employer and the employee to make a deal
and ‘stick to a story’. Also, the reports of offence sometimes reach the
public prosecutor’s office after the irregular migrant already entered
the repatriation procedures, which complicates the collection of
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evidence. Nonetheless, more recent figures from the federal customs
authorities do indicate that the new 2004 law and the steep increase in
personnel have resulted in a very substantial increase in the numbers
of controls in recent years (see table 3.4). This would suggest that the
pressure on employers is rising in Germany.
Table 3.4 Labour market controls in Germany, employers and employees,
2003-2006
2003 2004 2005 2006
Persons controlled at the worksite 79,269 264,500 355,876 423,175
Controls of employers 32,572 104,965 78,316 83,258
Sources: Bundeskriminalamt 2004: 50; Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit 200812
Between 2003 and 2006 the number of controls increased signifi-
cantly. The number of employers who were inspected more than
doubled, while the number of employees who were checked increased
more than fivefold.
Risk analyses and specialised control units
During the 1990s, the Dutch approach to the problem of illegal em-
ployment of irregular migrants lacked an information-based strategy.
In 1999 the Dutch Court of Audit concluded that the inspections
lacked a systematic approach based on a risk analysis. The control sys-
tem was thus open to so-called ‘white spots’, sectors that may be heav-
ily populated with illegal labour, but are nonetheless left in peace (Al-
gemene Rekenkamer 1999: 5, 18). Since then, the Labour Inspectorate
Table 3.2 Labour market controls and reports of offence/administrative fines,
1999-2006 in the Netherlands
Year Controls Reports of offence/
administrative fines
1999 6,034 783
2000 5,040 718
2001 3,840 739
2002 3,737 688
2003 3,700 731
2004 5,950 1,063
2005 8,633 2,201*
2006 11,026 3,013
Source: Arbeidsinspectie 2000-2007
* From 2005 onwards, it is not the number of reports of offence, but the number of
administrative fines that is counted. In reality, the number of administrative fines in 2005 is
well over 2,500 because in many cases both employer and facilitator are fined
(Arbeidsinspectie 2005: 67).
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has invested in a risk analysis based approach to labour market fraud,
leading to the selection of certain sectors as ‘risk sectors’ and to the in-
troduction of a number of special intervention teams. If we go by the
facts and figures of the most recent year report of the Labour Inspecto-
rate (Arbeidsinspectie 2007) we get the following ‘top five’ of sectors in
which the employment of irregular workers is the highest: (1) retail
trade, (2) agriculture and horticulture, (3) hotel and catering industry,
(4) construction and (5) temp agencies. A number of these sectors of
the Dutch economy have been ‘classics’ over the years (most notably 1,
3 and 4) and some, such as temp agencies, have become problematic
sectors in recent years. In the latter case, it has been an official govern-
ment policy to deregulate the sector of employment intermediation
that that cleared the way for a fast rising number of legal, shady and
criminal temp agencies that mediate in the demand for irregular la-
bour (Van der Leun & Kloosterman 2006). The year report over 2006
also gives an interesting breakdown of the controls, in terms of the in-
formation source on which the control was started, revealing the La-
bour Inspectorate’s underlying risk calculation. The largest number of
controls were on the Labour Inspectorate’s own initiative (based on
their own information analysis), second were the controls that were
conducted in cooperation with other partners in the so-called interven-
tion teams and third were the controls that were started up on the ba-
sis of tips and other notifications from outside of the inspectorate (Ar-
beidsinspectie 2007: 10). The ‘returns’ on the controls (in terms of
number of fined illegally employed persons) are highest when the con-
trols are based on tips of the general public, underscoring the effective-
ness of using the general public’s discontent to the state’s advantage.
Since the late 1990s, the Dutch government has introduced an in-
creasing number of so-called intervention teams for those sectors of
the economy that have a high risk profile for employing workers illeg-
ally and employing irregular migrant workers. There were some early
predecessors such as the Clothing Intervention Team that was active
during the years 1994-1997 and targeted the predominantly Turkish
sewing shops in Amsterdam (Raes et al. 2002). The intervention teams
are made up of inspectors and officials of various government agencies
such as the Labour Inspectorate, Tax authorities, Social Insurance
Bank, Public Prosecutors Office, municipalities and the Aliens Police.
Within these teams, the patchwork of government control agencies is
pulled together. In the 2004 white paper on irregular migrants, the
Dutch government announced its intention to create a ‘nation-wide
network of intervention teams’ (Minister van Vreemdelingenzaken en
Integratie 2004: 24). In addition to existing (or previously operational)
intervention teams, such as the Westland, Construction and Confection
intervention teams, there will be new teams for sectors such as
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warehouses and distribution. Despite the fact that a number of these
teams have been in operation for some years, there are no systematic
evaluations of their effectiveness. There was a recent more procedural
evaluation of the ‘internal’ cooperation that gave an overall picture of
satisfaction with the interagency cooperation in the intervention teams.
Tellingly, however, it points to the participation of the police and to pro-
blems with information exchange and access to the systems of the var-
ious participations as priorities for improvement (Castenmiller et al.
2007). The police have to deal with multiple demands on their ser-
vices, and the information systems of the various organisations are not
always able to ‘communicate’. The Ministry of Social Affairs is setting
up a system for the intervention teams to overcome the difficulties, but
none of the members of intervention teams were aware of this at the
time of the evaluation (ibid: 17). Moreover, different sectors have differ-
ent problems in terms of labour law violations and the structural char-
acteristics of certain sectors also influence employers’ behaviour and
the impact of the control system. Not all sectors are equal and there-
fore not all intervention teams achieve, or are able to achieve, the same
results.
Why some sectors are more equal than others
One of the earliest intervention teams was the Clothing Intervention
Team. In the early 1990s, it was a public secret that illegal practices,
especially involving irregular migrant labour, were widespread in
the Amsterdam garment industry (Raes et al. 2002). Until 1993, it
was estimated that 10,000 illegal workers, migrant or otherwise,
worked in this sector. State responses were twofold. First, there were
legal initiatives such as the extension of the Dutch Act on Chain Lia-
bility to the garment sector in 1994, which made retailers formally
responsible for the illegal practices of their contractors. Secondly,
the authorities organised crackdowns through the introduction of a
Clothing Intervention Team, which organised raids on Turkish sew-
ing shops and especially targeted violations of the Aliens Employ-
ment Act (WAV). The activities of this intervention team were one
of the main reasons for the nearly complete disappearance of the
garment industry in the Dutch capital (Raes et al. 2002). However,
the demise of the Turkish garment industry in Amsterdam also had
a lot to do with changing strategies among retailers (who were rely-
ing more on imports from low wage countries).
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A traditional Dutch sector in which irregular migrant labour is com-
mon is agriculture and horticulture. For years, the Labour Inspecto-
rate noted a 20 per cent average of violations of the Aliens Employ-
ment Act during their controls. Only recently, has this figure started
dropping, reaching 17.5 per cent in 2005 and 13 per cent in 2006
(Arbeidsinspectie 2007b). The percentage of irregular resident mi-
grants involved in labour market fraud is, however, relatively stable
(18 per cent). The sector as a whole is marked by specific character-
istics: the vast majority of irregularly employed aliens are Poles and
other migrants from Middle and Eastern Europe. At the same time,
the number of work permits issued for the sector has been on the
rise for years: from 9,675 in 2002 to 39,645 in 2006. Ninety-two
per cent of these permits are granted to Poles and other migrants
from Middle and Eastern Europe. The Labour Inspectorate attributes
the drop in labour law violations to the wider availability of permits,
measures taken by the sector itself and an increase of controls.
However, this general picture contrasts sharply with a geographically
more specific part of the sector.
If agriculture and horticulture are ‘traditional’ sectors of aliens la-
bour law violations, then the greenhouses of the Westland district
are ‘notorious’. The Westland Intervention Team (WIT) specifically
targets this district of greenhouses that is roughly wedged in be-
tween the large cities of The Hague and Rotterdam. The team be-
came operational in 1999 and conducts controls in cooperation with
a number of different control authorities. Despite these controls and
the general tightening of the legal framework (including the intro-
duction of the administrative fine), the Westland still lives up to its
reputation. While the Labour Inspectorate found 13 per cent of viola-
tions of the Aliens Employment Act for the sector as a whole (not
including the Westland), the WIT scored 35 per cent for the same
year (2006). The Labour Inspectorate points especially to the supply
side to explain the differences: the proximity of large cities and spe-
cialised intermediaries and temp agencies (Arbeidsinspectie 2007b).
However, other explanations may also be feasible. The demand may
be high because of availability, and/or simply because of profitabil-
ity, because the chance of getting caught is a calculated risk or be-
cause irregular migrant labour is a necessary lever to make a profit
and to keep business afloat. Furthermore, outsourcing this industry
is possible in theory but – in contrast to the garment industry – is
hardly possible, economically or politically.
In Germany, controls are based on both the analysis of the authorities
themselves and on the basis of tips and information received from the
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general public (Stobbe 2004: 101). The prime sector for labour market
controls, especially since the Berlin ‘building boom’ started in the early
1990s, has been the construction sector. Another reason for its central
place in the control regime is the fact that this is a sector in which the
numbers of irregular migrant workers are often considered not to be
dropping, in spite of the many controls (Liedtke 2005: 212). Over the
years, a number of other sectors have been put forward as prime sec-
tors for irregular migrant employment, such as hotel/catering, trans-
portation, cleaning services, the food industry and agriculture (Liedtke
2005; Bundesregierung 2005: 107). However, Scho¨nwa¨lder et al.
(2006: 48) are very critical of the information the German government
has on the distribution of irregular migrants workers over the various
sectors of the economy.
The basis of individual estimations is often not transparent or it is
derived from individual examples. Workplace controls by the
authorities are not systematically evaluated. In the absence of such
systematic evaluation, the reports of the authorities on the raids
carried out and cases of illegal employment discovered can only
be dealt with as individual cases.
The fact that the construction sector has been a hotbed of irregular mi-
grant labour in Germany is, however, relatively uncontested. Especially
during Berlin’s construction boom in the 1990s, special teams were
formed to counter illegal employment in construction. According to
Martin and Miller (2000), the very large teams, composed of police-
men and labour inspectors, organised at least one major inspection of
a construction site per month.
A major work site inspection involves up to 100 police with dogs to
surround the construction site to prevent anyone from leaving dur-
ing the inspection, and 200 to 300 labour inspectors to check the
legal status of each worker on the site. (Martin & Miller 2000: 23)
However, there are also some indications that illegal employment dur-
ing this period of rapid expansion of the building industry in the Ger-
man capital has also been tacitly approved (Sinn et al. 2005: 48).
The Bundesregierung (2005: 107) also states that a ‘sectoral shift’ is
in progress. Private employment of irregular migrants is supposed to
become relatively more important. Van der Leun and Kloosterman
(2006) hypothesise about a similar shift from more ‘public’ to more
‘private’ spheres in the Netherlands. A sectoral shift towards private
households – in building activities such as house renovations, for ex-
ample – and the well-known but hardly touched upon ‘private sector’
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of the domestic aid for cleaning, childcare and care for the elderly
causes problems for control agencies. Female migrants, in particular,
tend to be employed in domestic work, which is only very seldom a
tax-paying job, regardless of the legal status of the domestic worker. In
this sector, as in many others, migrant workers are not necessarily ille-
gal residents, sometimes they just lack a legal right to work or ‘only’
engage in labour market fraud through tax evasion. The literature on
female regular and irregular migration and domestic work shows a
clear divide between the north and the south of Europe. In many
Southern European countries, the 24-hour live-in domestic worker is a
normal phenomenon, whereas countries such as Germany, the UK and
the Netherlands tend to employ domestic workers on live-out condi-
tions (Anderson 2000; Jordan 2006). In her characterisation of mi-
grant domestic workers in various European cities, Anderson (2000:
85) places Berlin in the quadrant typified by ‘live-out’ working condi-
tions and a ‘documented’ status. That does not mean that there are no
irregular migrants in domestic work in Northern Europe, as both
Anderson herself documents and as can be seen from other studies
such as those by Philip Anderson (2004) and Lutz (2007). Because the
demand for migrant domestic work is not met through special recruit-
ment policies as it is in on a certain scale in the Southern Europe, Lutz
(2007b: 189) maintains that countries such as Germany and the
Netherlands ‘(…) ignore the existence of this phenomenon by trans-
forming it into a ‘twilight zone’ that exists only as an irregular market’.
This twilight zone gives female irregular migrants a certain shelter
against government control, although not against dangers of exploita-
tion and violence that employment in private households can entail.
Cyrus and Vogel (2006: 104) indicate that most of the women they in-
terviewed who worked in a domestic setting were unafraid of the ‘vir-
tual possibility’ of labour market controls. Work in the private sphere is
an obvious ‘white spot’ for labour market controls. If governments
would like to change this, it would probably cause more problems for
the German authorities than it would for the Dutch authorities. There
are a number of reasons why the German authorities do not and can-
not control private households, ranging from the constitutional protec-
tion of the private household to considerations of effectiveness and a
low public ‘visibility’ (Stobbe 2004: 103; Sinn et al. 2005: 48). When in
2001 they did look behind the front door – the authorities in Frankfurt
raided 200 private households for the first time – it created such a
public outcry about the intrusion on the private sphere that they were
also the last. Nonetheless, the German government tried to include the
private sphere when it introduced its new legislation for labour market
control in 2004. This proposed intrusion into the private homes of
German citizens was heavily criticised in the ensuing parliamentary
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and public debates. It was ultimately withdrawn from the bill (Cyrus,
Du¨vell & Vogel 2004: 55). In contrast, the Dutch Construction Inter-
vention Team is increasingly directing its attention to construction
work at private households, primarily on the basis of tips (Bosse &
Houwerzijl 2006). In 2005, for example, half of the controls that the
Labour Inspectorate conducted in the construction sector were at pri-
vate households, which has caused no public unrest to speak of. How-
ever, controls in private homes for domestic work are also unheard of
in the Netherlands. Despite the common knowledge that domestic
work can almost be equated with labour market fraud (at the very least,
tax evasion), this traditional ‘white spot’ is left unbothered and has
never been prioritised by the labour control authorities.
In the day-to-day practice of labour market controls, the exclusive
mandate for the Customs authorities since 2004 does not mean that
there is no cooperation with other authorities. Cooperation at the level
of information exchange, coordination and joint investigations are
commonplace. The Bundesregierung (2005: 108) lists eleven organisa-
tions that work together on controls and information exchange, includ-
ing the police, the border police, immigration authorities and social in-
surance authorities at the federal level and the level of the La¨nder. The
competences of the inspectors of the customs authorities are, however,
remarkable. Since 1998, the officers of the custom authorities have the
same rights and duties as police officers. That means that the inspec-
tors no longer have to call on the police if in the course of their investi-
gation certain suspicious facts – indicating an offence or misdemea-
nour – emerge (Sinn et al. 2005: 47). Vogel’s qualification of faster
(‘schneller’) had to do with the increased possibilities for checking and
cross-checking documents as the result of new technologies. Faster
thus applies to the databases, registrations and crosschecking underta-
ken via the ‘back office’ of the control authorities, though also to the in-
creasing opportunities authorities have for carrying out checks on the
spot. Sinn et al. (2005: 47) point out that the checking of identities and
legal status through the verification of documentation is an integral
part of external controls. The introduction of new documentary require-
ments intended to prove ‘legality’ went hand in hand with new data
systems that allow for fast track ‘checking procedures’:
So wurde zum Beispiel zuna¨chst ein Sozialversicherungsausweis einge-
fu¨hrt, dann wurde es in einigen Branchen verpflichtend, den Ausweis
am Arbeitsplatz mitzufu¨hren, und heute soll in einem Pilotprojekt in
Berlin-Brandenburg mit offen getragenen Chipkarten experimentiert
werden. (Vogel 2006: 112)
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The Bundesregierung (2005: 111) underscores the contribution that on-
line access during the controls to the databases of the social services,
labour offices and the central aliens register could make to the effec-
tiveness of the controls. However, controls aren’t the only measures ta-
ken in Germany against the illegal employment of irregular migrants.
The intensifications of the control regime aimed at the exclusion of ir-
regular migrants are implemented alongside measures to widen the
possibilities for legal labour migration, especially in some sectors
where irregular migrant workers were/are commonplace. In the case
of Germany, these ‘new guest worker schemes’ already started in the
early 1990s, for example, for seasonal labour in agriculture and sub-
contracting to foreign construction companies for the construction in-
dustry. Most of the schemes were meant to accommodate and legalise
irregular labour migrants from Eastern Europe, especially Poland.
Though the intention was to regularise irregular labour migration, this
goal has only been met partially, as the new schemes could not com-
pensate for all the demand and also opened up new possibilities for
fraud and irregular labour migration (Menz 2001; see also Broeders
2001: 145-146). In fact, the new government schemes also required
new control efforts on behalf of the state, as is often the case. All in all,
a clear example of what Portes and Haller (2005: 409) call a ‘paradox
of state control’ meaning that ‘(…) official efforts to obliterate unregu-
lated activities through the proliferation of rules and controls often ex-
pand the very conditions that give rise to these activities’.
Higher, faster, more!…more effective?
A question remains as to whether all these investments in technology,
interoperability, manpower and control capabilities amount to a more
effective labour market control regime and to a decrease in irregular
migrant labour and labour market fraud. As can be seen from the sta-
tistical material gathered and presented above, ‘effectiveness’ is hard to
measure on the basis of the available data. Furthermore, the fact that
no data at all are available on the target population – in this case, the
‘stock’ of irregular migrant workers – makes it even more difficult to
comment on effectiveness. There is a general lack of reliable evalua-
tions of controls and the working of the various intervention teams, as
many researchers have observed before. For the Dutch case, there is an
evaluation study on the internal procedures of the intervention teams
and there are two studies on employers’ compliance with the aliens la-
bour law based on surveys and interviews with employers (Mosselman
& Van Rij 2005; Groenewoud & Van Rij 2007). All three studies have
been commissioned by the authorities themselves. The two surveys
among employers have methodological ‘flaws’ that seriously influence
the reliability of the answers that employers give. The responsible
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Minister for Social Affairs and Employment aims to seek alternative ve-
nues of research to gain insight into compliance among employers
(Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2007). That being
said, the studies do give some insight into the relative weight employ-
ers ascribe to the various factors that influence their choice on whether
or not to employ irregular migrants. The material may not give much
insight into the actual developments in irregular employment and the
control thereof, but it does say something about the employers’ percep-
tion of the field. As such, it comments on the ‘balance of threat’, rather
than the ‘balance of power’, so to speak. On the basis of the survey stu-
dies two parallel, if not somewhat contradictory, conclusions can be
drawn. The first is that financial gain – and not the lack of an available
legal workforce – is the predominant motive for employers to use irreg-
ular migrant labour. More supply of labour, or the now ‘legalised’ EU
workforce from Central and Eastern Europe, is therefore unlikely to al-
leviate an important part of the demand for irregular migrant labour. A
second conclusion is that the perceived risk of being caught by controls
and being fined (with higher fees) does seem to have a preventive ef-
fect. The perceived chance of getting caught and fined is substantially
higher than the actual chance of being subjected to labour market con-
trols, underlining the discouraging effect of controls and fines. This is
also substantiated by the fact that the percentage of repeat offenders
has been dropping, especially since the introduction of the administra-
tive fine. There are thus indications that some employers remain incor-
rigible, and therefore can’t be deputised, as well as indications that
other employers can be discouraged into compliance with labour laws.
3.5 Exclusion through documentation
Exclusion through documentation requires roughly the same ‘infra-
structure’ as is used for policies operating under the logic of exclusion
from documentation that was described in the previous paragraph. It is
a shift of goals, methods and procedures rather than means. The focus
of interagency cooperation and control authorities should tilt towards
the irregular migrant himself, instead of a dominant focus on the em-
ployer. Obviously, since the two logics of exclusion use the same ‘infra-
structure’ they are not mutually exclusive. More than that, in an ‘ideal
world of policy efficiency’, they are mutually reinforcing: employers are
sanctioned and irregular migrants are apprehended and returned to
their country of origin. Both goals can be achieved in a single worksite
control, but they do require a different approach towards detection,
documentation and identification as well as a different deployment of
manpower and resources. The intensifications in the labour market
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control regime and the increasing political attention for the phenome-
non of irregular migrants and irregular migrant labour that is apparent
in both countries, would suggest that this second ‘layer’ of the control
regime aimed at the irregular migrants also comes to the fore. Two in-
terrelated phenomena take up centre stage in this second logic. In the
first place, identification becomes even more important than in the first
logic. Irregular migrants have to be recognised first as irregular mi-
grants, and then later on have to be identified and connected to their
legal identity and their country of origin. Secondly, the need for identi-
fication almost automatically increases the role and importance of the
deployment of modern identification techniques such as database
technology.
3.5.1 Deputation and databases
Under the second logic, identification becomes the goal for the data-
bases and database technology. It is no longer sufficient to establish
that a certain worker is an irregular migrant worker who should be ex-
cluded from the labour market. Instead, identification should be geared
towards revealing the identity of an irregular migrant with a view to la-
ter expulsion and return policies (see chapter four). In other words: the
authorities at work in the field of labour market regulation would be
required to look further than the labour market itself and place their
control efforts in the service of direct control on irregular residence
and even expulsion policies. Obviously, that would not only mean a
shift in working procedures (and legal requirements), but also in the
mental map of the professionals working in the field of labour market
fraud. Previous experiences in the Netherlands with a similar shift –
when the 1998 introduction of the Linking Act required various educa-
tion and housing authorities to act as gatekeepers and executors of ex-
clusionary policies towards irregular migrants – showed mixed results
(Van der Leun 2003). Some authorities readily took up their new gate
keeping functions, while other professions dealt with it in a more ‘flex-
ible’ manner and moulded the requirements to fit in with their own
professional standards. Deputation in the case of exclusion through
documentation is primarily aimed at the authorities of the state itself.
Unlike the previous paragraph, this paragraph therefore mainly deals
with internal reorganisation, within and between various agencies. One
reason for this is that all policies dealing with apprehension, incarcera-
tion and expulsion are at their very core only within the jurisdiction of
the state itself. Deputising private individuals, private organisations or
even semi-public organisations on these issues is politically and legally
impractical or even impossible.13 A second reason is the fact that not
all government authorities are necessarily responsive to the needs and
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demands of the central government. They have institutional practices
and interests, standard operating procedures and they mostly regard
their tasks from the perspective of their core business, which, in this
case, is the fight against labour market fraud.
In the Netherlands, ‘identification’ has become a central notion in
many government policies. Labour market fraud policies are no differ-
ent. After all, one of the main routes to work for irregular migrants is
to appear legal, which is often achieved by using false papers or by ille-
gitimately using legal papers that do not belong to the migrant in ques-
tion (Broeders & Engbersen 2007). Against the backdrop of an increas-
ingly strict control regime, the importance of obtaining false papers or
buying or borrowing of legitimate documentation – sometimes known
as lookalike fraud – have become even more important strategies to
keep the door to the labour market open. The Dutch government has
responded in kind: identity management and identity fraud have be-
come household policy concepts. According to Prins and De Vries
(2003), policies relating to ‘immigration’ and ‘security’ are two of the
main accelerators for the development of system of digital identifica-
tion, i.e. controlling and verifying identities by means of database sys-
tems and/or other technical means. Indeed, the proliferation of identity
related databases that have been created in the field of labour market
fraud, or other databases that can be useful to labour market inspec-
tors, has steadily grown. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is developing
a Document Information System Civil Status, a database containing
the document characteristics and markers needed for the authentifica-
tion of foreign passports and IDs that will be accessible for various
authorities. The SIOD has created an ‘identity expertise centre’ (De
Vries et al. 2007: 64-66). Furthermore, the police use a Verification
and Information System that stores the numbers of all lost and stolen
passports (Barensen & Eijkelenboom 2006), which may help in the
matter of fraudulent use of non-falsified documents. Lookalike fraud,
that uses legal documents, is one of the reasons that the Dutch author-
ities are increasingly looking into the possibilities to include biometric
features into identification documents. If a person is linked to his iden-
tity document by means of a fingerprint, look-alike fraud will be de-
tected and proven more easily in the case of direct controls. The police
also maintain a register of all aliens in the Netherlands, which used to
be called the Aliens Administrative System (Vreemdelingen Adminstratie
Systeem – VAS) and is now part of a more comprehensive police data-
base, the Politie Suite Handhaving (PSH – V). In general, politicians are
eagerly looking into database technology as a new instrument in the
fight against identity fraud and irregular migrant labour. In 2004, both
the Dutch Minister for Justice and the Dutch Minster for Aliens affairs
and Integration stressed the need to connect databases and to facilitate
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the exchange of information among several authorities in order to fight
identity fraud and counter irregular migrant employment.
As was already indicated in the previous paragraph, the German
authorities responsible for counteracting illegal employment are per-
haps even more geared to information exchange than the Dutch (Sinn
et al. 2005). In addition to the ‘filtering out’ of irregular migrants on
the basis of information exchange, the German authorities are also in-
creasingly investing in systems that can establish identities. For a long
time, all foreigners are registered in the Central Aliens Register (Aus-
la¨nder Zentral Register – AZR). This database contains personal informa-
tion on all foreigners in Germany who are officially registered or whom
the police have investigated, who have been apprehended or who have
been repatriated. The catalogue of data registered in this database has
gradually expanded. For example, in 2002, information on issued and
rejected visa was added (Sinn et al. 2005: 43). The foreign-resident
authorities, the Federal Border Police (Bundesgrenzschutz – BGS), the
Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt – BKA)
and the police departments of the La¨nder have access to this database.
If an irregular migrant is an asylum seeker, or has applied for asylum
in the past, he might be traced through his fingerprint, which would be
registered in the AFIS system of the BKA. In 2005, a ‘lost papers’ data-
base was set up within the Federal Administration Office, registering
lost and found identification documents that belonged to nationals of
third countries requiring a visa and that were issued by foreign authori-
ties (Sinn et al. 2005). These data might be used to counter (lookalike)
identity fraud and determine the identity or citizenship of a foreigner
and thus facilitating the implementation of repatriation later.
However, the actual use of these systems in many cases still seems
to confirm the first logic of exclusion from documentation, rather
than the second. As far as can be deduced from the available litera-
ture the data systems are used to detect fraud and block access to the
labour market, rather than using them in a more investigative way to
detect irregular migrants with the aim of transferring data to the im-
migration and police authorities, potentially and ultimately leading to
arrest and expulsion. If anything, the flow of data seems to be more
in the direction of the labour market authorities than in the direction
of the immigration and police authorities. This suggests that the con-
trols mainly target employers and exclude irregular migrant workers,
rather than result in the apprehension of irregular migrants with a
view to expulsion. Furthermore, in a number of cases, access is re-
stricted to immigration and police authorities because of the nature of
the data. This makes deputation of labour market officials at the level
of data exchange more difficult and the exchange of information more
‘one-sided’. There is of course data exchange at a more general level,
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in the form of inter-agency workgroups that gather and discuss infor-
mation to make controls more specific and effective. The 2004 Dutch
white paper on irregular migrants did include a proposal for the di-
rect deputation of labour market inspectors in matters of identifica-
tion. However, this proposal to give labour market inspectors the au-
thority to conduct identification investigations was dropped in favour
of making it a punishable offence for employers not to cooperate in
establishing the identity of an employee (Minster voor Vreemdelin-
genzaken en Integratie 2005: 9). The government apparently saw a
greater advantage in deputising employers, who can be severely fined,
than in widening the investigative duties of the Labour Inspectorate.
In sum, deputation in data exchange is limited in the sense that la-
bour inspectors can only be deputised to a certain extent. However,
the policing competences of German customs inspectors are an exam-
ple of mixing two functions – policing and labour market controls –
to a much greater extent than what was even proposed in the Nether-
lands. In connection to illegal employment, German inspectors have
the authority to establish identities, conduct interrogations, confiscate
evidence and to search and arrest suspects. This is an entirely differ-
ent level of deputation altogether.
When targeting irregular migrants themselves, deputation and data-
bases are very much entwined with controls. The electronic resources
for identification are of more interest when an irregular migrant has
been apprehended and identification is needed to detain and/or expel
him. Under the logic of ‘exclusion through documentation’, controls
are important, but only if they lead to the arrest of irregular migrants,
rather than the fining of employers. If the authority to apprehend ir-
regular migrants cannot be transferred, then the police authorities
must cooperate closely with the labour inspection.
3.5.2 Control and punishment
When the authorities fix their eyes on the irregular migrant, the height
of the fines becomes of lesser importance. Fines can be of importance
for migrants who do not have a work permit but do have a legal status
of residence. Fines may deter them from working irregularly again.
But if an irregular migrant worker does not have a valid residence per-
mit, the logical thing to do from a state perspective is to detain, identify
and ultimately expel them – that is, for a government that seriously
places ‘irregular resident migrants’ as a policy problem at the same le-
vel as labour market fraud. Legally speaking, this was always the logical
thing to do, but there are many indications that the police have not
seen irregular residence as an important priority for a long time (En-
gbersen et al. 1999; Van der Leun 2003). This was the case for both
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the ‘normal’ police surveillance, in which irregular migrants were not
considered a priority, as well as for the assistance that the police gave
to labour market inspections. In Germany, irregular residence is a
criminal offence and is therefore officially a priority. Though how this
translates in day-to-day practice is unclear. However, since successive
Dutch and German governments have tagged irregular residence and
irregular migrant labour as a significant problem, the pressure from
the central government on agencies such as the Labour Inspectorate,
local authorities and the police has been mounting. In part, this can be
seen in changes implemented in Dutch and German policing, in gen-
eral, and developments within the Aliens Police more specifically. (This
topic will be dealt with in chapter four.) It can also be seen from the in-
volvement of the police in labour market controls. Since labour market
inspectors lack the authority to deal with irregular residence, irregular
migrants can only be dealt with if they are transferred to the police or
immigration authorities, or if the police are participating in the con-
trols. In other words, labour market controls would have to become
part of a chain of control, starting at detection at the workplace and
leading ultimately to expulsion.
Since the early 1990s, the Netherlands has seen an increase in politi-
cal pressure that is put on the police – and especially the Aliens Police,
or Aliens Department, as they were previously known – to actively deal
with the irregular migrant population (Engbersen et al. 1999; Engber-
sen et al. 2002). The 2004 white paper on irregular migrants explicitly
announces the intensification of joint controls by the Aliens Police and
the Labour Inspectorate. The underlying goal is to increase the number
of expulsions as a result of the joint controls (Minister voor Vreemde-
lingenzaken en Integratie 2004: 23). This would imply that police in-
volvement in labour market controls has been rising since then. Again,
the available data make it difficult to get a good impression of the de-
velopment in police controls on the labour market. Engbersen et al.
(2002: 30) point out that registrations in the Aliens Administrative
Register (VAS) do not systematically differentiate between irregular re-
sident migrants that were apprehended during a labour market control
or as the result of any other form of police control. Many of those
found working illegally have been entered into the system as irregular
resident migrants, i.e. in breach of the Aliens Law, rather than in
breach of the Aliens Employment Act (WAV). Their analysis of the
VAS data for the years 1997-2000 even show a decline of the number
of apprehensions under the Aliens Employment Act, dropping from
2.1 per cent to 1.0 per cent among all apprehensions (ibid: 32). A later
analysis of VAS data stretching to 2003 confirms this trend, with la-
bour market related apprehensions hovering around 1 per cent
(Leerkes et al. 2004: 224-5). The ‘real’ number of labour market
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apprehensions is anywhere between the registered 1 per cent and the
unknown percentage that may be hidden in the figures registered un-
der breaches of the Aliens Act. It is, however, noteworthy that the
authorities don’t seem to feel a need or political pressure to register
these figures more accurately. If we assume that at least some number
of irregular migrants apprehended during a labour market control is
not accurately registered, we should turn to other data that may give
some insight into the matter. One could, for example, look at the activ-
ities of the Westland Intervention Team. Their year report on 2003 (the
most recent that has been published!) suggests an intensification of
joint controls by the Labour Inspectorate and the police. The number
of so-called ‘A-controls’ in which the police participated rose to 15 per
cent of all WIT controls in 2003, which is still a very modest percen-
tage, especially given the reputation of the Westland. The report notes
that these A-controls are far more effective in terms of detecting and
prosecuting cases of violating the Aliens Employment Act. They calcu-
late that the chance of getting caught is 6.5 times higher for employers
and employees than in the case of B-controls, in which the police does
not participate.14 The main reason for this is that the participation of
the Aliens Police makes it possible to identify nearly all of the migrant
workers. During the A-controls, 760 employees were checked, of which
161 were found to be irregular resident migrants. The Aliens Police re-
ports that 82 per cent of these irregular migrants have been effectively
expelled, 16 per cent has been ‘discharged’ (heengezonden) and 4 per
cent was still in detention by the time the year report was published
(Westland Interventie Team 2003: 11). Interestingly, the report notes a
decline in the number of apprehended irregular migrants when com-
pared to 2002, but attributes this to the fact that in 2003 they con-
trolled smaller firms. All in all, there seems to be only scattered infor-
mation that does not add up to a clear picture of whether joint checks
are increasing and to what effect. For example, an evaluation report on
labour market controls in agri- and horticulture (excluding the WIT
controls) reports an increase in joint controls from 2002 to 2005, but a
drop in 2006 that takes the percentage below that of 2002 (41 per cent
in 2006, 46 per cent in 2002). Also, between 2002 and 2006, the
number of apprehended illegally resident aliens drops from 315 in
2002 to 76 in 2006. This report does point to the fact that the results
of the WIT in the same period (which have not been published), show
an entirely opposite picture (Arbeidsinspectie 2007b).
Germany’s situation is similar to that of the Netherlands. The politi-
cal pressure to do something about irregular migrant employment and
irregular residence is clear, but there is little evidence available to pin-
point the exact developments in practice. As in the Dutch case, the po-
lice statistics of the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) do not differentiate
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between irregular migrants who have been apprehended on the basis
of violating the labour laws and those apprehended for violating the re-
sidence laws. Police statistics for 2006 list 92,633 suspects for offences
against the residence law, asylum law and EU rules for free movement.
When this is combined with the statistics for the number of irregular
migrants among all non-German suspects, of which there were 64,605
in 2006, the number of irregular migrants apprehended for violations
of the labour laws drop well below this last figure (as irregular mi-
grants can obviously be suspects in various crimes and misdemeanours
other than the violation of residence laws). To be more precise, the
number of irregular migrants apprehended for violating the residence
laws in terms of illegal residence (illegaler aufenthalt) stood at 40,424
and there were an additional 12,642 ‘other’ breaches of the residence
laws.15 There is also an indication of ‘offences connected to irregular
migrant labour’ but the numbers are so low (369) that they most likely
relate to the bigger cases of labour market fraud. Moreover, the suspects
are more likely to be employers than employees (Bundeskriminalamt
2007: 108, 110, 116). Both in Germany and the Netherlands, the regis-
tration of irregular migrants apprehended during work site controls
seems flawed. There are indications that they are not separately listed
and are thus ‘hidden’ within the larger statistical category of those ap-
prehended for being ‘irregular residents’. However, that leaves the size
of their relative share in the total of apprehensions wide open to de-
bate: it could mask small numbers or it could mask larger numbers.
Some of the scattered indications that have been found suggest that
the numbers may be – ‘disappointingly’ – low, especially against the
background of an unmistakable political pressure to increase the num-
ber of apprehensions. Still, a more sophisticated registration that could
provide information about the increase or decrease of apprehended ir-
regular migrant workers over the years has not been implemented by
the authorities, nor demanded by politicians. It does not seem to be a
priority.
The proxy of police involvement in labour market controls, as an in-
dication of turning towards the second logic of exclusion, is not a very
easy one in Germany, either. A distinction must be made between the
legal framework and practice before and after the new law on irregular
migrant labour. Stobbe (2004: 100-102) maintains that, until the early
1990s, the legal framework in Germany was primarily aimed at the
regulation of the labour market. Its contribution to migration control
came second. The labour market inspectors did not prosecute irregular
migrants themselves; they left this to the police and immigration
authorities with whom they cooperated. Notably, when the labour agen-
cies suspected the presence of irregular migrants at a certain worksite,
the police were called in to ‘surround’ the worksite and, if necessary,
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arrest irregular migrants. Immigration officials were then called in to
do the document checks. In short, labour markets inspectors required
police assistance to deal with irregular migrants themselves in terms of
identifying and apprehending them. However, no figures are available.
Since 1998, customs officers have had the competences of police offi-
cers when it comes to irregular migrant labour and, since 2004, the
customs officers are solely responsible for labour market controls and
have seen their ranks swelling. These competences include establish-
ing identities and taking irregular migrants into preliminary custody.
In short, the customs authorities no longer have need for police
assistance.
There is no central record of the number of apprehensions resulting
from these labour market controls. Given the steep increase in the
number of inspectors and inspections and the police-like competences
of the inspectors, one would expect an increase in the number of irreg-
ular migrant labourers that were caught and arrested. A report detail-
ing the ‘fight against undeclared labour in 2004-2005’ by the Senate16
of the Land Berlin, however, gives different indications. Despite the fact
that Berlin has traditionally been a hotbed for irregular migrant labour
– especially in construction – the numbers of apprehended irregular
migrants have been dropping, plummeting from 1,340 persons in
2000 to 404 in 2004. A number of reasons account for this drop. The
first is the fact that the apprehensions and procedures resulting from
the controls of the customs officers are not entered into the statistics of
the police and are hence missing from these data. Another reason is
that the EU’s free movement of workers now covers Polish workers,
who accounted for much of the irregular migrants in previous years
(Senatsverwaltung fu¨r Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Frauen 2005: 20-21). The
relation between the customs offices’ statistics and police data is some-
what unclear and is further hampered by the fact that there are no re-
ports of the Berlin customs offices that contain statistics. A year report
of the Bavarian customs authorities, containing facts and figures on
the activities of the Bavarian branch of the Finanzkontrolle schwarzar-
beit, also lacks figures on what happens to irregular migrants detected
during their controls (Oberfinanzdirektion Nu¨rnberg 2007).
3.6 Conclusions
Evaluating these policy developments in Germany and the Netherlands
is not a straightforward affair. Conclusions may be drawn on three dif-
ferent levels: the political level, the policy level and the level of the ex-
ecution of policy. Descending further to the level of daily practice, in-
formation becomes scarcer, and it is less easy to determine its value
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and validity for the processes this chapter aims to describe. The best
that can be obtained from the facts and figures gathered in this chapter
are indications for a number of developments, some indications being
more firm than others. The general trend for labour market controls
with a view to irregular migrants workers for both countries is neatly
summed up in Vogel’s characterisation ‘higher, faster, more’. An added
characterisation of my own, in reference to the quality of the data,
could be ‘dancing in the dark to faster music’. The speed of the music
definitely has effects on both the controllers and the controlled, but the
darkness makes it difficult to be very specific.
That being said, a number of observations and indications do stand
out. The first is that the two countries are strikingly similar in the pol-
icy choices they make at a general level. At the political level, there is a
marked trend to intensify policies aimed at blocking irregular mi-
grants’ access to the labour market (policies following the first logic of
exclusion) and a more reserved trend towards incorporating the second
logic of exclusion, aimed at the irregular migrant himself, into the la-
bour market control system. In the Netherlands, the government
seems more explicit in its stated aim to target the irregular migrant
himself. Both trends are characterised by an increasing use of database
technology and the creation and refinements of digital boundaries:
more registration is combined with networked registration. For policies
aimed at the irregular migrant himself, this trend is especially appar-
ent in a heavy investment in new databases aimed at identification,
identity fraud and the establishing the authenticity of documents and
identities. Blocking access has also increasingly shifted ‘out of the state’
in more recent years; deputation of employers and enlisting the help of
the general public to get information and tips have become popular
choices in policy development.
At the level of policy itself, one might say that both governments
have put their money where their mouths are. Measured in terms of
funding and staffing, the Dutch and German labour market control
agencies have definitely been on the receiving end of government
spending. These intensifications have resulted in more controls and
more fines. Furthermore, both countries have invested in making the
control regime more precise in terms of directing attention to those
sectors in which irregular migrant labour is commonplace. Again, the
biggest steps have been taken in strengthening the control regime
aimed at blocking access to the labour market. The main emphasis is
on the demand side of irregular migrant labour and hence on employ-
ers. When it comes to the second logic of exclusion, it becomes more
difficult to see if, where and how the political priorities are translated
into policy. Identification has become a more central feature of the con-
trol system. In the Netherlands, the police are supposed to be more
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involved in the labour market control regime. In Germany, the customs
authorities – solely responsible for labour market controls since 2004
– have been ‘fully deputised’ and now have police-like duties and com-
petences. How this translates into a control regime that functions
along the lines of the second logic of exclusion, and is thus aimed at
the irregular migrant, his apprehension and ultimately expulsion, is
hard to tell. The data are either missing or foggy at best.
As usual, the level of daily practice of labour market controls is the
most difficult level to get a clear view of. Here, an interesting paradox
evolves. The first logic is primarily aimed at discouragement and block-
ing access, both phenomena that are difficult to measure as the ‘dis-
couraged’ can’t be listed or counted. Yet most of the available statistical
information is only able to provide indications for the first logic. The
second logic is aimed at apprehension and detention, i.e. of entering a
subject into the state apparatus (instead of shutting him out), yet the
data on this category are by and large missing, or not adequately regis-
tered. It is therefore impossible to distinguish between irregular mi-
grants apprehended during worksite controls and those apprehended
during the course of some other form of control. Neither the size of
the group of apprehended irregular migrants workers – or the develop-
ment of its size over time – can be accurately determined, thus render-
ing any comment on ‘effectiveness’ impossible. It seems reasonable to
assume that the control regime targets the individual irregular migrant
now more than it did in the past, a result of the steadily mounting poli-
tical pressure in recent years and the investments in identification pro-
cedures and databases. But to what extent is impossible to say, as the
numbers are simply not gathered and calculated. The following chapter
on detention and expulsion may provide more insight into this matter.
This lack of reliable data means that governments themselves are ‘dan-
cing in the dark’, even though they are bound to have more informa-
tion than is out in the open. The fact that these data are not gathered
and/or made public may indicate any number of things, ranging from
disappointing results to priorities at the level of implementation differ-
ing sharply from national political priorities, to rising apprehensions
hidden within a larger category of apprehended irregular migrants.
However, it also means that scientists, journalists and, for that matter,
parliament have no way of evaluating the control system and its recent
operational changes in any real, empirical sense.
What do these developments in policymaking – with all the restrictions
on its interpretation – amount to in terms of Dutch and German politi-
cal economies? How can we theoretically typify the Dutch and German
welfare states in terms of the relation between state, market and irregu-
lar migrant labour? The neo-Marxist theorem that irregular migrants
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are a ‘new reserve army of workers’ can be rejected. The investment in
legislation, manpower and resources is simply too substantial. If any-
thing, these policy programmes of restriction point away from the idea
of governments providing the market with cheap and docile labour.
‘Government’ is not the footman of ‘business’ in this respect.
Segmented labour market theory, however, holds more than a little
sway. Irregular migrant workers are found in specific sectors of the
economy and there are some indications that governments have turned
a blind eye in some cases (Berlin construction during the ‘boom’).
There are also some indications that the new guest worker schemes in-
dicate a willingness to cater to needs of a segmented labour market.
Furthermore, there are notorious ‘white spots’ where the authorities
cannot and/or will not intervene with controls. Governments are re-
stricted and often reluctant when it comes to controlling private house-
holds, thereby de facto consenting to widespread fraudulent domestic
work, including domestic work by irregular migrant workers. Needless
to say, this lack of control also places domestic workers in a vulnerable
position in a potentially exploitative environment. In short, there is seg-
mentation in the Dutch and German labour markets – of which gov-
ernments are fully aware – but they are left alone as a result of political
choices and/or restrictions in capacity. But where the authorities do tar-
get known hotbeds of irregular migrant, the Dutch and German gov-
ernments cannot be said to be helpful or even conveniently ‘unin-
volved’ with these sectors. Controls are most intense, and increasingly
so, in those parts of the economy that are well known for labour mar-
ket fraud and irregular migrant labour. The stated aim of these control
policies is the reduction of irregular migrant labour as far as possible.
An interesting witness of this phenomenon is the category of the ‘un-
documented unemployed’ that emerged from fieldwork among undo-
cumented migrants in the Netherlands in the 1990s (Burgers &
Engbersen 1999). Roughly a third of the interviewed undocumented
aliens were unemployed, and since then, the intensity of the control re-
gime has been pushed up further. The fact that the greenhouses of the
Netherlands’ Westland region are still, and incorrigibly, in need of ir-
regular migrant labour indicates segmentation, but the control regime
does not indicate sympathy or benevolence towards its employers.
There is not much pressure on government from these sectors of the
economy, if anything there is political pressure on employers. Neither
the Dutch nor the German government is likely to get itself into trou-
ble by actively addressing these parts of the labour market. GNP simply
does not depend on it, and firm policies are more likely to create politi-
cal capital with the electorate, than they cost in terms of ‘economic’
loss. Policy gaps are hardly the result of active lobbies on the state.
Nonetheless, in spite of intensifications in funding and manpower,
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policy gaps and a degree of segmentation cannot be avoided. Govern-
ments and agencies select the sectors they prioritise for control and, by
default, they de-prioritise other sectors. Sometimes they even skip
whole sectors of the economy, such as domestic work, that are noto-
rious hotbeds for labour market fraud and irregular labour due to poli-
tical and legal restraints. But the most dominant constraint remains a
matter of capacity: there are simply too many companies to control.
When the EU proposed a framework policy against employers of irreg-
ular migrants in 2007, it aimed for the control of 10 per cent of all reg-
istered companies in each member state, even though the European
Commission’s own assessment indicated that only 2 per cent were
being controlled at the time (Carrera & Guild 2007: 5). According to a
covering note on this proposal by the Foreign Ministry to the Dutch
parliament, reaching the target of 10 per cent would require an in-
crease in staff from the current 180 to 930 inspectors (Ministerie van
Buitenlandse Zaken 2007). Perhaps unsurprisingly the Dutch govern-
ment opposed the 10 per cent target. White spots are therefore inevita-
ble and we may conclude that while segmentation is not the intention
of policy, some foreseeable segmentation may well result from it, or in
some cases simply cannot be avoided.
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4 Police surveillance, detention and expulsion
4.1 Introduction
On entering the domain of police surveillance, detention and expul-
sion, we increasingly enter the domain of the coercive state. At least in
theory, exclusion here means exclusion from the state altogether: first
removal from society (through arrest and detention) and ultimately re-
moval from the national territory (through detention and expulsion).
States that genuinely invest in expulsion policies will have to organise
a chain approach of police surveillance, detention and expulsion. Or at
least, that is what logic would dictate. The closer organisations are to
the actual expulsion, the more dominant the organisational logic of ex-
clusion becomes. In the ‘chain’ of government agencies that is central
to this chapter, competing interests and demands gradually lessen and
make place for what might be called ‘organisational single-minded-
ness’. The police have ample room to manoeuvre between the various
political demands and societal claims on their organisation. In the past,
the Dutch police have always adhered to their own interpretation of the
political demands for the control on irregular migrants (Engbersen et
al. 1999; Van der Leun 2003), often favouring community relations
over migration control. The next link in the chain, the detention of ir-
regular migrants, is much more singular in its task of exclusion. Immi-
grant detention centres have and need less room than the police to de-
viate from their task of ‘detaining immigrants’. The fact that immigrant
detention is usually separate from the normal prison regime, where re-
turn to society plays a role in the day-to-day regime, makes it even
more singularly oriented on societal exclusion. The same can be said
for the last part of this chain of exclusion: those parts of the immigra-
tion authorities that are charged with the expulsion of illegal aliens
have a clear agenda that does not leave much room for weighing off
different options against each other. Exclusion, in the most definite
sense, defines their organisational rationale.
Obviously, the surveillance, detention and removal of illegal aliens
are not phenomena without historical precedent. States and – before
the advent of the nation state – cities have always differentiated between
various groups within their territory and have controlled, detained and
removed those elements that were considered criminal, dangerous or
simply ‘alien’ to the socio-political body (Morris & Rothman 1998;
Matthews 2005). Illegal aliens now figure as a present-day incarnation
of the vagrant and the vagabond. However, some other things have
changed over time. Expulsion in modern constitutional states is not
simply within the full discretion of the state executive. Expulsion poli-
cies are embedded in a legal and societal framework and an interna-
tional legal environment that restrict the possibilities for expulsion poli-
cies. National legal frameworks bind the executive’s discretion in a di-
rect way, while societal resistance against expulsion policies, invoking
vivid images of deportations, mass expulsion and population transfers
in the past, may shame governments into inaction (Walters 2002).
Other practical and important restraints are the costs and the heavy
drain on other government resources such as detention capacity and
personnel. Or, as Noll (1999: 269) puts it, forced returns come with
‘high economic, political and psychological costs’. Despite the contested
nature of police surveillance, detention and expulsion and the heavy
practical and financial costs, these policies do seem to be on the rise in
many EU member states, not least in Germany and the Netherlands.
‘Unwanted’, irregular migrants are more and more subjected to deten-
tion regimes and the efforts to expel them have become a political prior-
ity. Even though expulsion remains, in essence, a ‘solution of last re-
sort’, it has in recent years come to be regarded and treated as the indis-
pensable closing section of any serious immigration policy. In the
Dutch white paper on return, it is even stated that ‘return policy should
not be the closing section but rather an integral part of immigration
policy itself’ (Minister van Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 2003: 5).
And even though voluntary return is the preferred option in both the
Netherlands and Germany, the ‘use of forced returns cannot be missed’,
as phrased by the German Ministry of the Interior (Bundesminsterium
des Innern 2008: 154). This raises the question of why, and to what ex-
tent Germany and the Netherlands, are intensifying the implementa-
tion of their expulsion policies. How serious are these political wishes
and how are they translated into policies of practical implementation?
If both the domestic and foreign obstacles are high, what underlies the
determination to see these policies through?
There are two interesting theoretical takes on the issue of police sur-
veillance and detention and to a lesser extent on expulsion. Migration
control literature, as also discussed in chapter two, offers explanations
for the intensification of these policies, while the criminological theory
on the ‘new penology’ offers some alternative lines of thought explain-
ing especially the intensifications in immigrant policing and detention.
The theoretical framework for this chapter will be elaborated on in
paragraph 4.2. Paragraphs 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 will deal with the policy
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developments and implementation in Germany and the Netherlands in
terms of, respectively, police surveillance of irregular migrants, immi-
grant detention and expulsion policy. Paragraph 4.6 will draw some
conclusions.
4.2 Internal surveillance: the state in control and/or the penal
state in action?
Theoretically, police surveillance and detention take us into the world
of ‘crime and punishment’ and raises criminological perspectives. To a
certain extent, this is strange. In the Netherlands, irregular residence is
not a criminal offence, and therefore not punishable by criminal law.
In Germany, it is a criminal offence though it is seldom punished un-
der criminal law. Detention of irregular migrants is usually administra-
tive detention and the goal is not to punish migrants with a prison sen-
tence or fine for their irregular stay, but to prepare them for expulsion.
Yet, in terms of explanations for the increase of the internal migration
control by the police and the increase in the use of immigrant deten-
tion, it is criminological theory, in particular, that seeks to explain these
phenomena. The theories on the ‘new penology’ and the ‘new punitive-
ness’ put forward explanations and expectations on the increase of con-
trol and surveillance and on the spread and evolvement of detention re-
gimes. In this chapter these theories are applied to specific case of in-
ternal migration control on irregular migrants, which sometimes
requires some adaptation of the original insights that were not always
concerned with irregular migrants. Moreover, this criminological theo-
ry is less concerned with the issue of the intensification of expulsion
policies. The issue of expulsion, together with policing and detention,
is also a matter of migration control theory, which – in a nutshell – ex-
pects governments to try to close the policy gaps in immigration policy
even at high costs in order to increase their grip on immigration flows.
Expulsion is also an issue for political theory on interstate relations. A
number of authors have placed the issue of expulsion at the transna-
tional level, invoking questions of citizenship, statelessness and inter-
national relations between states.
Prison plays a central role in this chapter, both theoretically and em-
pirically. It is the central link in the chain that starts with the appre-
hension of irregular migrants and ends in either their expulsion or
their return to the streets and their life in irregularity.
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Police surveillance can only lead to expulsion if there is enough capa-
city in detention facilities for the irregular migrants that are appre-
hended by the police. Detention can only lead to expulsion if all the ne-
cessary preparations for expulsion are facilitated and made during the
time in detention. The detention regime regulates the inflow of irregu-
lar migrants through capacity and, to some extent, also regulates the
outflow by arranging the conditions for expulsion. If not, detention will
interrupt an irregular migrant’s residence, but not end it.
4.2.1 Police surveillance
The ongoing criminological debates about the ‘new penology’ and the
‘new punitiveness’ provide a theoretical background for the develop-
ments in the policing and imprisonment of irregular migrants. Feely
and Simon have coined the concept of the ‘new penology’ in 1992. Ac-
cording to them:
(…) the new penology is markedly less concerned with responsibil-
ity, fault, moral sensibility, diagnosis, or intervention and treat-
ment of the individual offender. Rather, it is concerned with tech-
niques to identify, classify, and manage groupings sorted by dan-
gerousness. The task is managerial, not transformative. (Feely &
Simon 1992: 452)
In the new penology, the emphasis is on actuarial policies that are in-
strumentalised by ‘aggregate classification systems for purposes of sur-
veillance, confinement and control’. In short, the penal system be-
comes a system of control that manages ‘dangerous’ populations, while
ideas of rehabilitation and correction are left behind. As Cheliotis
(2006: 315) observes:
In particular, the emergence of what is seen as a permanently
marginal and, thus, irredeemably dangerous segment of the popu-
lation – the so-called ‘underclass’ – calls for their control and con-
tainment, while rendering any prospect of treatment and integra-
tion futile.
The goal of policy programs characterised by a ‘new penology logic’ is
not so much to eliminate crime, but rather, to make it tolerable
through systemic coordination (Feely & Simon 1992: 455).
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One of the main indicators of the existence of this ‘new penology’ is
rising incarceration figures in Western countries; first and foremost in
the US, but increasingly also in Western Europe as well. Moreover, this
‘dangerous underclass’ that is managed through detention is increas-
ingly a ‘coloured underclass’, consisting of African Americans in the
US and of immigrants and irregular migrants in the EU (see the next
paragraph). However, the new penology also influences the police, who
are obviously one of the prime actors in the control and management
of ‘the underclass’, and are responsible for the ‘supply’ of detainees.
The main tasks of the police are to secure and maintain the legal and
social order. A general feeling of insecurity and fear of an underclass
will increase popular and political demands on the police to provide se-
curity and to keep the streets safe. This culture of fear and insecurity
that underlies the ‘new penology’ is said by a number of authors to
thrive on the political dominance of neo-liberalism, which is obsessed
with insecurity and the search for policies to address the presumed
sources of this societal fear (Ericson 2007; Reiner 2007; Wacquant
2001b). Ericson (2007) claims that this broad current of societal and
political insecurity fuels the production of new measures and laws that
criminalise all kinds of potential sources of harm and insecurity. It
does so through two mechanisms. The first is the introduction of
‘counter law’. These are laws that are invented to ‘(…) erode or elimi-
nate traditional principles, standards, and procedures of criminal law
that get in the way of preempting imagined sources of harm’ (Ericson
2007: 24). This counter law also involves efforts to blur the traditional
distinctions between the legal forms of criminal, civil and administra-
tive law. Ericson’s second principle is that of the ‘surveillant assem-
blage’, in which new surveillance infrastructures are developed and
new uses of existing surveillance networks are extended that also erode
or eliminate traditional standards and procedures of criminal law.
The police are adapting to these changing circumstances. Sheptycki
(2007: 490) states that the police have undergone a number of trans-
formations. Policing institutions have been changing in response to
new transnational policies, the effects of the information technology re-
volution, and the spread of neoliberalism. In other words, international
events and transnational crime – such as terrorism, international drugs
trafficking and irregular migration – lie at the roots of contemporary
insecurity and fear (see also Bauman 2009). International policy re-
sponses to these phenomena influence the tasks and possibilities of po-
lice organisations. Neoliberal obsessions with insecurity have increased
the demand on the police to deal with insecurity, while the spread of
information technology has pushed technology to the fore as the new
prime instrument of control and the management of ‘dangerous popu-
lations’. A surveillance assemblage is being developed that is also
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aimed at irregular migrants, as this group is part and parcel of the new
underclass (Engbersen 1999). Moreover, irregular migrants constitute
a group that is both local in its presence and global in its origin. The
internal control on this ‘glocal’ underclass of irregular migrants will de-
pend heavily on the capacity of modern database technology to link na-
tional and international data sources, especially when the police are
pursuing policies that are ultimately meant to lead to expulsion. Link-
ing anonymous irregular migrants in Germany and the Netherlands
back to legal identities in countries of origin worldwide requires a new
scale and scope of data gathering. However, the widespread use of ICT
in police organisations also carries the risk of what Sheptycki calls
‘compulsive data demand’, meaning that these organisations have an in-
satiable thirst for information, resulting in a ‘volume of data so great
that trying to analyze it has been likened to drinking from a fire hose’
(Sheptycki 2007: 495).
A ‘new penal’ perspective on the police surveillance of irregular mi-
grants differs from a perspective of migration control. A new penal ap-
proach to irregular migrants is likely to favour control on criminal and
troublemaking irregular migrants combined with a detention regime
that is primarily aimed at keeping them off the streets. Policies for
either their return to society or their country of origin would not be
considered a priority, similar to the devaluation of rehabilitative pro-
grammes for the normal prison regime. Expulsion is likely to be lim-
ited, perhaps confined to the return of criminal migrants (both legal
and illegal). Furthermore, the arrests themselves would probably suf-
fice for the statistical indicators that have to be met. Migration control
theory, by contrast, would consider expulsion a logical aim for govern-
ment to strive for, as it is the ultimate indication of government’s con-
trol of migration flows. The police would then be the first shackle of a
chain approach of both control and information between various agen-
cies. Identification of irregular migrants, without which expulsion is
impossible, is a task that requires various sources of information, the
gathering and processing of which usually lies between the police and
detention and immigration authorities. Identification with a view to
‘detecting’ and arresting irregular migrants is primarily within the do-
main of police surveillance. Identification with a view to arranging
documents for an irregular migrant in order to expel him often takes
place within the walls of a police station, detention centre or prison.
4.2.2 Prison
One of the crucial questions – in view of the two logics of exclusion
used in this book – is about the nature of immigrant detention in Ger-
many and the Netherlands. The answer to that question depends on:
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(1) the policy goals that underlie immigrant detention and (2) the se-
riousness with which these goals are pursued in day-to-day practice. A
new penal approach to immigrant detention is more likely to limit it-
self to a policy goal of exclusion of irregular immigrants from society
and its institutions (getting them out of sight and off the streets). De-
porting the easy cases would not, however, be shunned. A migration
control perspective would see the prison in a different light and expect
a policy approach and practice in which detention is seen as a neces-
sary space of transit in preparation for expulsion. Even though ‘giving
the impression of control’ is not alien to this approach either, one
would expect a more serious preoccupation with efforts to close the
‘policy gap’ in detention and expulsion in order to gain and claim con-
trol over migration processes. In the first case, adhering to the first lo-
gic of exclusion that merely blocks access to society and societal institu-
tions, detention centres would function as Bauman’s (1998) ‘factories
of exclusion’, in which people are ‘habituated to their status of the ex-
cluded’. Detention would only be a deterrent, a harsh and symbolic way
of sending the message that ‘our’ immigration systems are not soft (cf.
Walters 2002: 286). Still, if countries such as Germany and the Neth-
erlands are implementing policies that adhere to the second logic of ex-
clusion that is under investigation in this book, this would not be
enough. The second logic of exclusion requires more of the immigrant
detention regime. Prisons and immigrant detention facilities will have
to be geared to gathering documentation and information with a view
to the identification of irregular migrants, as this is the only way to
make expulsion possible. Detention is then truly part of a chain ap-
proach running from arrest to the ultimate form of exclusion: expul-
sion. In short, if the Dutch and German prisons are part of the second
logic of exclusion they will have to be operated as factories of
identification.
The overall rise of the prison population in many Western countries
has been taken as one of the prime icons of, and indicators for, the
new penology (Feely & Simon 1992). Against a background of popular
uncertainty and fear criminologists see governments seeking ‘neolib-
eral’ solutions in matters of crime and security. This new approach to
control is predominantly coercive and sees the prison system as a
means to control populations, but has lost faith in the notion that pris-
ons can contribute to ‘solving’ social problems through correction and
rehabilitation. Increasingly prisons are governed with an actuarial logic
by a new generation of professionals ‘who are more inclined to talk the
language of performance indicators and are perhaps less interested in
“classical” goals of rehabilitation’ (Cheliotis 2006: 319). Of course, for
irregular migrants, whether they are expelled or simply put back on
the street when detention can no longer be legally justified, correction
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and rehabilitation are not relevant options. Governments see no need
to rehabilitate those who were not supposed to be there in the first
place. Only a doorway to a legal status would be an incentive for such
rehabilitative programs, but such opportunities are rare, if not excep-
tional, in countries such as the Netherlands and Germany.
Turning the focus towards immigrants and detention, various
authors stress that the increase in incarceration rates has a distinct col-
our. Wacquant (1999, 2001a) notes that African Americans are increas-
ingly overrepresented in the American prison population. According to
him, this is a deliberate move on the part of the government to control
the black underclass in a time when ‘traditional’ control mechanisms,
such as the black ghetto, are no longer able to fulfil that function. Or
perhaps more accurately (and dramatically), he sees a ‘deadly symbio-
sis’ of the ghetto and the prison: we live in a time when ‘ghetto and
prison meet and mesh’ (2001a). In essence Wacquant sees mass incar-
ceration of African Americans as the new penal management of pov-
erty, which replaced welfarism as the dominant strategy to deal with
the underclass (Matthews 2005: 177). In a comparison of the American
and the European prison regimes and the rise in mass imprisonment
on both sides of the Atlantic, Wacquant (1999: 216) notes that ‘foreign-
ers and quasi-foreigners would be the “blacks” of Europe’. In other
words, European prison populations are increasingly made up of non-
native inmates with a legal status varying from full citizenship to ille-
gal alien. Those with a legal status tend to be overrepresented within
the normal prison system; those without a legal residence are usually
incarcerated within their own special ‘branch’ of the detention regime.
There is a specific trend to use the so-called administrative detention
regime as an instrument of the ‘management of unwanted migrants’.
Wacquant (1999: 218) notes that, in France, and by implication also in
wider Europe, there has been a ‘deliberate choice to repress illegal im-
migration by means of imprisonment’. Weber and Bowling (2004:
206) note a sharp increase in immigration-related detention capacity
in the UK (see also Gibney & Hansen 2003). And even in the US,
where illegal migration is usually not subject to much internal migra-
tion control, Inda (2006: 116) notes a ‘surge in the numbers of undo-
cumented immigrants incarcerated in county jails, federal prisons and
immigration detention centers’ (see also Ellermann 2005).
A new penology approach to immigrant detention would imply that
irregular migrants are not being held with a view to expulsion, per se,
but mainly to keep them off the streets. Basically detention would be
used to address the visible symptoms of the societal problems that ir-
regular migrants ‘cause’, but would be less interested in addressing the
root causes of the irregular residence itself. The prison system would
be used to manage ‘irregular migrants’ as representatives of a
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‘dangerous underclass’ that society fears and/or does not wish to see. A
number of authors seem to detect the logic of the new penology in the
practices of immigrant detention. For example, Boswoth (quoted in Lee
2007: 850) holds that:
The point is that prisons and detention centres … are singularly
useful in the management of non-citizens because they provide
both a physical and a symbolic exclusion zone.
Morris and Rothman (1998, quoted in Lee 2007: 857) maintain that:
As such, imprisonment arguably serves the purpose of merely
warehousing the unwanted and undeserving poor.
If, however, the state has its aims set on making expulsion policies ef-
fective, simply ‘warehousing’ irregular migrants would be pointless. If
migration control is the dominant consideration underlying policy, de-
tention would have to serve different goals. Firstly, detention is meant
to prevent abscondment and, secondly and most importantly, detention
should serve to prepare for expulsion through the identification of ir-
regular migrants and by organising documentation. Turning irregular
migrants back on to the street would have to be considered defeat from
the perspective of control – another chapter in the story of states losing
control on migration.
When it comes to the imprisonment of irregular migrants,
Wacquant’s prison-as-ghetto metaphor is not the only popular meta-
phor. Agamben’s metaphor of the camp, ultimately referring to the hor-
ror of the German death camps, is also often used (Walters 2002; Ra-
jaram & Grundy-Warr 2004; Schinkel forthcoming). To Agamben, the
camp is the most extreme materialisation of the ‘state of exception’, a
place where there is no longer any distinction between law and vio-
lence (cf. Walters 2002: 285) and there are no longer any restrictions
on the behaviour of the ‘sovereign’. The state of exception, of which the
camp is the most extreme manifestation, is a situation in which the
law is suspended in order to defend the law, or even a situation in
which the law is suspended in the name of the law (Andrew 2005: 12).
Although there are certainly modern examples of the camp as a mani-
festation of this extreme state of exception (the American detention re-
gime in Guantanamo Bay17 is a good fit), it seems a top-heavy meta-
phor for the administrative detention of irregular migrants. Irregular
migrants, though very vulnerable in a legal sense, are certainly not
stripped of every right. Human rights, often with a national constitu-
tional translation, and certain procedural rights such as appeal and ju-
dicial review may be limited, but are nonetheless real. That does not
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mean that it should be considered impossible that modern Western
states might bend the law, choose ‘particular’ interpretations of the law
or even suspend parts of the legal framework in their dealings with ir-
regular migrants. As such, the state of exception is a more interesting
notion than that of the camp itself. Especially in its interpretation by
Ericson as ‘counter law’:
Normal legal principles, standards and procedures must be sus-
pended because of a state of emergency, extreme uncertainty, or
the threat of catastrophic potential. The legal order must be broken
to save the social order. (Ericson 2007: 26; emphasis added)
Another important reason to entertain the possibility of the use of
‘counter law’ in the detention of irregular migrants is the fact that the
state is dealing with non-citizens who lack a legal immigrant status
and are only protected by human rights, international treaties and a
limited set of constitutional and procedural rights. Modern liberal
states have – also in recent history – tried to limit the legal rights of le-
gal immigrants, changed their legal frameworks to limit access to pro-
cedures, rights and institutions for asylum seekers and have, in a
sense, suspended national asylum laws by means of European policy
innovations such as the doctrines of ‘safe countries of origin’ and ‘safe
third countries’ and, more recently even, ‘supersafe third countries’. It
should be mentioned here that modern states have also been responsi-
ble for extending legal rights and strengthening the position of mi-
grants vis-a`-vis the state, in spite of declared political intentions to cur-
tail immigration (see for example Joppke 1998, 1999; Cornelius et al.
2004). Legal inclusion and legal exclusion of regular and irregular mi-
grants are sometimes simultaneous processes and there is pressure on
both directions. Either way, it points to the importance of citizenship
and legal status – or lack thereof – which plays an important role in
matters of immigrant expulsion. A lack of proven citizenship, often the
result of an irregular migrant destroying, hiding or lying about his or
her legal identity, provides protection against expulsion by the state. So
naturally, the state tries to limit the possibilities of irregular migrants
to obscure their identity (Broeders & Engbersen 2007). The question
is: how far does the state want to try to bend the law when it comes to
detention and expulsion? More specifically, how much ‘counter law’ or
how much of a ‘state of exception’ will it allow itself in dealing with ir-
regular migrants who are, by law, the ultimate ‘non-citizens’?
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4.2.3 Expulsion
If we disregard the odd diplomat that gets sent home every now and
then, expulsion in Western Europe is nowadays primarily a matter of
immigration policy. Expulsion and return policies target two semi-sepa-
rate groups: irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers. These two
groups are semi-separate because, in the eyes of the law, they are both
ultimately considered illegal aliens. Expulsion policies have two dimen-
sions. The first is the internal organisation of expulsion policies; the
second is the external, international dimension, as liberal Western
states have found there is no such thing as unilateral expulsion in the
modern state system. The new penology perspective is largely ‘empty-
handed’ when it comes to expulsion policies. It may account for the de-
portation of the easy cases, as this is good for the image of control and
the production figures – but it would be hard-pressed to find a justifi-
cation for the insistence on a policy that requires as much effort and
resources as expulsion policies do. Migration control theory, by con-
trast, focuses on the preoccupation of politicians to keep – or try to
keep – migration processes under control and to ‘close the gaps’ in pol-
icy outcomes. High investments to increase the actual expulsion rates
are more easily explained from this perspective.
Internally, there is a distinct trend in which governments are increas-
ingly ‘obsessed with the need to “tighten up” their deportation and re-
patriation policies’ (Walters 2002: 280). Immigration policies are con-
sidered to be ‘unfinished’ without a serious return policy that sends
the message that policies have come full circle. This message of an im-
migration policy without soft spots is intended for the migrants,
would-be migrants and the domestic population. In the context of the
UK, Gibney and Hansen (2003: 7) speak of a ‘removal gap’ that, ac-
cording to the British Home Secretary, undermines public support for
asylum policies, and therefore needs to be ‘closed’. Policy gaps, accord-
ing to Cornelius and Tsuda (2004: 5), are usually caused by either un-
intended policy consequences or result from an inadequate policy im-
plementation. Either way, trying to resolve the problem of a ‘removal
gap’ implies that governments have to look at their own procedures
and bureaucratic organisations. The answer18 to the removal gap lies
primarily within the governmental organisation itself. In Walter’s
(2002: 278) view, this leads to a process in which states embark on
‘governing the governmental system, rather than governing the popula-
tion in a direct manner’. The government becomes preoccupied with
scrutinising and reforming its own procedures. Reforming the proce-
dures with an eye to expulsion would imply a turn towards ‘identifica-
tion’ as a main bureaucratic task. Internally, the detention system will
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effectively have to function as a factory of identification, which can be
very difficult as many irregular migrants refuse to cooperate with iden-
tification in order to avoid expulsion. Despite the known difficulties
and restrictions, governments will embark on this course to prevent
being seen as ‘soft on migration’ or, worse, out of control in matters of
migration control. Whether or not irregular migrants can be identified,
documented and expelled also heavily depends on the external dimen-
sion: expulsion requires at least a minimal cooperation of another sov-
ereign state. Deportation then, is a bilateral affair. Or, as Walters
(2002: 275) puts it:‘Modern deportation is both a product of the state
system, and […] one of a number of techniques for the ongoing man-
agement of a world population that is divided into states’. That makes
citizenship a vital marker in the international system ‘advising state
and nonstate agencies of the particular state to which an individual be-
longs’ (Hindess 2000: 1487). However, different states have different
interests when it comes to the migration of their own citizens or the ci-
tizens of other nations. Sometimes states have good reasons to read
the marker right and sometimes there is ample reason to misread it.
Effective expulsion policies imply a need to know which country to re-
turn a migrant to and that this country recognises the migrant as its
own citizen and ‘accepts’ him back. If irregular migrants who hide
their identity are the main obstruction to expulsion policies, then unco-
operative or unwilling countries of origin are a very good second. Even
though the right to return is a human right enshrined in international
law, a right of entry is still something that has to be codified and docu-
mented by sovereign states. Returning to China, for example, is notor-
iously difficult because of the highly impractical requirements of pass-
port re-issue, replacement and extension (Liu 2008). Putting political
pressure on China to take back its own citizens is even harder. Many
countries of origin are reluctant to take back their citizens, often be-
cause it is far more attractive for them to have young men and women
working elsewhere and sending home remittances than having them
back home where they have a good chance of being unemployed (Eller-
mann 2008). That makes expulsion policies also a matter of foreign
policy, diplomatic relations and, in the case of Germany and the
Netherlands, a matter of multilateral EU foreign policy. At the level of
the EU, member states have started some cooperation in matters of ex-
pulsion policy and the negotiation of readmission agreements (Chole-
winski 2004; Mitsilegas et al.; 2003; Samers 2004a). It also means
that the scale and the dimensions for the surveillance and data gather-
ing needed for the identification of irregular migrants, takes on a mul-
tilateral scale. That issue is partly dealt with in this chapter and partly
in chapter five on the development of EU migration databases.
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4.2.4 Factories of identification?
Combining insights from the ‘new penology’ perspective and the mi-
gration control thesis with the general framework of the two logics of
exclusion of this book, the question basically boils down to this: does
the state apparatus of policing, detention and expulsion function as a
factory of identification?
The first logic of exclusion concerns itself with shutting off access to
societal institutions. Within the new penology this is taken to the ex-
treme, and access to society as a whole is cut off by means of imprison-
ment. Irregular migrants are part and parcel of the feared new under-
class and this societal fear has to be mitigated by the state. But as the
state is hardly interested in addressing the root causes (either of cri-
minal behaviour or of illegal residence), it only addresses the visible
manifestation of irregular migrants: their presence itself. Irregular mi-
grants are arrested (i.e. removed from the street) and detained (i.e. ta-
ken out of sight). The new penal approach thus expects policies preoc-
cupied with the visible signs of social unsafety, which would explain in-
creased police surveillance and full prisons. Expulsion is an added
bonus but will be much less of a priority, as the prison ‘does the trick’.
The actuarial logic that dominates the perspective of the new penology
will rather aim for measurable results (i.e. arrests and detentions) that
require less troublesome procedures and efforts than those needed for
expulsion policies. In short, the system functions as a factory of exclu-
sion, which ends at the level of detention.
The question under investigation in this book, however, is whether
and to what extent states such as Germany and the Netherlands are
making a turn towards the second logic of exclusion in their internal
migration control policies. In order to take exclusion to its ultimate
form and have an effective expulsion policy, the need for documenting
and identifying irregular migrants becomes paramount. Under the sec-
ond logic the system of policing, detention and expulsion should func-
tion as a factory of identification. This is not easy because it requires a
lot of the internal organisation of state bureaucracies, as well as the ex-
ternal relations with other sovereign states. However, the anxiousness
of modern governments to be able to control the phenomenon of mi-
gration and the increasing availability of technological means to help
them do that may explain why states embark on the difficult road to ex-
pulsion. Migration control theory and surveillance theory would expect
states to construct new internal migration policies that may close the
policy gaps that undermine migration control. That means policies that
not only just detain and exclude, but also detain and identify, in order to
make expulsion policies feasible. To work as a factory of identification,
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the German and Dutch states must effectively organise police, deten-
tion and expulsion into a chain that can ‘secure the pre-conditions of
removal’, meaning all measures that serve the identification, localisa-
tion and documentation of irregular migrants (Noll 1999: 268).
4.3 Police surveillance
The police in Germany and the Netherlands are organised in different
ways. Like many government organisations in Germany, the police has
both a federal ‘branch’ and a police force at the level of the La¨nder. Un-
til 2005, the German Bundesgrenzschutz was responsible for the border
patrols, the patrols directly behind the border and at seaports and air-
ports. In 2005, this Bundesgrenzschutz was rebaptised as the Bundespoli-
zei. The responsibility for the internal controls on irregular migrants
lies with the police forces of the La¨nder and, in the case of labour mar-
ket controls, with Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit (FKS) of the Customs
Department. In the Netherlands, there is a similar division of labour
between the military Royal Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee –
Kmar) that is responsible for the checks at, and directly behind, the
borders, and the regular police force that is responsible for the internal
surveillance of irregular migrants. In the Netherlands, the regular po-
lice is organised into 25 districts. Moreover, within these district police
forces, there are special units that have been delegated the task of inter-
nal surveillance of regular and irregular migrants within the police
force. These units were called Aliens Services (Vreemdelingendienst) un-
til 2003 when a re-organisation renamed them the Aliens Police
(Vreemdelingenpolitie). Especially in the Netherlands, there are clear in-
dications that the internal control on irregular migrants was stepped
up due to political pressure in recent years, even though this intensifi-
cation is also a source of strain between the police organisation and
the national government on the issue of who determines policing
priorities.
4.3.1 Trends in police surveillance: priorities and organisation
For a long time, the internal control on irregular migrants could hardly
be considered a priority for the Dutch police. Studies conducted in the
1980s and 1990s indicate that the discretion in the day-to-day practice
of policing was very big (Aalbers 1989; Clermonts 1994; Engbersen et
al. 1999) making the internal surveillance of irregular migrants, to a
large extent, a matter of local decisions. For a long time, discretion was
used as a rule to not apprehend irregular migrants if they were not en-
gaged in criminal behaviour (Engbersen et al. 2002: 21). The Aliens
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Police use a five-point list of priorities that is predominantly focused
on criminal irregular migrants and those who cause public order dis-
turbances. Only the last of the five points is on the surveillance of ir-
regular migrants in a more general sense (Boekhoorn et al. 2004: 137-
8). There have also been practical constraints on the surveillance of ir-
regular migrants. In 2002, the Dutch Advisory Council on Aliens Af-
fairs (ACVZ) conducted interviews with members of the Aliens Police
in the four largest Dutch cities (collectively known as the Randstad).
The officers indicated that the detention capacity shortage was larger
than recorded in the official figures and that they often got instructions
to limit the number of apprehended irregular migrants due to a short-
age of detention capacity (ACVZ 2002: 22; see also Den Hollander
2004: 162). Nonetheless, during the 1990s, the pressure on the police
to become more active in the police surveillance of irregular migrants
came to rise.
In 1994, the Law on Compulsory Identification was introduced. This
significantly widened the possibilities and competences that the police
had to increase controls and identity checks. It also called upon the po-
lice to cooperate with other control organisations, such as the Labour
Inspectorate, the tax authorities and the FIOD. In terms of staff and
budgets, the introduction of this act was also important for the Aliens
Service. In the years following 1994, various intensifications almost
doubled the number of staff (from 700 to 1,360 FTE). According to
Boekhoorn et al. (2004: 126), this had an unforeseen side effect. In the
Netherlands, police surveillance of irregular migrants is both a general
task for all police officers (the so-called basic police) as well a specific
task that is delegated to the Aliens Service. The vast increase in staffing
at the Aliens Service was taken up by the basic police as a sign that in-
ternal surveillance of irregular migrants could now be considered a
specific responsibility of the ‘specialists’, and not so much one of their
own anymore. In 2001, the new Aliens Act 2000 entered into force.
One of the measures in this act was to broaden the competence of the
police to conduct identity checks and controls on irregular migrants.
The new act made it easier to stop, interview and investigate aliens sus-
pected of irregular residence (the criterion was changed from ‘having
concrete indications’ into having ‘an objective reasonable suspicion’
about irregular residence). It also became easier for the Aliens Service
to enter private houses without the permission of the owner. The aim
of these reforms was to increase the number of controls, detentions
and expulsions of irregular migrants (Boekhoorn et al. 2004: 115). In
2003, the Aliens Service was thoroughly reorganised and ‘renamed’
Aliens Police. This reorganisation served both a long-standing desire of
the Aliens Service organisation to focus more on their operational tasks
and the political wish to increase operational surveillance. Up until
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2003, the Aliens Police had two basic tasks. The ‘administrative sur-
veillance’ of the Aliens Law (also known as the ‘paper surveillance’)
and the ‘operational surveillance’. The administrative tasks consisted
mainly of the paperwork concerning the entry and stay of legal aliens,
such as the issuing of documents. Until 2003, the approximately 1,500
staff were divided over the two tasks of the Aliens Police. The majority
was assigned to the paper surveillance (900) while the remaining 600
worked in the operational surveillance. The reorganisation meant
transferring all paper surveillance out of the police organisation and
into the hands of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND)
and the municipalities. It also meant an intensification of the means
for the operational surveillance of irregular migrants (Boekhoorn et al.
2004: 106). While the transfer of the paper surveillance to the IND
and the municipalities meant the loss of 900 jobs, the organisation at
the same time received extra staffing to be able to increase the controls
that the government insisted on. An extra 450 FTEs were added to the
ranks of the Aliens Police, which totalled 1,050 FTE after the comple-
tion of the reorganisation, this time all for the operational surveillance
of irregular migrants.
In Germany, the internal control on irregular migrants is much less
characterised by organisational expansion and new policies and laws.
Two things account for at least part of that: the first is that irregular re-
sidence is considered a criminal offence; the second is that there is no
specialised subdivision within the police of the La¨nder dealing with the
issue of aliens and irregular migrants. As a general principle, the Ger-
man police are obliged to investigate all crimes that come to their
knowledge. Because irregular residence is a criminal offence, punish-
able by a fine or imprisonment, the principle of legality prohibits that
the police dismisses a case; only the public prosecutor has that authori-
ty (Vogel et al. 2009). This is of course a very formal restriction that
will still allow policemen on the street to make use of their discretion-
ary space, but the formal incentive is to deal with irregularity when it
is encountered. In Germany, there is no special branch of the police
force that is directly responsible for ‘immigration policing’. There is,
however, a division of labour between different agencies that can be
translated into the Dutch terminology of the paper surveillance and the
operational surveillance. The Auslanderbeho¨rde (foreign-resident author-
ity) take care of the paper surveillance as they are responsible for all ad-
ministrative dealings with both legal aliens (organising their adminis-
tration and their identity documents) and illegal aliens (organising the
removal orders) in Germany. The operational surveillance – the enfor-
cement of the Foreigners Law – is in the hands of the police, the feder-
al police and the FKS.
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The federal police are responsible for the borders and further only
come into play for the internal surveillance of irregular migrants at
very end of the procedure as the actual deportations of irregular mi-
grants are the responsibility of the federal police. Internal operational
surveillance is divided between the FKS and the police of the La¨nder.
The FKS, though formally not police officers, deal with the labour mar-
ket controls including the tasks that in the Netherlands are fulfilled by
the police. As explained in the previous chapter, they have police-like
powers including the authority to arrest and interview suspects. Gener-
al internal surveillance is within the competence of the regular police.
Irregular migrants are sometimes encountered during the investigation
of other crimes and misdemeanours, or may be stopped on the basis of
a well-founded suspicion. As all foreigners are legally required to carry
identification documents – and most native Germans usually carry and
are willing to show them (cf. Vogel et al. 2009) – identity checks are
not a very controversial topic in Germany. There are differences be-
tween the competences of the various Bundesla¨nder and the various ‘po-
lice organisations’ with regard to the authority to conduct identity
checks. All police can ask suspects to identify themselves, but there are
differences in the discretion to stop and ask people for identification
when there is no direct suspicion. The FKS has the widest scope of dis-
cretion albeit only within the confines of labour market controls. They
can check identities without the need for an informed suspicion. In
2006, they checked 423,1745 identity documents during the course of
labour market controls (Bundesrechnungshof 2008: 29). In all Bundes-
la¨nder, the police need to have a special search warrant to enter a pri-
vate house. In six of the sixteen Bundesla¨nder, the police need a special
permission to conduct identity checks in public. In the other ten states,
the police may stop and check any individual if they can justify it by
the characteristics of the situation (Vogel et al. 2009).
4.3.2 Measuring police surveillance
Just about the only data available to get some impression of police sur-
veillance of irregular migrants and the intensification thereof are police
data. For the Dutch case, there are figures available for the time period
between 1999-2004 (Boekhoorn et al. 2004). These figures indicate a
clear increase in the number of apprehensions of irregular migrants19
during this timeframe, rising from roughly 12,000 apprehensions in
1998-1999 to roughly 23,000 apprehensions in 2003-2004 (see table
4.1).
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Table 4.1 Apprehended irregular migrants specified by reason of apprehension in
the Netherlands, April 1998 – April 2004
Reason for
apprehension
1998-
1999
1999-
2000
2000-
2001
2001-
2002
2002-
2003
2003-
2004
Aliens Law 6,604
(55%)
6,428
(52%)
6,978
(46%)
7,742
(44%)
10,564
(46%)
9,629
(42%)
Criminal Law 2,859
(23%)
3,439
(28%)
5,125
(34%)
6,667
(38%)
8,664
(38%)
9,076
(40%)
Other laws* 2,538
(22%)
2,516
(20%)
3,069
(20%)
3,133
(18%)
3,697
(16%)
4,253
(18%)
Total
(100%) 12,001 12,383 15,172 17,542 22,925 22,958
* Includes (non-limitative) the Opiumwet (narcotics law), Algemene Plaatselijke Verordening
(local decree) and de Verkeerswet (traffic law)
Source: Boekhoorn et al. 2004: 157
Though the police are not always very accurate at ‘booking’ an irregular
migrant under the ‘proper’ legal article (see the previous chapter on
the apprehensions under the Aliens Employment Act), it is interesting
to note that the relative share of irregular migrants booked purely for
the breach of the Aliens Law is actually decreasing. An increase would
in fact have been expected as a result of the intensification on ‘normal’,
i.e. non-criminal, irregular migrants. The relative share of irregular mi-
grants booked under criminal law on the other hand is rising fast,
climbing from 23 per cent in 1998-1999 to 40 per cent of all appre-
hensions in 2003-2004. This may mean two things. One explanation
may be that the Aliens Police conducted the intensification of irregular
migrant surveillance strictly according to their own set of priorities,
which favours the control on criminal and public disorderly irregular
migrants over ‘normal’ irregular migrants. An alternative explanation
posits that the general buildup of the exclusionary Dutch illegal aliens
policy in the last decade marginalises irregular migrants through the
exclusion from the labour market and public provisions. The success
of these policies contributes to forms of ‘subsistence crime’. The exclu-
sion of illegal immigrants seems to result in groups of irregular immi-
grants resorting to poverty-related crimes in order to finance their stay
in the Netherlands. This ‘marginalisation thesis’ is supported by the
fact that the increase in apprehensions under criminal law are to a
large extent explained by apprehensions for minor offences such as
theft, shoplifting and burglary (see Engbersen & Van der Leun 2001;
Leerkes 2009). Obviously, the one explanation does not foreclose the
other.
Unfortunately, it is hard to determine, on the basis of the available
data, whether the intensifications and reorganisation of the Dutch
Aliens Police in 2003 have translated into a general increase in the
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active surveillance of irregular migrants, other than the criminal irreg-
ular migrants that are prioritised by the police themselves. The avail-
able data (computed on the basis of police datasets) run only to 2004.
As the reorganisation and the recruiting of new operational personnel
took quite some time and severely burdened the organisation (Boek-
hoorn & Speller 2006), even an extra two years wouldn’t have told us
much more. Data from 2006 onwards could tell us more if and when
they become available. In order to monitor the effects of the reorgani-
sation and the political desire to intensify police surveillance, the Min-
istry of Justice introduced new performance indicators. The most im-
portant of these are the number of primary and secondary identifica-
tion investigations that Aliens Police department are to conduct
annually. A primary investigation means that a person whose identity
cannot be established on the spot is taken in for further investigation
to find out his identity and legal status. A secondary investigation is
the identification and documentation of an irregular migrant with a
view to expulsion. For the Aliens Police, as a whole (all 25 districts),
the target for the primary identity investigations was set at 40,000 and
the target for the secondary investigations was set at 11,883 for the year
2006 (Boekhoorn & Speller 2006: 67). For a city police district like
Amsterdam-Amstelland, this translates into an average of 400 primary
identity investigations and 150 secondary identity investigations per
month. In some districts, this has already led to a professionalisation
of the identification process and the introduction of an identiteitsstraat
(literally an ‘identification street’) in the police station, where all the
practical and technical means available for identification are lined up.
The police regard this professionalisation of the process of identifying
and documenting irregular migrants as one of the main goals for the
future development of expertise (Boekhoorn & Speller 2006: 69).
Surprisingly, the police data for Germany show a decline in the
number of apprehended suspects without legal residence between
1996 and 2005 (see table 4.2). To a certain extent, this can be ex-
plained by the specifics of the German immigration history that shows
an enormous peak in asylum migration during the early 1990s that
has gradually subsided since then. If the apprehensions at the border
are subtracted – as they are not considered a result of internal migra-
tion control – there were 46,196 apprehensions of irregular migrants
as a result of the internal police surveillance in 2005. This roughly
doubles the numbers for the Netherlands. Given the differences in po-
pulation size of the two countries, however, it cannot be considered
much.
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Table 4.2 Irregular migrants in police statistics in Germany, 1996-2005
Suspects without legal
residence1
Suspects without legal
residence minus illegal
migrants apprehended
at the border 2
Illegal residence as offence3
1996 137,232 110,208 -
1997 128,146 102,941 -
1998 140,779 100,578 -
1999 128,320 90,531 -
2000 124,262 92,777 -
2001 122,583 94,023 -
2002 112,573 89,935 -
2003 96,197 76,223 60,615
2004 81,040 62,825 48,296
2005 64,747 46,196 41,883
1 Tatverdächtige mit illegalem aufhalt
2 Tatverdächtige abzüglich der an den Grenzen aufgeriffenen unerlaubt eingereisten Ausländer
Source: Kreienbrink & Sinn 2006: 16
3 Straftat: Illegaler aufenthalt nach Auslandergesetz
Source: Bundeskriminalamt 2007: 42; 2005: 44
There is another aspect of the apprehension figures in table 4.2 that
mark a difference between the Netherlands and Germany. Though the
data are only available from 2003 onwards, they indicate that the vast
majority of the irregular migrants are apprehended (or at least booked)
for their irregular residence and not for committing another crime.
The proportion even increases over the documented years (2003-2005).
This is confirmed by the police in Frankfurt, who estimate that only a
small number (about 8 per cent) of the detected irregular migrants
have also committed other crimes (in Vogel et al. 2009). This suggests
that irregular migrants in Germany are ‘less criminal’ than those ap-
prehended in the Netherlands. In light of the marginalisation thesis,
this might be explained by a relatively better position, room to ma-
noeuvre and opportunities to ‘make a living’ for irregular migrant in
Germany, compared to the position of irregular migrants in the Nether-
lands. This would suggest that there is less reason for irregular mi-
grants in Germany to engage in ‘subsistence crime’. Even though the
difference is noteworthy, the available data are not sufficient to support
more than a suggestion.
4.4 Detention as an instrument of migration control
Immigrants are a steadily growing part of the prison population in
most European countries, and Germany and the Netherlands are no ex-
ception. When compared to the other European countries, both states
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are in the upper area of the so-called middle section when it comes to
the number of foreigners in prison. In 2005, 28 per cent of the Ger-
man prison population was foreign and 32.9 per cent of the prison po-
pulation in the Netherlands was of foreign descent (Van Kalmthout et
al. 2007: 11). The annual statistics for 2006 gathered by the Council of
Europe confirm these relative positions, setting the proportion in the
Netherlands at 32.7 per cent and in Germany at 26.9 per cent (Aebi &
Delgrande 2008). The overrepresentation of foreigners in German and
Dutch prisons seems to confirm the general new penology thesis on
detention and its specific interpretation on immigrant detention by
Waquant. Oddly enough, in Germany, the overrepresentation of for-
eigners is highest in the former East German La¨nder, where the for-
eign population is much smaller (proportionally) than in the former
West (Du¨nkel et al. 2007: 351). On the whole, Du¨nkel et al. (2007: 358)
attribute the differences to discrimination, a much more restricted ac-
cess to non-custodial measures for foreigners and to a more violent be-
haviour among certain groups of foreigners. However, the normal dis-
claimer applies and Du¨nkel et al. assert that more research is needed
on these issues. In addition to these reasons, one has to consider the
fact that some violations of the law can only be made by immigrants,
such as breaches of immigration and residence laws. The significance
of this category within the general ‘foreign’ prison population, the ma-
jority of them irregular migrants, will be elaborated below.
4.4.1 Trends in administrative detention in Germany and the Netherlands
The detention of irregular migrants is an increasingly substantial part
of internal migration control policies in which detention is instrumen-
tal to achieving certain policy goals that are otherwise considered una-
chievable. The UNHCR, who is primarily concerned with refugees,
lists a varied number of grounds on the basis of which member states
of the EU detain asylum seekers. The list includes:
pre-admission detention, pre-deportation detention, detention for
the purposes of transfer to a safe third country, detention for the
purposes of transfer to the responsible state under the Dublin
Convention and criminal detention linked to illegal entry/exit or
fraudulent documentation. (UNHCR 2000, quoted in Hailbronner
2007: 163)
This list can be widened to include groups other than asylum seekers
to discern a number of semi-separate groups of irregular migrants who
populate the Dutch and German prisons. In the first place, there are
foreign-born criminals who will lose their residence as a result of the
POLICE SURVEILLANCE, DETENTION AND EXPULSION 131
crime they committed. They are declared persona non grata and will be
deported after they served their sentence, which they typically serve in
a regular prison. In the second place, there are asylum claimants who
are detained during the procedure of their asylum application in so-
called ‘pre-admission detention’. Not all countries use this practice
whereby detention is used as a preventive measure (see Hailbronner
2007). Pre-admission detention almost turns an asylum application
into a ‘crime of arrival’ (Weber & Bowling 2004: 198). These first two
categories are, however, not the primary focus of this study. The third
category consists of migrants who no longer have a legal right of resi-
dence and who are the subjects of internal migration control. This cate-
gory comprises irregular migrants apprehended at the border, arrested
by the police while residing in the territory of the state (see preceding
paragraph) or asylum seekers whose asylum request was turned down.
This last group becomes irregular after the time that they are granted
to prepare for their own independent return has expired. The reasons
that states give for the use of detention are usually centred on two
main issues. The first is the prevention of abscondment. Detention is
obviously the ultimate form of localisation, one of Noll’s (1999) ‘pre-
conditions of removal’. The second reason is that of identification: de-
termining nationality in the absence of travel or identity documents
and arranging travel documents. Van Kalmthout (2005: 325) writes that
one of the main justifications for immigrant detention in the Nether-
lands is insufficient cooperation of an irregular migrant with the
authorities when it comes to establishing his identity, the shedding or
destroying of identity papers and the use of false papers (see also
Grimm 2004 for the German case). These are also the reasons that the
UNHCR lists as the grounds on which detention may be resorted to if
necessary (see Hailbronner 2007: 167).
There are huge differences between EU member states in the legal
framework that regulates the detention regime for irregular migrants.
Two indicators are often mentioned to determine the ‘severity’ of the
regime, which are also indicators for the degree of ‘exception’ that
states allow themselves in the incarceration of irregular migrants. First
of all, states differ in the legal definition of whether ‘irregular resi-
dence’ or ‘irregularity’ is considered a criminal offence. The majority of
the EU countries, including the Netherlands, do not consider irregular
stay to be a criminal offence, meaning that there is no ground under
criminal law for detention. In a smaller group of EU countries,20
which includes Germany, irregular stay is a criminal offence that is
usually punishable with fines and detention (Van Kalmthout et al.
2007: 64). However, the legal differences are usually not translated
into practical differences between the various detention regimes. Even
though irregular residence is a criminal offence in Germany, irregular
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migrants are usually not detained under criminal law. As in most
countries, immigrant detention is an administrative detention and is
not considered a punitive measure, but rather, a measure to safeguard
other purposes, mainly expulsion (Du¨nkel et al. 2007: 377). Conversely,
the fact that irregular residence is not a criminal offence in the Nether-
lands does not mean that some actions related to irregular stay are not
punishable by law. For example, illegal entry, producing false docu-
ments and not leaving the country while classified as a persona non gra-
ta are all punishable offences (Van Kalmthout et al. 2007: 64).
Secondly, the EU member states vary considerably in terms of the
time an irregular migrant can be held in detention: countries may
measure the length of stay in hours, days or months. Some even lack
any maximum prescribed by law. The length of administrative deten-
tion in Germany and the Netherlands is long as compared to most
other European countries. The German authorities can detain irregular
migrants up to eighteen months. The administrative detention for ir-
regular migrants is initially six months, which can be extended by an-
other twelve months. This maximum length of eighteen months is,
however, an exception. On average, the administrative detention lasts
six weeks. Obviously, this ‘average length’ is based on detainees who
both stay shorter and much longer than the six-week period. Research
published in 1990 shows that that the proportion of detained irregular
migrants awaiting expulsion who spend more than six months in cus-
tody is roughly 10 to 20 per cent (Du¨nkel et al. 2007: 383). The deci-
sion to detain an irregular migrant is made by a judge on the basis of
recommendation by the local Foreign Nationals Agency. In Germany,
the constitution requires all decisions concerning the deprivation of lib-
erty to be made by a judge. In the Netherlands, there is no fixed dura-
tion of imprisonment (Van Kalmthout et al. 2007: 59). In principle, it
can last until expulsion is realised or even remains just a possibility.
When expulsion has not been realized within 6 months, the
courts generally rule that the interest of the detained foreigner
weighs heavier than the interest of expulsion of the government.
However, this does not apply when the expulsion is to be expected
shortly or when the foreigner himself can be blamed for not being
able to realize the expulsion. (Van Kalmthout & Hofstee-van der
Meulen 2007: 650)
Figures for 2000-2001 show that the average length of immigrant de-
tention in the Netherlands was 36 days (ACVZ 2002: 23). However,
practice shows that long-term detention of fifteen up to eighteen
months is no exception (Van Kalmthout & Hofstee-van der Meulen
2007: 650).
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4.4.2 Detention capacity and organisation
The expanding role of detention for the organisation of internal migra-
tion control on irregular migrants should be visible from the growth of
the detention capacity and changes in the organisation of the adminis-
trative detention regime. The build-up of the detention regime in the
Netherlands provides insight into the importance the Dutch govern-
ment attaches to detention (and ultimately expulsion) as well as the se-
parate groups of irregular migrants that are targeted. Van Kalmthout
(2005: 322) gives a brief overview of the increase in detention capacity
since the early 1980s. In 1980, the capacity for administrative immi-
grant detention was 45 places and the measure to detain irregular mi-
grants was executed 450 times. The increase in capacity started in
earnest during the 1990s. Moreover, the new detention capacity was
specifically designated – and sometimes built – for irregular migrant
detention, instead of cells in normal prisons earmarked for immigrant
detention. In 1994, the Willem II penitentiary in Tilburg was taken
into use, with 560 places for immigrant detention. In 1998, the so-
called ‘departure centre’ in Ter Apel opened its doors, adding another
394 places for immigrant detention with a view to expulsion. Since
1998, a large number of new venues have come to be used, including
the so-called grens hospitia (‘border shelters’), the expulsion centres at
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol and Rotterdam Airport, new detention
centres in Zeist and Rotterdam and two detention boats in Rotterdam.
It is noteworthy that the Dutch expulsion centres were introduced as
part of a government programme entitled ‘Towards a safer society’. In
other words, the intensification of expulsion policies through these
centres was introduced as a measure of public safety, and not primarily
as a measure of immigration policy (Den Hollander 2004: 160). In
2006, the capacity for immigrant detention stood at 3,310 places (DJI
2007). The increase in capacity serves two goals: first, short-term de-
tention exercised right at the border (to turn back illegal immigrants
apprehended at the border and asylum seekers whose claims are re-
garded ‘manifestly unfounded’ in fast-track procedures); second, deten-
tion to prepare for the expulsion of irregular resident migrants. If we
set the rise in immigrant detention capacity against the background of
the overall expansion of the Dutch detention capacity in the same time
period, the following picture emerges. Total detention capacity has stea-
dily risen since the 2000s, though, in recent years, it seems to be stabi-
lising (and even sloping downwards a little). In comparison, the capa-
city for immigrant detention keeps on rising steadily (see graph 4.1).
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Graph 4.1 Detention capacity in the Netherlands, 1999-2006
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In relative numbers, administrative detention capacity has also risen
sharply. If we look at immigrant detention as a percentage of the total
prison capacity (i.e. excluding youth facilities and enforced mental
healthcare), the share of immigrant detention has risen from 9.1 per
cent in 1999 to 18.1 per cent in 2006. In short, the relative share of
immigrant detention capacity doubled in the last eight years. Van
Kalmthout (2005: 323) further adds that the annual number of mi-
grants detained with a view to expulsion is roughly 12,000, which
translates into 25 per cent of the total annual inflow in Dutch prisons.
The German regime for the detention of irregular migrants differs
from the Dutch case in a number of aspects. First of all, the prison sys-
tem is decentralised. The La¨nder are responsible for the buildings and
the personnel, which attributed to large differences between facilities
and regimes. Furthermore, in 2006 the Federal government, despite
heavy criticism from both academics and practitioners, decided to
transfer the legislation for prisons to the level of the La¨nder as well
(Du¨nkel et al. 2007: 345). Secondly, these differences are also visible in
the more specific case of immigrant detention for the purpose of
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expulsion. In the Netherlands, notably since the 1990s, detention facil-
ities have been specifically designated for immigrant detention and im-
migrants are thus kept separate from the normal prison population.
The regime in Germany is more ‘mixed’. The facilities for administra-
tive detention vary considerably among the La¨nder, ranging from spe-
cial facilities for the administrative detention of irregular migrants to
normal prisons where they are held alongside criminal convicts. There
are three different models of detention: (1) special establishments for
the administrative detention of irregular migrants; (2) detention in reg-
ular prisons (Justizvolzugsanstalt – JVA); or (3) in special departments
of such a JVA (Van Kalmthout et al. 2007: 54). A more detailed over-
view of the detention facilities in the various Bundesla¨nder in 2004
gives the impression that a large part of the German capacity for ad-
ministrative detention is realised within JVAs – some of it in separate
sections, but much of it as an ‘earmarked’ part of regular capacity
(Du¨nkel et al. 2007: 381-382). A number of the German detention facil-
ities have a rather bad reputation and, on numerous occasions
throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, have been visited and reported
on by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Du¨nkel et al.
2007: 377-8).
Due to its decentralised organisation, the detention capacity’s devel-
opment over time is difficult to measure. Du¨nkel et al. (2007: 379-380)
give some indication of development over time, but these data must be
treated with the utmost care because they do not measure capacity, but
rather, the actual stock of detained foreigners who are pending removal
on one specific day (1 January) per year (see graph 4.2). The only infor-
mation that can be taken from this graph is that capacity has increased
since the early 1990s and that a small number of Bu¨ndeslander seem to
take up the lion’s share of the detained foreigners pending removal
(again, on 1 January of each year). The top three of the sixteen Bu¨ndes-
lander are also depicted in the graph.
The current capacity for the administrative detention of irregular mi-
grants awaiting removal is roughly 2,250 places (Du¨nkel et al. 2007:
380). That is not much, especially when set against a background of
222 German prisons with a total capacity of 80,000 places – a ‘mere’
2.8 per cent of the total prison capacity. Moreover, the graph, with all
its limitations, shows that in 1994 there were 2,600 foreigners impri-
soned with a view to expulsion, meaning either that the total capacity
has gone down since the middle of the 1990s or, more likely, that the
German regime is more flexible in terms of placement of irregular mi-
grants. The latter is an obvious option, as many irregular migrants are
detained in normal prison facilities. This gives the German immigra-
tion authorities more flexibility in the placement of irregular migrants.
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The figures can be put in a better perspective by zooming in on Berlin,
one of the La¨nder. Berlin lists very low figures in terms of the data un-
derlying graph 4.2 (highest score is 18 in 1994) and therefore didn’t
make it into the top three in the graph. This is odd because it has a
specialised immigrant detention centre with 340 places in Ko¨penick,
making it the Land with the second largest detention capacity (Du¨nkel
et al. 2007: 381). A recent dissertation by Pieper (2008) on the topic of
detention and migration gives exact figures for this Berlin facility in
the year 2002. According to official figures, 5,676 people were taken
into immigrant detention (abschiebungshaft) during that year (Pieper
2008: 187). This means that, on average, every place in Ko¨penick was
used almost seventeen times during 2002. Though it is of course im-
possible to extrapolate this figure to the other La¨nder, it does give some
indication of intensive use of the available detention capacity. How ef-
fective this use is can only be approximated by looking at the data for
the actual expulsions in the next paragraph.
Graph 4.2 Foreign detainees pending removal in penitentiary establishments
in Germany (total) and selected Bundesla¨nder, 1990-2006 (count of
detainees on 1 January of each year)
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4.5 Expulsion
The crucial question is whether the investments in immigrant deten-
tion actually result in an increase of effective expulsions of irregular
migrants. In 2005, the European Commission concluded on the basis
of the then available information (for the period 2002-2004) that in
the EU 25 roughly one in three of the formal ‘return decisions’ on ir-
regular migrants are effectively implemented and result in removal
(CEC 2005). Two-thirds of the return decisions are not in any way im-
plemented. In a number of countries governments are trying to close,
or at least diminish this ‘deportation gap’, i.e. ‘(…) the gap between the
number of people eligible for removal by the state at any time and the
number of people a state actually removes (deports)’ (Gibney 2008:
149). In short, states are investing in detention and expulsion policies,
despite the knowledge that expulsion is difficult and costly. Germany
and the Netherlands are also trying to improve their expulsion policies.
4.5.1 Leaving detention, leaving the country?
Immigrant detention can end in one of two possible outcomes: the ir-
regular migrant is expelled or he is released back onto the streets. In
the latter case, it is likely he will go back to his prior life with the same
irregular status for which he was brought into detention in the first
place. On the basis of statistics from the Dutch Immigration Services
(IND) for the years 2000 and 2001, the Dutch Advisory Committee for
Aliens Affairs concluded that immigrant detention resulted in expul-
sion for 60.7 per cent of all detainees in 2000 and for 56.9 per cent in
2001 (ACVZ 2002: 23). The remaining detainees were released either
because of administrative errors (vormfouten) or because there was no
realistic expectation that expulsion would be possible. Finally, a large
percentage was released due to ‘unknown’ factors (26.6 per cent in
2000 and 35.1 per cent in 2001). Release from detention does not
mean these irregular migrants won’t be detained again. Those who stay
irregularly after their release have the same risk of being apprehended
as they did before their first detention. Van Kalmthout et al. (2005:
145) find that, of a subset of detained irregular migrants (N=262) with
an immigration dossier, 18 per cent were in immigrant detention be-
fore. To some ‘undeportable’ irregular migrants, the detention system
risks becoming a revolving door.
In 2005, the IND reported that it had been possible to proceed with
deportation for 60 per cent of all irregular migrants detained over the
year (IND 2006: 65). On the basis of his research among 400 immi-
grant detainees in 2003-2004, Van Kalmthout (2007b: 101) claims the
percentage of irregular migrants actually expelled is much lower and
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even lies below 40 per cent. This is a rather low percentage, especially
when set against the background of extending detention lengths and
rising costs: an estimated E 35,000 detention costs per successful ex-
pulsion. The absolute number of expulsions from the Netherlands has
also been on the decline since 2003 (see table 4.3). The Dutch govern-
ment distinguished between two sorts of ‘actual departures’, the cate-
gory opposed to the so-called ‘administrative removal’ where an alien is
considered to have left the country when he is not found during a check
at his last known home address. In the case of a deportation, an alien is
escorted past the border and/or back to his country of origin. The ma-
jority of the deportations are conducted by airplane (IND 2006). A su-
pervised departure provides that the immigrant’s travel documents be
held by the authorities until he has effectively passed the border. The
absolute numbers for both categories have dropped since 2003, signal-
ling a trend of a decreasing effectiveness of expulsion policies.
Table 4.3 Expulsions and supervised departures from the Netherlands, 2000-2006
Deportations
(uitzetting)
Supervised departure
(vertrek onder toezicht)
Total actual departure
2000 9,947 15,262 25,209
2001 9,498 7,049 16,547
2002 12,015 9,055 21,070
2003 11,374 11,006 22,380
2004 9,215 9,800 19,015
2005 8,912 NA
2006 7,765 NA
Sources: Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 2003: 8; Ministerie van Justitie
2004: 48-49, 2005: 37-38, 2006: 48, 2007: 42
There is also an important connection between the length an irregular
migrant is detained and the chances of his being actually expelled. In
an earlier research project using a sample of 400 detained irregular
migrants, Van Kalmthout et al. (2004: 95-98; see also Van Kalmthout
2005: 332) found that 56 per cent was detained for less than three
months, 22 per cent between three and six months and 22 per cent for
longer than six months. Tellingly, the number of irregular migrants
that was effectively expelled was highest among those detained under
three months (67 per cent). This percentage dropped significantly as
time went on; only 19 per cent of those detained longer than three
months were effectively expelled. This is confirmed by the data used by
the ACVZ (2002: 23-24). Roughly 80 per cent of the detained irregular
migrants who were expelled were in detention for less than 28 days.
Conversely, the average detention length of irregular migrants released
because expulsion could not be implemented was 121 days. So far, it
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seems that the intensification of the detention regime has not trans-
lated into an increase of actual expulsions. It also seems that the deten-
tion regime is harshest, because of its length, for those irregular mi-
grants who may eventually prove to be ‘undeportable’.
The history of German expulsion policy is closely entwined with the
sizable migration flows into this country, especially in the years after
the fall of the Berlin wall. According to Ellerman (2008: 173), the im-
migration authorities conducted fewer than 8,000 deportations in
1985, a number that climbed to 15,000 in 1990, peaked at 47,000 in
1993 and stabilised at around 35,000 by 2000. More recently, the Ger-
man figures have a taken a more significant tumble (see graph 4.3).
There was a steady decrease in the number of expulsions during the
2000s that intensified after 2005 (Kreienbrink 2007). The category
‘forced removals’ comprises three different subcategories, two of which
are taken into account in the figures underlying graph 4.3. Zuru¨ckwei-
sung or ‘rejection at the border’ is not taken into account because it is a
matter of border policy, not of internal migration control. Zuru¨ckschie-
bung, or removal, is meant to return an apprehended irregular migrant
to the country from which he entered Germany. Force and detention
can be used for this category of irregular migrants. If an irregular mi-
grant has been in the country for more than six months he has to be
deported (Abschiebung), in which case an irregular migrants is usually
physically transported (and sometimes escorted) out of the country. In
2006, the number of deportations was 13,894 and the total number of
forced removals was 18,623.
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Graph 4.3 Deportation and forced removals from Germany, 1996-2006
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The relation between the length of immigrant detention and actual ex-
pulsions cannot be accurately determined for the German case as the
necessary statistics are lacking. However, estimates range from 60 per
cent to 80 per cent of administrative detainees that are actually ex-
pelled (Du¨nkel et al. 2007: 386, Kreienbrink 2007: 152). That is signifi-
cantly higher than in the Netherlands. For the length of immigrant de-
tention, there are also only estimates and ‘averages’. Du¨nkel et al.
(2007: 383) say that the average stay in immigrant detention is six
weeks. However, they immediately add that this average obscures the
fact that many detainees are only briefly in custody, while roughly 10
to 20 per cent of them spend more than six months in detention. It is
also interesting to note that, during the 1990s, the composition of de-
ported aliens displayed a marked shift away from illegal immigrants
and criminal immigrants in favour of rejected asylum seekers. While
in the late 1980s, asylum seekers accounted for only 25 to 30 per cent
of forced removals, in 1993, this had risen to 76 per cent and, by the
end of the decade, continued to range between 47 to 58 per cent (Eller-
mann 2008: 173). Kreinenbrink (2007: 61) who uses data from 2000-
2004, estimates that roughly one-third of the current population in im-
migrant detention does not have an asylum background. Considering
the dominant focus on failed asylum seekers in German expulsion pol-
icy – a much more prominent emphasis than in the Netherlands – the
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drop in the expulsion figures becomes less dramatic than it seems at
face value. Graph 4.4 shows the numbers for the total of all forced re-
movals and the figures for the number of asylum applications in Ger-
many for the time period 1990-2006.
As can be seen from graph 4.4, the gap between the number of ex-
pulsions and the number of asylum claims is closing fast and they al-
most overlap in 2006. The drop in the number of asylum claims ex-
plains the decrease of the number of removals to some extent, but does
not tell the whole story. Ellermann (2008) points to another explana-
tion: the increasingly difficult process of identification due to the fact
that migrants and asylum seekers do not carry identification docu-
ments. The impact of this ‘problem of the papers’ has grown enor-
mously since the mid-1990s. Officials of the Interior Ministry stated in
2002 that, in the mid-1980s, the immigration authorities had to obtain
travel documents for only 30 to 40 per cent of all asylum seekers. Less
than two decades later, it is estimated that 85 per cent of all asylum
seekers arrive without documentation (in Ellermann 2008). The situa-
tion in the Netherlands is similar. Of the 400 detainees in Van
Kalmthout’s study, 61 per cent had no documents at all. After disclud-
ing the remaining false and invalid documents, a total of 88 per cent
Graph 4.4 Forced removals from Germany, asylum applications in Germany,
1990-2006
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did not have any useful documentation (Van Kalmthout 2005: 59). The
bottleneck of identification seems an important contender to explain
the decreasing deportation figures when budgets and staffing for de-
tention and deportation process are rising.
4.5.2 Searching for identities
As said before, the bottleneck of identification is the result of a lack of
cooperation – or even the active obstruction – of the irregular immi-
grant himself, his country of origin, or often the country the immigra-
tion authorities suspect to be the country of origin, or both. The pro-
blems with irregular migrants primarily involve the destroying of iden-
tity papers, lying or withholding information about identity and
country of origin and refusing to cooperate with the immigration
authorities and the embassies of their countries of origin. The bur-
geoning number of undocumented cases in immigrant detention dur-
ing the last decade is a significant indication that irregular migrants
are well aware of ‘the importance of not being earnest’ (Engbersen &
Broeders 2009). Countries of origin – in this case represented by em-
bassies and consulates in Germany and the Netherlands – are often
also unwilling to cooperate or use an array of tricks to frustrate the pro-
cess of identification and repatriation (see for example Kreienbrink
2007: 116). Some countries, like Ethiopia, simply refuse to cooperate,
while other countries, such as China, formalise their procedures to
such an extent that repatriation often becomes de facto impossible (Liu
2008). Even though most countries cannot and will not blatantly re-
fuse to accept their own citizens back, they can influence the timing
and opportunities for return by informally stretching procedures. Noll
(1999: 274) maintains that some countries of origin handle the issuing
of travel documents for irregular migrants as a sort of an ‘informal fil-
ter for remigration’. Confronted with these obstructions that lead to
dropping expulsion rates, the Dutch and German authorities have
sought counter-measures to professionalise the identification process
and to increase pressure on, or the incentives for, both the individual
migrant and the authorities of the countries of origin. Ultimately, the
authorities try to develop instruments that make the process of identifi-
cation less dependent on the cooperation of migrants themselves.
Organising identification: centralisation and professionalisation
Both Germany and the Netherlands have implemented organisational
changes in recent years to increase the effectiveness of the expulsion
process. Often, these organisational changes were meant to increase
the professionalisation of the authorities involved in expulsion policies.
Identification has proven to be a very specialised task that benefits
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from centralisation, especially in Germany where expulsion is within
the competence of the La¨nder. As early as 1993, the conference of the
Interior Ministers of the La¨nder decided to instate a special working
group on the issue of return policies (AG Ru¨ck) to debate and devise
common strategies for expulsion (Kreienbrink 2007: 117). At the feder-
al level, the Bundespolizei direction in Koblenz established a coordina-
tion centre for ‘return issues’ that specifically deals with the most ‘diffi-
cult’ countries of origin in terms of the identification, recognition and
documenting of irregular migrants who are ‘suspected’ to be their na-
tionals. Right now, the centre deals with fourteen countries, thirteen of
them being in sub-Saharan Africa. This central direction relieves the
La¨nder of the task of trying to obtain documents from these countries
(Kreienbrink 2007: 134). At the level of the La¨nder, there is a trend of
centralisation as well. Normally, all Ausla¨nderbeho¨rde have the jurisdic-
tion to issue expulsion orders but, in the Bundesland Baden Wu¨rttem-
berg, only four central Ausla¨nderbeho¨rde, out of 120 in total, can issue
them. According to Ellerman (2005: 1230-1231), this centralisation also
makes the process of expulsion less ‘vulnerable’ for public resistance
and the ‘particularistic demands of constituency-serving elected offi-
cials’. In the Netherlands, there has also been a process of organisa-
tional change. Following the priority given to the problem of irregular
migration in 2003’s white paper on return (Terugkeernota) and 2004’s
white paper on irregular migrants, in 2005, the government decided to
create a new return migration organisation. The Return and Departure
Service (Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek – DT&V), became operational in
2007 to deal with both ‘voluntary’ and forced returns. The DT&V has
since taken over a number of tasks related to return from the IND, the
Aliens Police and the Royal Constabulary.
Pressuring migrants
Getting uncooperative irregular migrants to cooperate with the authori-
ties in establishing their identity seems like a direct path to identifica-
tion and subsequent expulsion. The most important instrument that
the authorities use to this end has already been dealt with in the pre-
vious paragraph. The detention regime for irregular migrants is in it-
self a severe source of pressure on irregular migrants. Besides the in-
carceration itself, the regime usually proves harsher than that of nor-
mal prisons as the facilities and circumstances are below regular
prison standards. There is often overcrowding, a lack of medical and le-
gal aid and poorly trained, if not unqualified, staff (Du¨nkel et al. 2007;
Van Kalmthout & Hofstee-van der Meulen 2007). As irregular mi-
grants are, by legal definition, not supposed to return to society, all ac-
tivities and education that prepare regular prisoners for their return to
society are lacking. Furthermore, irregular migrants who refuse to
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cooperate have no way of knowing how long they are likely to stay in
detention. The detention regime is meant to increase the pressure on
irregular migrants to cooperate, just as it is meant to deter other mi-
grants from a life in illegality (Van Kalmthout et al. 2007: 53).
The authorities rely on immigrant detention to learn the identity of ir-
regular migrants by means of repeated interviews, language tests
(though often considered expensive and inaccurate; see Kreienbrink
2007: 137) and research of files, documents, registrations and data-
banks. During the evaluation of the German immigration law in 2006,
the question was also raised if the authorities should be able to search
immigrants’ homes for clues of their nationality and identity (Kreien-
brink 2007: 135). Once authorities suspect – but do not necessarily
prove – they have determined an immigrant’s nationality, they often
must present the individual at the embassy or consulate of the sus-
pected country of origin. The embassies must then acknowledge the
immigrant as a citizen before they might be willing to provide a new
passport or laissez-passer. Depending on the available proof of identity
and nationality, the presentation of the immigrant is done either on pa-
per or in person (Van Kalmthout 2005: 140-142). A ‘paper presentation’
requires the irregular migrant to complete a form answering questions
regarding identity, place of origin, family, etc., which is then examined
by embassy personnel. An in-person presentation means that the irreg-
ular migrant will be interviewed by embassy personnel in order to es-
tablish his nationality. If the embassy accepts the migrant as its na-
tional, a document will be issued for his return. Presenting migrants is
hardly an exact science, and in both Germany and the Netherlands, the
authorities will sometimes present the same migrant to a number of
embassies. Germany sometimes brings the representatives of various
embassies together to prevent what the German authorities call ‘em-
bassy tourism’, i.e. to limit the risk that various successive embassies
reject the migrant as their own (Kreienbrink 2007: 137). In the Nether-
lands, the authorities take some migrants past a number of different
embassies without substantial indication of any country of origin, but
in the hope of coming upon the right one. However, this so-called ‘em-
bassy shopping’ yields little result and a lot of protest from the legal
profession (Van Kalmthout 2005: 194).
Pressuring countries of origin
Presenting immigrants to embassies is not just meant to put pressure
on the irregular migrant. It is also meant to influence the behaviour of
the countries of origin. Many countries of origin prove very uncoopera-
tive. As Western states get keener on expulsion, the number of unco-
operative countries is on the rise. In 1990, German authorities dealt
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with the representatives of ten countries on a regular basis. By 2000,
that number had risen to 80 (Ellermann 2008: 174). The documented
cases are usually unproblematic, but
many governments drag their feet when it comes to issuing travel
and identity papers to individuals who no longer possess these
documents, thereby effectively rendering repatriation impossible.
(Ellermann 2008: 171)
One of the main efforts to increase the diplomatic pressure on coun-
tries of origin has been the negotiation of so-called readmission agree-
ments. Germany has been negotiating these agreements unilaterally,
while the Netherlands usually negotiates its readmission agreements
as a part of the Benelux group (IOM 2004). Readmission agreements
usually specify the procedures that will be followed in the case of im-
migrants whose identity and nationality are contested. As readmission
agreements primarily serve the interests of the countries wishing to ex-
pel irregular migrants, they must contain either effective threats or in-
centives for the countries of origin in order for them to sign the agree-
ment. One of the main bargaining chips used in the negotiation of
these readmission agreements is making development aid dependent
on cooperation in the matter of accepting returning citizens (Kreien-
brink 2007; Ellermann 2008). The negotiation of such treaties is
usually a lengthy and difficult process that is sometimes subject to an
endless array of stalling tactics. Furthermore, many states have found
out that there can also be a huge difference between the paper reality
of a bilateral agreement and the practical implementation of that agree-
ment. Ellermann (2008) describes two readmission agreements that
Germany negotiated during the early 1990s of which much was ex-
pected after signing the paperwork. The one with Romania was a big
success and resulted in the repatriation of 60,000 Romanians in 1993
and 1994, alone. The agreement with Vietnam did not even come close
to the agreed targets and was considered a failure. The very different
incentives for the countries of origin are usually considered the main
explanation for the differences in compliance and effectiveness: the
strong incentive of the lure of EU membership made Romania very co-
operative, while the absence of such a tempting prospective explains
the Vietnamese obstructionist tactics. The negotiation of readmission
agreements at the EU level, a next step in the efforts to increase the ef-
fectiveness of expulsion policies, often suffers from a similar lack of
quid pro quo in the proposed and signed agreements (see chapter five).
For the German case, Ellermann (2008: 180-183) describes how, in or-
der to increase the number of readmissions, interior officials in Biele-
feld (Nordrhein Westphalen) circumvent diplomatic and political levels,
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trying to establish liaison structures with officials of the interior minis-
tries in some countries of origin. With the same agenda in mind, they
also try to better the relations with lower level embassy personnel. This
‘small diplomacy’ seems to work as the cooperation of some of these
countries has improved, but some of the side-payments involved in the
process come awfully close to bribing.
Identification without the help of the immigrant himself
The easiest way to identify uncooperative irregular migrants is by
means of instruments that do not require their cooperation at all. The
first thing both the Dutch and German authorities do is to check the
available national and international database systems that may provide
information on the individual in custody. The German authorities
check the Central Aliens Register (AZR), the central database of the
immigration authorities that is also fed by various public and semi-
public authorities who are legally obligated to exchange, check and pass
on information relating to foreign nationals (Vogel & Cyrus 2008: 3).
In the Netherlands, an irregular migrant is checked against the data in
a large number of databases including the Aliens Administrative Sys-
tem (VAS), National Schengen Information System (NSIS), the Muni-
cipal Basic Administration (GBA) and a number of national and inter-
national police databases such as Netherlands National Investigative
System and the Europol and Interpol databases (Van Kalmthout et al.
2005: 129). However, many of these databases still require a minimal
degree of cooperation from the irregular migrant in question as they
only store alphanumerical information – names, dates, places, and phy-
sical characteristics – meaning that authorities still need at least a
name to make a match between a detainee and the database informa-
tion. In light of this structural flaw, the German and Dutch authorities
have embarked on a strategy to include in their databases a number of
biometric identifiers. Identifiers such as digitalised fingerprints, photo-
graphs suitable for facial recognition and retina scans would mean that
the authorities no longer need to rely on the immigrant’s cooperation.
The use of biometric information would allow them to make sweeping
searches of the available data. At both the national and the interna-
tional levels (especially in the EU), migration control has seen a real
turn towards the use of biometric data. Progress is only being made
slowly, however, as the use of biometrics is technologically and legally
challenging as well as costly.
In Germany there were early pleas for a more structural approach to
the use of biometrics in matters of immigration and identification. In
2001, the Sussmu¨th commission proposed storing all the data of visa
applicants in a central register and making it available for the authori-
ties that need to identify irregular migrants with a view to expulsion.
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As many irregular migrants enter the country on a legal visa, it would
be a logical step to store copies of documents, fingerprints, photos, etc.
(Unabha¨ngige Kommission Zuwanderung 2001: 154-156). The inclu-
sion of biometrics would expedite the identification of irregular mi-
grants who travelled in on a visa. In 2006’s evaluation of the immigra-
tion law, the plea was repeated. However, the photographic data cur-
rently available in the AZR are not sophisticated enough to be used for
identification purposes (Kreienbrink 2007: 136). In 2005, Germany
also introduced a special section in the so-called fundpapierdatenbank, a
database for lost-and-found identity documents. Part of it is now re-
served for the storage of all documents underlying a visa application
for Germany. Copies of the passport, application forms and photo-
graphs are stored and made available for searches by immigration
authorities and the police for purposes of identifying irregular mi-
grants. The biometric identifier in this database is also photograph-
based facial recognition. The technology of this system is more sophis-
ticated than the AZR, but due to its relatively short existence, does not
generate many hits yet (Kreienbrink 2007: 136). In the Netherlands,
the turn towards biometrics has taken a similar route. A number of the
databases contain fingerprints. This goes for some police databases,
but especially for the so-called HAVANK database, the central storage
system of government-collected fingerprints administered by the Na-
tional Criminal Investigation Department (Nationale Recherche). One
section of HAVANK contains fingerprints of all asylum seekers in the
Netherlands and can be used to trace identities. The fingerprints of ir-
regular migrants who were taken into immigrant detention are also re-
gistered. The Dutch white paper on return called for the increased use
of biometrics to improve the effectiveness of identification. The ulti-
mate aim was to gather biometric data on all people embarking on a
procedure that may lead to entry to the Netherlands (Minster voor
Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 2003: 4). In the eyes of the govern-
ment, this required a number of new national databases and the unwa-
vering support for the EU initiatives in immigrant database technology
that are underway (see chapter 5). One of the issues under investiga-
tion was to compel all airlines to digitally register a biometric identifier
of all the passengers they transport (a scheme of which not much has
been heard of since, but which is certainly not technologically impossi-
ble). For the registration of biometric identifiers of visa applicants the
Netherlands prepares for the introduction of the national pendant of
the European Visa Information System (VIS) that will store the finger-
prints of all those who apply for a visa in Europe (see chapter five).
Once gathering biometric data on the various groups that enter Ger-
many and the Netherlands takes on a grander scale and more data are
stored, the identification process will become less dependent on the
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cooperation of individual migrants for revealing true identities. Assum-
ing that the body does not lie – and governments do assume this when
they talk about biometrics – identification may become a simple matter
of cross-checking for certain parts of the irregular migrant population
(rejected asylum seekers, visa overstayers).
4.6 Conclusion: factories of identification?
The general question of this chapter can be answered in the affirma-
tive: the ship of state is turning towards identification in both Germany
and the Netherlands. There is a noticeable turn towards policies that
aim to identify irregular migrants with a view to expulsion. Both coun-
tries are investing in the identification process in all parts of the bu-
reaucratic chain leading to expulsion. The police and immigration
authorities introduce procedures and instruments that make identifica-
tion possible and foreign policy is aimed at diplomatic relations with
important countries of origin and the negotiation of readmission agree-
ments. Furthermore, both countries are exploring the possibilities that
the ‘brave new world’ of modern surveillance techniques provides.
More and more, the immigration authorities turn to database systems
for the identification of irregular migrants. Where possible, the data-
base systems work with biometric identifiers that can link immigrants
to their legal identity and other personal data without needing their ac-
tive cooperation. Given the enormous problem of uncooperative irregu-
lar migrants hiding their identity or lying about it to the immigration
authorities, biometrics make it almost possible to ‘skip’ the immigrant
himself in terms of identification. A ‘surveillant assemblage’ aimed at
regular and irregular migrants is clearly emerging. This issue will be
taken up further in chapter 5 in the discussion on the new EU immi-
gration databases (SIS II, EURODAC and VIS). In sum, we can say
that Germany and the Netherlands are increasingly operating their po-
licies of internal migration control as ‘factories of identification’.
However, we do have to note that the proclaimed aim of these poli-
cies – an increase in the number of expulsions – is not met. If any-
thing, the numbers seem to be declining rather than rising. The inten-
sification in policing and, in particular, the rising incarceration rates
are not translated into more expulsions. This important counter-indica-
tion has a number of reasons. For one thing, expulsions vary with the
general volume of migration that can lead to irregular residence, such
as asylum migration. This is, however, only part of the story. Dropping
expulsion rates are an important counter-indication for the desired re-
turn on the government’s investment in detention and identification
policies but, at the same time, can be seen as the prime motivation for
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investing even more resources in solutions for the problem of the iden-
tification of irregular migrants. The main reason for the dropping ex-
pulsion figures is the fact that irregular migrants are well aware of ‘the
importance of not being earnest’. The fact that irregular migrants have
realised the value of frustrating the identification process has lifted
identification to an even more central place in policymaking. Theoreti-
cally, the migration control perspective best explains why the Dutch
and German governments are embarking on the difficult road of expul-
sion. The efforts to close the deportation gap are based on the political
incentive to be in control of migration. The heavy investments suggest
that it is actual migration control they are after and not just the image
of control as is often presumed. For example, Gibney and Hansen
(2003: 15) characterise deportation policies as a ‘noble lie’, necessary
because ‘no state is willing to collapse the distinction between legal
and illegal migrants’. However, irrespective of where the line between
migration control and ‘image control’ may lie exactly, investment in the
‘factory of identification’ is likely to continue.
The fact that ‘anonymous’ irregular migrants – often aided by coun-
tries of origin – are able to frustrate expulsion so effectively also has a
profound effect on the way the detention system functions in practice.
Given the difficulties with identification, immigrant detention cannot
optimally function as a clearinghouse for irregular migrants, i.e. as a
stopgap en route to expulsion. This is especially noteworthy consider-
ing how the data strongly suggest that the overall majority of success-
ful expulsions in both countries are effectuated in the first weeks and
months of detention. The longer detention lasts, the less likely the out-
come will be expulsion. Still, both governments keep significant num-
bers of irregular migrants in detention for much longer than that and
keep up a legal framework that allows for detention up to eighteen
months in Germany and, theoretically, even longer in the Netherlands.
But the lengthy and very costly detention of an irregular migrant who
will eventually end up on the streets again does not seem a very ra-
tional migration control approach. Making detention capacity available
for newly apprehended irregular migrants who have a higher chance of
being deported – and thus releasing ‘undeportable’ cases much earlier
– would seem a more effective and rational approach. What can ac-
count for this apparent irrationality? Here the new penology perspec-
tive comes to the fore. For those who have to stay in detention for a
longer period of time, the regime has a ‘new penological’ character.
Undeportable irregular migrants are held in a detention system that is
essentially not meant for long stays. The regime is usually harsher
than that of normal prisons as the facilities and circumstances are well
below normal standards. Overcrowding, a lack of medical and legal aid,
poorly trained, if not unqualified, staff and the lack of all activities and
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education preparing regular prisoners for their return to society add up
to a harsh regime, especially considering the long period irregular mi-
grants can be legally detained in Germany and the Netherlands. From
the perspective of new penology, their societal exclusion for a longer
period of time can already be measured as a policy effect. Prison then
simply functions as a ‘factory of exclusion’ that keeps irregular mi-
grants off the streets and out of sight for a longer period of time. That
alone is considered a valuable proceed of policy. An added value – and
a slightly more ‘rational’ line of reasoning from the perspective of mi-
gration control – is the idea that the long and harsh detention regime
may serve as a deterrent for current and future irregular migrants.
One might speculate that the authorities hope that the harsh detention
regime encourages these irregular migrants to try their luck elsewhere
after they have been turned back on the streets. The fact that there
were ‘returning’ prisoners in Van Kalmthout’s sample of irregular mi-
grants means that at least a number of them were not deterred. For
them, the detention system risks becoming a revolving door; for others,
it may indeed be an experience that brings them to leave the country.
However, both in terms of human and economic costs, these long de-
tentions seem a high price to pay for an unknown and immeasurable
contribution to the effectiveness of expulsion policies.
The de facto functioning of the detention system as a deterrent
brings the notion of the state of exception into mind. There is evidence
that both countries are stretching their policies to adapt to the circum-
stances and problems they face in order to increase effectiveness. In
doing so, they also undermine ‘traditional principles, standards and
procedures of criminal law’ amounting to the use of counter law
(Ericson 2007). The length and conditions of immigrant detention
(especially in the Netherlands where illegal residence is not a criminal
offence) and some of the efforts of immigration authorities to expel ir-
regular migrants (such as presenting aliens to various countries and
‘informalising’ diplomatic relations to increase expulsion rates, as is
done in Germany) all brush against the limits of the legal system and
allow degrees of exception. Writing on the use of surveillance in immi-
gration matters, Lyon (2007: 134) even maintains that Agamben’s no-
tion of the ‘state of exception’ has actually become ‘business as usual’.
That may be too all-encompassing for the Dutch and German situa-
tion, but there is no doubt that legal constraints are increasingly bent
or bypassed.
The concept and legal status of citizenship emerges from this state
of exception as a central albeit ultimately Janus-faced status. In es-
sence, the lack of a known citizenship among irregular migrants both
facilitates the ‘exceptional’ handling of immigrants by the state, as well
as restricts the state in achieving its aims. First, there is the fact that
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irregular migrants willingly hide their legal identity and citizenship
makes them all the more vulnerable vis-a`-vis the state. To some extent,
this puts them in a legal no-man’s land. Lack of citizenship is often
also a lack of legal/diplomatic representation, which gives the detain-
ing state authorities more ‘leverage’ in their dealings with irregular mi-
grants. The immigrant’s valuable lie comes at a high cost. With the
growing importance of immigrant detention, an individual irregular
migrant will find himself more and more cornered between the rock of
prison and the hard place of expulsion. Still, the lack of citizenship
puts the state authorities in an impossible position at the international
level, as the lack of citizenship blocks the state’s possibilities to deport
irregular migrants. Both the irregular migrant and the supposed coun-
try of origin are well aware of this, thus using this politico-legal restric-
tion on the deporting state to their advantage. In turn, this strengthens
deporting countries in their resolve to find new means of identifica-
tion. For founding EU and Schengen members, such as Germany and
the Netherlands, the obvious place to develop new initiatives is at the
European level.
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5 European tools for domestic problems
5.1 Introduction21
In a Europe without internal borders, migration control cannot be de-
termined and executed at ‘just’ the national level. In practice, this
means that the EU and the Schengen states, in particular, have a joint
agenda when it comes to border control, visa policy and immigration
and asylum policy. These are issues around which a significant policy
agenda – primarily aimed at the exclusion of ‘unwanted’ immigrants –
has developed in the last two decades since the Schengen cooperation
began in 1985. Measures that were taken on irregular migration were
usually related to border control issues, the countering of human
smuggling and the closing of certain migration routes into the territory
of the Schengen states. Internal migration control on irregular mi-
grants has long been considered a national matter, not least because of
an – informal – recognition of the large differences between the mem-
ber states in their political perception and handling of the issue of ir-
regular migration. The differences between the northern member
states, where irregular migrants are considered a problematic presence
and the southern member states, where irregular migrants are a much
more tolerated part of the informal economy (and society), seem to
stand in the way of a common stance on internal migration control on
irregular migrants. Yet, as the previous chapters showed, countries
such as the Netherlands and Germany are quite serious about the de-
velopment and implementation of internal surveillance of irregular mi-
grants. At the same time, they are confronted with the obvious limita-
tions of a purely national approach. As a result of frustrations with
readmission and expulsion policies at the national level, member states
have increasingly been looking at EU-level policymaking. Their hope is
that the EU’s political weight will increase the leverage on unwilling
and uncooperative countries of origin. The biggest frustration of expul-
sion policies, which is the impossibility of identifying irregular mi-
grants, could also potentially benefit from a European approach. The
fact that an irregular migrant could have entered the EU at any exter-
nal border means that he may have left traces of his identity and/or
itinerary in any other EU member state, information that may be made
accessible through a European approach. It may be national politics
and laws that declare an irregular migrant to be ‘undesirable’ or even
‘criminal’, but if the national instruments can only do part of the job,
these member states are likely to look to the EU to provide additional
tools.
This chapter analyses the policies and instruments developed at the
level of the EU that can ‘aid’ member states in their domestic ‘fight
against illegal migration’, as it is phrased in the official documents of
the EU. The EU initiatives will be analysed in terms of two theoretical
questions set out in paragraph 5.2. The first is derived from the general
theoretical framework and basically asks what the contribution of these
EU policies and instruments is to the working of the first and second
logic of exclusion. The second is linked to debates in political science
and political sociology about the nature of EU cooperation. To what ex-
tent can EU policies and instruments on irregular migration be charac-
terised as a common solution to a common problem? Or, should these
policies be viewed as the instrumental use of EU resources for domes-
tic agendas and policy problems? Paragraph 5.3 sketches a brief histori-
cal outline of the European cooperation in matters of irregular migra-
tion, originating outside of the legal framework of the EU and slowly
edging towards integration into the EU’s structures. Paragraph 5.4
deals with two policy initiatives that try to alleviate some of the difficul-
ties in domestic expulsion policies. The first is the negotiation of joint
readmission agreements and the second is the negotiation of a return
directive. Paragraph 5.5 focuses on the development of European ‘in-
struments’. Here the emphasis is on the development – and the politi-
co-technical changes within the development – of an emerging network
of EU migration databases consisting of the Schengen Information
System (SIS) and its aptly named successor the SIS II, the EURODAC
system and the Visa Information System (VIS). These systems have an
important function in the exclusion of irregular migrants, both at the
external borders of the EU and, as will be shown below, in the internal
migration control in individual member states such as Germany and
the Netherlands. The following paragraph will analyse the character,
development and potential of these data systems and where possible
the practical use of the system, highlighting the cases of Germany and
the Netherlands. Conclusions will be drawn in paragraph 5.6.
5.2 EU policymaking: transfer of competence or a European tool
shed?
European unification has been a long history of nation states overcom-
ing their national interests to achieve common goals and, ultimately, to
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prevent the repetition of the disaster of world war originating in Wes-
tern Europe. The original rationale of the post-war European coopera-
tion was to restrict national states in their capacities for new wars. Eu-
ropean nations decided to bring production of coal and steel, being the
raw materials for the weapons of mass destruction in the immediate
post-war days, under supervision of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, Europe’s first truly supranational organisation. Even today, and
in contrast to most international organisations, the core of the EU still
is, in essence, a very supranational treaty: the EEC treaty, which is now
referred to as the first pillar of the EU. In the first pillar, the European
institutions are fully involved in the development of common policies
through the so-called community method, and the implementation of
these policies is subject to judicial review by the European Court of Jus-
tice. Even though European cooperation has known periods of serious
stagnation and revived nationalism, it is usually seen as a process that
limits and diminishes the national sovereignty of its member states.
The general direction of Europeanisation has been that of ‘an ever clo-
ser union’, as it is phrased in the Treaty of Rome and in the preamble
of the rejected ‘constitutional’ treaty. European integration is therefore
also often associated with restrictions on national policies and discre-
tionary space. From a national perspective, ‘Brussels’ is often a restric-
tive power: fishermen can’t fish because of quota, firms get fined be-
cause of breaches of EU regulations for competition and national deci-
sions are revoked because the European Court of Justice determines
they are in violation of the EU treaties. In other words, the EU moulds
the behaviour of national governments so that it complies with the
joint decisions taken at the European level. In this reading, the com-
monality takes precedence over the national. However, in the literature
on European migration policy, the emphasis on the national perspec-
tive is still very much dominant. To a certain extent, this is logical be-
cause the sensitive EU policy terrain of what we now call Justice and
Home Affairs, which includes immigration, asylum and visa, was ori-
ginally the result of international negotiations within the Schengen
group (and hence outside of the EU legal order). And even when it was
taken into the framework of the EU, it was still kept firmly intergo-
vernmental and outside of the normal EU decision-making process
(Monar 2001; WRR 2003). Cooperation in matters of Justice and
Home Affairs has been a project of reluctant and hesitant nation states,
although one should note that Europeanisation usually is (Broeders
2009).
Besides the traditional scheme of resorting, albeit reluctantly, to the
EU to deal with problems that manifest itself at a European scale, there
is another theoretical perspective that argues that national actors, or
more precisely, the executive, seek out the European level not so much
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to devise common solutions for common problems, but to escape do-
mestic constraints on policymaking (Wolf 1999; Guiraudon 2000,
2003; Lahav & Guiraudon 2006; Lavenex 2006; Boswell 2007).
Branches of the executive, such as immigration authorities, ‘go Europe-
an’ to avoid parliamentary scrutiny or judicial accountability that would
impede their activities at the national level (Boswell 2007). Guiraudon
(2000) refers to this behaviour as ‘venue shopping’: agencies making a
vertical escape from the various domestic constraints on policymaking
resulting from democratic, judicial and public scrutiny (see also Lahav
& Guiraudon 2006; Lavenex 2006). The European scene makes it pos-
sible to escape domestic constraints and open up new spaces for action
(Guiraudon 2003: 265).This logic especially applies to organisations re-
sponsible for control and security (such as police and intelligence orga-
nisations operating at the international level), but also more and more
for the immigration authorities responsible for the EU’s fight against
illegal migration. The policy frames and usually soft law resulting from
international cooperation do not constrain nation states, but rather,
sanction national or protectionist initiatives. As Lahav and Guiraudon
put it: ‘International organisations and supranational participation le-
gitimize the role of certain actors in policy-making that defend a logic
of control’ (2006: 207). Instead of being restrained in their autonomy,
the EU level of policymaking makes it possible to avoid national con-
straints and to strike alliances with ministerial counterparts from the
other EU member states. According to Wolf (1999: 336), the opening
up of an additional political arena dominated by government represen-
tatives strengthens the executive; they alone can operate at both na-
tional and international levels. According to Wolf, the strategic use of
this new arena can be seen as a new version of the ancient raison d’e´tat.
This old notion of state interest highlights the ‘(…) fact that govern-
ments strive for autonomy has always been of a double-edged charac-
ter, i.e. it has been directed to the international and the domestic con-
text simultaneously’ (Wolf 1999: 337; see also Lavenex 2006: 331). This
instrumental use of the EU’s capacity would account for both a selec-
tive Justice and Home Affairs policy agenda – focusing on control and
not so much on rights – and an intergovernmental organisation of de-
cision-making. Even so, allowance must be made for the fact that most
EU cooperation started from a very national, narrowly framed perspec-
tive, though developing along the way into a common policy frame-
work, including the community method of decision-making. Trading
in francs, guilders and German marks for euros wasn’t achieved over-
night either. It remains to be seen whether national governments can
maintain the EU as an escape route and withstand the communitarisa-
tion of the Justice and Home Affairs agenda, especially considering the
fact that ‘(…) the EU has hitherto proved to be particularly resistant to
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long-term instrumentalisation by national actors’ (in Lavenex 2006:
346; see also Broeders 2009).
Most of the policies adopted at the EU level under the caption ‘mi-
gration management’ are primarily focused on the prevention of un-
wanted migration (Guiraudon 2003: 266; Lavenex 2006: 335). So far,
migration control is the de facto undisputed aim of policy development
explaining the advances made in the development of soft law instru-
ments, restrictive policies and limited – if not sometimes totally lacking
– progress on the more substantive dossiers concerning, for example,
the rights of third-country nationals and common norms for the hand-
ling of asylum claims (see par. 5.3). Migration control, especially when
it is aimed at irregular migrants, is control through exclusion: barring
access to legal procedures and geographical borders. Increasingly, it is
also a matter of expulsion policies, which may be regarded the ultimate
exclusion. That also means that migration control is increasingly part
of the EU’s foreign policy agenda, especially where readmission agree-
ments are concerned (Lavenex 2006). Furthermore, as shown in the
preceding chapters on national Dutch and German policies, the exclu-
sion of irregular migrants is becoming a matter of digital surveillance.
The rapid technological advances in database technology and bio-
metrics also influence the possible contributions that the EU can make
to the fight against illegal migration. This raises the question of how
policies and instruments, such as these migration databases developed
at the EU level, contribute to the two logics of exclusion: at the level of
the Schengen community as a whole but, in light of the focus on poli-
cies of internal migration control, especially at the level of the national
state.
From the perspective of internal migration control, the defining
characteristic of an irregular migrant is his irregular residence. Irregu-
lar residence, however, does not presuppose irregular entry. There are
three basic categories of irregular migrants: those who enter and stay
illegally (the irregular migrant ‘proper’), those who apply for asylum
and become irregular after their application is rejected and those who
travel to the EU on a legal visa and become irregular its validity ex-
pires. These migration histories lay at the base of the development of
the EU migration databases and their use for the exclusion of irregular
migrants. The EU migration databases dealt with in this chapter have
been developed or adapted for the storage of data on irregular mi-
grants, visa applicants and asylum seekers and combinations thereof.
As these systems are not devised to shield access to societal institutions
such as the labour market or the welfare state, they are less likely to
make a contribution to the first logic of exclusion. However, the sys-
tems may contain functions that delegitimise and criminalise institu-
tions or networks that irregular migrants need and use for their
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irregular stay. The main function of these systems in migration control
is primarily linked to the external borders of the EU – the geographical
borders and the access to legal procedures for asylum and visa – and
therefore to external migration control. For the internal migration con-
trol, the main contribution of these systems can be expected in the sup-
port and instrumentalisation of the second logic of exclusion: that of
exclusion through documentation and registration. The EU-wide scale
of these systems that will document and register important legal mi-
gration flows into all of the member states brings the level of ‘identity
management’ (Muller 2004) through database technology to a whole
new level. Documenting identities and itineraries can be used for inter-
nal migration control as it may provide links to the missing informa-
tion that frustrates national level expulsion policies. When these sys-
tems become operational in the context of the fight against illegal mi-
gration and especially in the internal control on irregular migrants
they should become vital tools for the exclusion through registration,
as their principal function is to re-identify irregular migrants (Broeders
2007).
Information and communication technology has made it possible to
link various databases, create networks between them and it has ‘liber-
ated’ registrations and administrations from fixed places and locations
through remote accessibility. This interconnectivity and accessibility of
information potentially makes cross-checking a matter of seconds. Con-
sidering the state-of-the-art technology applied in establishing these
new EU databases, the limit may indeed be approaching the sky from
a purely technological perspective. Whether or not governments merge
different bodies of information will become a matter of political
choices and legal constraints, as the technological constraints are los-
ing their relevance quickly. Technological advances and possibilities of-
ten underlie ‘function’ or ‘surveillance creep’. This means that systems
originally intended to perform narrowly specified functions are ex-
panded as a reaction to new political circumstances (Lyon 2007), often
sidestepping or pushing back the limits of the original legal framework
and safeguards. European integration offers new challenges and possi-
bilities for the surveillance of regular and irregular migrants. Whether
or not they will be used for the domestic internal surveillance of irregu-
lar migrants depends on: (1) if and to what extent national govern-
ments can and will use the EU in an instrumental manner, pushing
for common policies and instruments that suit national needs and (2)
if and to what extent the systems actually make a practical contribution
to solving the problems national states experience in the internal con-
trol of irregular migrants, either through the first or the second logic
of exclusion.
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5.3 Schengen, Amsterdam and Prüm: a bird’s-eye view of
European cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs
EU policies on illegal migration weren’t always embedded in a dis-
course of security and the irregular migrant wasn’t always seen as a
threat to Fortress Europe. The changes in policy kept pace with the gra-
dual change in perception of the irregular migrant. Cholewinski
(2004) distinguishes three periods in the development of a ‘compre-
hensive common EU policy’ on illegal immigration that, according to
him, lost its human rights component along the way. The first period
runs from 1974 to 1989 and is characterised by member states display-
ing many reservations and a lack of political will to develop substantial
common initiatives. However, the proposals and analyses in this period
took a balanced approach to the problem: the vulnerable position of il-
legal immigrants was recognised and taken into account. A European
Commission proposal to counter illegal employment stipulated that
member states should ensure the fulfilment of employer obligations
and safeguard the rights of migrant workers so that the cost of an ir-
regular migrant worker would be equal to, if not exceed, that of a legal
worker (Cholewinski 2004). Even though this proposal was never
translated into a common policy, the discourse and analysis of the pro-
blems posed by irregular migration were distinct from those in later
years. The second period, running from 1990 to 1999, is characterised
by intergovernmental cooperation outside the institutions of the EU
proper and the so-called post-Maastricht Treaty measures. This period
includes cooperation in semi-formalised intergovernmental groups
such as the Ad Hoc Immigration Group, EU working groups and, in
particular, the Schengen Group. All of these institutions functioned
outside of the European Community’s legal framework and were there-
fore free of judicial or democratic control by the European Court of Jus-
tice or the European Parliament (WRR 2003; Samers 2004a). The best
known is the Schengen Group that negotiated the Schengen Agree-
ment (1985) and Convention (1990). The original Schengen Agree-
ment outlined the ambition of the original five signatory states,22 in-
cluding Germany and the Netherlands, to abolish their internal borders
and give real meaning to the long-standing European goal of free
movement. However, it was the later Schengen Convention (1990) –
basically an inventory of ‘flanking measures’ – that associated or even
equated, ‘Schengen’ with securitisation and the image of Fortress Eu-
rope. The convention and the ever-more voluminous rules and man-
uals that came along with it, known as the Schengen Acquis, were con-
sidered a necessary condition for the implementation of free move-
ment within the Schengen area. The convention regulates a long series
of crucial issues concerning national and common external border
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controls, cross-national police cooperation, practical issues such as ‘hot
pursuits’ across borders by the national police and data cooperation, in-
cluding registration of persons and objects. The convention is also the
starting point for a wide range of instruments for the registration and
surveillance of large population groups in the countries concerned
(Mathiessen 2001). First and foremost, among those instruments is
the Schengen Information System (SIS), the convention’s database flag-
ship, as it were. With the entry into force of the Treaty of the European
Union in 1993 much of the ad hoc commissions and working groups
on various issues of migration, asylum and security were taken up into
the new structure of the EU. ‘Combating unauthorised immigration,
residence and work by nationals of third countries on the territory of
the Member States’ was identified as a common interest for coopera-
tion in the intergovernmental third pillar of the new EU (Cholewinski
2004). Though the cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs, as it was
now called, became a formal part of the new EU treaty, decision-mak-
ing basically sidelined the European Commission and remained out-
side normal EU procedures for democratic and judicial review. Intergo-
vernmental cooperation between nation states weary of losing sover-
eignty remained the norm. Most of the measures aimed at illegal
immigration that were adopted in this period focused on the detection
of illegal employment, facilitation of expulsion and readmission and
the problem of trafficking and smuggling of human beings (Chole-
winski 2004).
The entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 set off the
third period. Amsterdam brought two major changes into the policy
domain of Justice and Home Affairs. The first was the incorporation of
the Schengen Acquis into the EU. The second was the transfer of some
of the Justice and Home Affairs cooperation from the intergovernmen-
tal third pillar to the community first pillar of the EU.23 Under the lofty
new heading of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (as Justice
and Home Affairs is now also known), the policies on immigration,
asylum, external borders and cooperation in civil law were transferred
to the first pillar, while police cooperation and cooperation in criminal
law remained in the intergovernmental third pillar. The Schengen Ac-
quis, containing provisions and regulations on all these matters, was
divided over the two pillars accordingly (WRR 2003). EU policy on ille-
gal immigration developed rapidly in the period following Amsterdam.
Though the treaty makes it much easier to adopt legally binding mea-
sures (in both the first and the third pillars), the member states retain
a preference for soft law and operational measures. The political dis-
course on illegal immigration in the post-Amsterdam era gradually
took on a grim tone: policy on illegal immigration became the ‘fight
against illegal immigration’. Measures taken in the post-Amsterdam
160 BREAKING DOWN ANONYMITY
period include strengthening of borders and carrier sanctions, the
adoption of a regulation for determining the member state responsible
for an asylum application (known as Dublin II, as it replaced the origi-
nal Dublin Convention). Dublin II is linked with the EURODAC cen-
tral database that contains the fingerprints of all asylum claimants over
the age of fourteen. This database has gradually taken on the secondary
aim of preventing illegal immigration (Aus 2003; Cholewinski 2004).
Visa policy was also stepped up for those countries considered to be
the major sources of illegal immigration. In order to create an effective
common visa policy the member states are working on a Visa Informa-
tion System (VIS), a database aimed at registration of issued and re-
fused visa, copies of travel documents and biometric identifiers.
Furthermore, initiatives were taken to promote cooperation among
member states in matters of expulsion policy. ‘Illegal immigration’ be-
came part and parcel of EU foreign policy and development aid
through the recording of readmission agreements in for example the
Contonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP countries. The
fight against illegal immigration also targeted the traffickers and smug-
glers who facilitate illegal migration to the EU (Cholewinski 2003; Mit-
silegas, Monar & Rees 2003; Samers 2004a).
At the top of the political agenda is the comprehensive plan to com-
bat illegal immigration, formalised in the European Commission’s June
2003 ‘Communication on a Common Policy on All Aspects of Illegal
Immigration’. The comprehensive plan centres around eight points for
action: visa policy, information exchange and analysis, pre-frontier
measures, financial support of actions in third countries, border man-
agement, improvement of cooperation and coordination at the opera-
tional level, the advanced role of Europol, aliens law and criminal law
(including illegal employment) and readmission and return policy
(Samers 2004a: 31; see also Mitsilegas, Monar & Rees 2003: 93). The
ambition to develop a comprehensive plan for all aspects of illegal im-
migration indicates that EU member states are slowly recognising the
importance of internal migration control. Indeed, border management,
though vital and politically visible, is just one of the main issues on the
list. The notion that erecting gates alone lacks effectiveness if migrants
who pass the hurdle of border controls – legally or illegally – are able
to live an unimpeded life in illegal residence has sunk in at the EU.
This is most clearly expressed in the European Commission’s Return
Action Plan of 2002. This plan would have to ensure that:
the message gets across that immigration must take place within a
clear legal procedural framework and that illegal entry and resi-
dence will not lead to the desired stable form of residence. (Euro-
pean Commission quoted in Samers 2004a: 41)
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Some member states were eager to speed up the Justice and Home Af-
fairs agenda even further. In May 2005, seven member states of the
EU, again including both Germany and the Netherlands, signed a new
treaty in the German city of Pru¨m. The Pru¨m treaty is also – unoffi-
cially – known as Schengen III, as there are some striking similarities.
It was negotiated outside the EU legal order, among a limited number
of member states and it, too, deals with ‘Justice and Home Affairs is-
sues’. Furthermore, information exchange is the dominant theme of
the treaty. The preamble states that the treaty seeks to establish:
…the highest possible standard of cooperation especially by means
of exchange of information, particularly in combating terrorism,
cross-border crime and illegal migration… (in Balzacq et al.
2006: 1)
The treaty outlines the role of additional ‘document advisors’ who are
to assist and advise consulates, carriers and host country border control
authorities in their task of separating real from false documents. It also
introduces new procedures for mutual assistance and cooperation
among signatory states in matters of repatriation. The treaty seems to
rest on the view that ‘data exchange will bring ‘greater security to all’
and aims to facilitate the exchange of the following types of data: DNA
profiles, fingerprints, vehicle registration, non personal and personal
data (Balzacq et al. 2006: 13). This adds to – and in many cases dou-
bles – all kinds of data exchange already in effect at the European level,
especially the data collection and surveillance equipped by EU migra-
tion data systems, such as the SIS, EURODAC and VIS.
In the slipstream of these first three migration databases, the EU
member states have already started discussing proposals for a second
generation of data systems. This new generation of databases is being
aimed at travellers usually considered ‘unproblematic’ from a migra-
tion policy perspective, such as EU citizens and travellers who have no
need for a visa. The EU is debating the setup of a Passenger Name Re-
cord (PNR) system similar to the one that the US authorities are oper-
ating. Such a system would require airlines to forward all passenger in-
formation (such as payment information, seat number, meal prefer-
ences, etc.) to EU authorities prior to landing. This information can be
stored and analysed. Though the PNR system is primarily intended to
be of use in counter-terrorism, the data it will generate would also be
of interest for fighting organised crime and irregular migration.
Furthermore, in March 2008 the European Commission launched its
proposal for the so-called Border Package, which includes the introduc-
tion of an EU-wide Entry-Exit System (CEC 2008). This proposed sys-
tem would require establishing a new EU-wide database to register all
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travellers to the EU as they enter or exit at the external borders of the
EU. In order to be fully effective, this new system would have to be in-
teroperable with the older databases, particularly the ones using bio-
metric identifiers (Guild et al. 2008). EU citizens also come into play,
now that, as of 2009, member states have started to ‘roll out’ the Euro-
pean biometric passport. In 2019, all EU citizens should be in posses-
sion of a machine-readable passport with biometric identifiers that can
be swiped on entering and leaving the EU territory. To this end, the Eu-
ropean Commission’s Border Package envisages an Automated Border
Control System that will automatically verify the authenticity of an EU
passport and, by default, the citizenship of its bearer. Although these
data will not be stored, the European Commission states that the sys-
tem will nonetheless ‘read and extract the information from the travel
document, capturing biometrics and performing the verification to en-
able entry or exit, as well as random checks of the SIS and national
databases’ (European Commission, quoted in Guild et al. 2008: 3). In
short, the new EU proposals are only partly aimed at irregular mi-
grants, though are testimony of the enthusiastic political embrace of
new technologies and, more importantly, continuing on the path of
making biometric identification the cornerstone of EU policies on mo-
bile populations.
From Schengen to Pru¨m, via Maastricht and Amsterdam, Germany
and the Netherlands have always been at the forefront of the European
cooperation in matters of borders, asylum and the fight against illegal
migration. Germany, in particular, has used its political weight within
the EU to initiate new schemes or pressured existing ones into a
‘match’ with the German policy agenda (see Aus 2006: 8; Aus 2008).
On the issue of internal migration control on irregular migrants, the
EU provides a possible solution to the big bottlenecks in expulsion pol-
icy: the lack of cooperation of countries of origin and the identification
problem.
As this study focuses on internal migration control, it, by and large,
does not take into account the development of a common European
border strategy, including Schengen, or the establishing of border con-
trol agencies such as FRONTEX. The remainder of this chapter will fo-
cus first on the European efforts to come to a common return policy
and the EU’s efforts to use the political clout of the EU to negotiate
readmission agreements with both countries of origin and countries of
transit. In addition to these rudimentary forms of policy, the European
cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs resulted in the construction
of a number of tools of migration policy. In terms of instruments, this
chapter will analyse the development of a European network of immi-
gration databases that can be used to control migratory movement and
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help identify irregular migrants hiding their identity (see also Broeders
2007; Broeders forthcoming).
5.4 Matters of scale and weight: EU return and readmission
policies
The trouble that individual member states have with sending back ir-
regular migrants as a result of a lack of cooperation from countries of
origin and transit (see chapter four) have made member states look for
answers at a higher level. The negotiation of readmission agreements
is now placed firmly on the EU’s external relations policy agenda and
the European Commission has been given the mandate to negotiate
them (Roig & Huddleston 2007: 366). The idea is that the political
weight of the EU is an effective tool to negotiate readmission agree-
ments with uncooperative countries (Mitsilegas, Monar & Rees 2003;
Lavenex 2006). However, there is fierce resistance from countries of
origin against these policies, as they consider them to be an instru-
ment for ‘externalising’ European problems. Nonetheless some pro-
gress has been made: a number of readmission agreements have been
negotiated successfully. But even a celebrated ‘success’ such the inser-
tion of readmission clauses in a large scale multilateral aid programme
as the Cotonou Agreement, which covers 69 African, Caribbean and
Pacific countries, proved problematic as soon as the ink was dry. Ever
since the entry into force of the agreement in 2003, the status of article
13 (which covers the readmission issue) remains unclear and disputed
between the parties (Roig & Huddleston 2007: 371). Negotiating read-
mission clauses has proven to be difficult, but the EU consequently
makes it even more difficult by trying to negotiate the double deal of
getting countries to take back not only their own citizens, but also
those migrants believed to have transited through their country en route
to the EU. This means taking ‘back’ transit migrants who are not na-
tionals and for whom, under international law, there is no obligation to
do so. However, the European Commission views ‘(…) readmission
agreements with transit countries as an alternative to repatriation to
countries of origin of irregular migrants, whose itinerary, but not their
identity, can be established’ (Roig & Huddleston 2007: 365). In negotia-
tions with neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe and in the south-
ern Mediterranean, which are the most important sending and transit
countries, it is especially the transit clause that frustrates negotiations.
As countries like Turkey and Morocco have similar difficulties in nego-
tiating readmission clauses with their own sending countries, they fear
getting stuck with European problems (Roig & Huddleston 2007;
Cassarino 2007). Or as a Turkish official phrased it: they fear that
164 BREAKING DOWN ANONYMITY
Turkey will become a ‘dumping ground for unwanted immigrants by
the EU’ (Apap et al. 2004: 22). Moreover, if these countries of transit
lack the political will, the political leverage and the capacity to send
these transit migrants back to their own countries of origin, they are
likely to stay in that country, where their only option is to look for a
new opportunity to gain access to the EU. These transit countries would
then function as ‘the doormen to the EU’s revolving door’ instead of
the Cordon Sanitaire that the EU is looking for (Roig & Huddleston
2007: 382).
Though there has been a significant increase in the number of EU
readmission agreements that are negotiated or are under negotiation –
testimony to the political importance attached to them – the negotia-
tions are usually only successful in specific cases and under specific
circumstances. The fruitful negotiations are those with countries that
are in line for EU membership, such as the CEE countries during the
1990s, or Balkan countries that were simultaneously negotiating the
Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU (Cassarino 2007:
187). That meant negotiations carried both a stick and a carrot. Where
there is no prospect of big spoils such as EU membership, the EU re-
fuses to bargain with its next best chips. The European Commission,
charged with negotiation of the EU readmission agreements, was pain-
fully aware of this in 2002 on the basis of the experience of negotiating
the first set of six readmission agreements:
As readmission agreements are solely in the interest of the Com-
munity, their successful conclusion depends very much of the
‘leverage’ at the Commission’s disposal. (Ellermann 2008: 185-186)
This leverage has, so far, been sought in the strategic use of develop-
ment aid and other funds, such as the Aeneas programme. In practice,
this has not gotten the EU very far (Lavenex 2006; Monar 2007). In
some cases the deal on a readmission agreement was struck but practi-
cal cooperation remained lax to non-existent, in other cases negotia-
tions were simply stalled, sometimes indefinitely. For some countries
neighbouring the EU the most important carrot the EU can offer are
so-called visa facilitation agreements, which can make the Schengen
border less hard for some of their citizens. However, many of the EU
member states do not find this a very attractive option, as they fear that
they will ‘close a door on irregular migration only to open a window on
new potential irregular flows of visa overstayers, already the largest ca-
tegory of irregular migrants in the EU’ (Roig & Huddleston 2007:
377). Frustrated with the negotiations on the formal level, some EU
member states – France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Greece – have
entered into more informal arrangements particularly with the
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Mediterranean countries of Northern Africa. The pressing problem of
‘re-documentation, the delivery of travel documents or laissez-passers by
the consular authorities of these countries’ has led these member states
to form new cooperative patterns with North African countries such as
Morocco, Algeria and Libya (Cassarino 2007: 187). The low public visi-
bility and the adaptability of these arguments make them more attrac-
tive for the countries of origin and thus more effective for the member
states concerned. Even though this practice seems to work for indivi-
dual member states, it might turn out harmful for further EU attempts
to negotiate formal readmission agreements with these countries.
The troublesome practice of expulsion policies has also led to other
EU initiatives. Over the years, a number of binding and non-binding
policies have been negotiated, such as a council directive on the mutual
recognition of expulsion decisions on third-country nationals and the
council decision on the organisation of joint flights for the removal of
third-country nationals (Canetta 2007: 437). Taking the cooperation on
return one step further is the current negotiation of a new Directive for
a Common European Return Policy, also known as the return directive.
This directive is slowly taking form, but it is also highly controversial
to the member states themselves, as well as an important source of
strain in the relation between the European Council and the European
Parliament. As this proposed directive contains a number of chapters
that may require Member states to make some serious adjustments to
their national policies negotiations are tough. Some member states are
weary of any clause that will lessen their national control on irregular
migration. For example, they do not want the directive to apply to the
so-called international zones at airports as they fear it will limit their
ability to stop and send back immigrants at the border (Canetta 2007:
439). The directive also stresses ‘the principle of voluntary return’
meaning that a migrant should be given the time to organise his trip
back to his country of origin autonomously after being issued with a
return decision and a removal order by the state. According to Canetta
(2007: 442), member states fear losing control over the management
of migration because of the risk that immigrants disappear into illegal-
ity during the phase reserved for the independent organisation of their
voluntary return. Moreover, they worry about the loss of the general de-
terrent effect of forced removals on potential future irregular migrants.
From the perspective of migration control, the member states are en-
thusiastic about another element in the proposed directive: that of the
re-entry ban. According to the proposal a removal decision shall in-
clude a re-entry ban for a period of up to five years that applies to the
whole of the EU (a horizontal provision that applies to all member
states). Controlling such a re-entry ban would imply the organisation
of an EU-wide data system able to conduct checks at the border to
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detect migrants under a re-entry ban when they apply for a visa for the
EU, apply for asylum or are apprehended when they cross the border
illegally. The EU is currently developing data systems for all of these
‘categories’ (see paragraph 5.5), but the data storage limits for these sys-
tems are much shorter than the five years that would be necessary to
control for the proposed five-year re-entry ban. For example, the cur-
rent re-entry-ban in the Schengen Information System is only two
years (IOM 2004: 259). It remains to be seen how the EU chooses to
deal with this issue. The logical choice is between shortening the re-
entry ban period and lengthening the data storage limits in the EU im-
migration databases. The most sensitive proposal in the directive is a
fixed maximum length of the ‘temporary custody’ (administrative de-
tention with a view to expulsion) of six months for all member states.
Concerning the very wide variation in practices among the members
states of the EU (Van Kalmthout et al. 2007), this is a very difficult
point. Especially for Germany and the Netherlands, which both exceed
this limit by a wide margin (Canetta 2007: 445). The ‘solution’ for this
problem, as can be read from the latest version of the directive of 16
May 2008, has been to keep the limit of six months, yet allow a further
maximum extension of twelve months if removal is delayed as a result
of a lack of cooperation from the irregular immigrant himself or diffi-
culty obtaining documents from third countries (CEU 2008: 24). Con-
sidering these are the main causes for most delays of expulsion, the
room to manoeuvre for member states such as Germany and the Neth-
erlands has hardly been ‘restrained’ by the current version of the direc-
tive. It also suggests that ‘deterrence’ of irregular migrants by the possi-
bility of a lengthy stay in administrative detention is valued highly by
the member states, even in the knowledge that effective expulsion is
usually achieved within the first months of detention (see chapter
four). The fate of the new directive has not been decided yet as it is
now basically stuck between the Council and the European
Parliament.24
5.5 Creating digital borders: a network of EU migration
databases
The EU migration databases have developed over a long period of time.
They began with the Schengen Information System (SIS) as part of the
Schengen Convention in 1995 and extend into the near future with the
expected launch of the SIS II and the Visa Information System. Along
the way of their development, the setup and functions of most of these
databases have been adapted to changing circumstances. Two develop-
ments stand out in this respect. Firstly, the fact that irregular migration
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and irregular residence grew into a political problem during these
years accounts for a number of changes in the development, scope and
functions of these systems. Secondly, the political prominence of ‘the
fight against terrorism’, gaining in strength after the terrorist attacks in
New York, Madrid and London has led to what Boswell (2007: 606)
calls ‘(…) the appropriation of migration control instruments for the
purposes of enhancing surveillance by security agencies’. The succes-
sive development of the SIS, EURODAC and VIS and the increasing
ambitions for and demands on these systems will be analysed below.
5.5.1 Schengen Information System (SIS), SIRENE and SIS II
Schengen operates two comprehensive registration and surveillance
systems. The first is the Schengen Information System (SIS), a data-
based registration and surveillance system. The SIS is in operation, but
is also under renegotiation and redevelopment in light of its operability
in an enlarged EU of 25 member states. The need to design a SIS II
also prompted member states to put their new wish lists on the table.
The other system, SIRENE, which stands for Supple´ment d’Informa-
tion Requis a l’Entre´e Nationale, is twinned with the SIS as an auxiliary
or supplementary system.
The SIS comprises a central database (called C-SIS), which is housed
in a heavily guarded bunker in Strasbourg, and of national SIS data-
bases (called N-SIS) in all of the Schengen states. Its purpose is to
maintain
public order and security, including state security, and to apply the
provisions of this convention relating to the movement of persons,
in the territories of the contracting parties, using information
transmitted by the system. (article 93 of the Schengen Convention,
quoted in Mathiesen 2001: 7)
This broadly defined purpose provides the legal base for a large data
system that stores information on both persons and objects. There are
five categories of persons on whom information may be entered into
the SIS. In light of the internal surveillance of irregular migrants, the
entries under article 96, ‘persons to be refused entry to the Schengen
area as unwanted aliens’, are the most important. Of the objects that
can be entered into the SIS, the most important category is that of lost
and stolen ‘identity papers’, which in 1998 already constituted the lar-
gest number of entries. The information on persons that may be stored
in the SIS is a rather basic and limited list: first and last names, known
aliases, initials of middle name, date and place of birth, distinctive phy-
sical features, sex, nationality, whether persons are considered armed
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and/or dangerous, reason for the report and action to be taken. Data
are entered according to national standards, and the national authori-
ties are responsible for their accuracy. Not all authorities have unrest-
ricted access to the system; immigration authorities, for example, only
have access to the data on irregular migrants. The system is a so-called
hit/no hit system: a person is fed into the computer and produces a hit
if he or she is listed in the database. Even in case of a hit, not all infor-
mation is readily accessible. Rather, the computer replies with a com-
mand, such as ‘apprehend this person’ or ‘stop this vehicle’ (De Hert
2004: 40). According to the German Interior Ministry, in 2005, there
were more than 30,000 terminals in the Schengen Area where the SIS
can be accessed.
All in all, the SIS is a rather basic system, with a limited range of op-
tions for the user, which is exactly why SIRENE was added. The SIS
was not designed for detailed data exchange and, in practice, serves as
an index to the associated SIRENE system that facilitates the exchange
of complementary information, including fingerprints and photo-
graphs. Although SIRENE is often described as the operational core of
Schengen, there is no reference to the system in the Schengen Conven-
tion (Justice 2000: 19). The factual data are stored in the SIS, though
the SIRENE system makes it possible to exchange ‘softer’ data such as
criminal intelligence information. In order to make this a ‘convenient’
arrangement, the national SIS and the SIRENE bureaus are in most
countries entrusted to the same organisation, usually a central police
department responsible for international cooperation. It is mandatory
to notify the state that made an entry when the SIS produces a hit.
After all, this state is responsible for its accuracy and is able to double-
check. When it comes to irregular migrants, however, the rules are less
strict. Hits are only reported in exceptional cases and the standard pro-
cedure is to refuse entry (at the border) or to arrest, interrogate and
turn the individual over to the authorities responsible for expulsion
when detected inside the country (Justice 2000: 22). Though the SIS is
an instrument intended to maintain ‘order and security’, its main pre-
occupation seems to be with illegal immigration (Guild 2001). In
1999, the overwhelming majority of the entries on persons were on
‘unwanted aliens to be refused entry to the Schengen countries’ (Jus-
tice 2000: 8). The figures on the SIS since 1999 suggest that this still
holds true. The total number of entries is increasing at a firm pace: in
2007 the SIS held about 17.6 million entries. Entries on persons in the
SIS are not the main contributors to this increase as its yearly averages
vary between the 800,000 and 900,000 entries. But, as can be seen
from table 5.1, entries on irregular migrants (article 96) do, in turn,
take up the lion’s share of entries on persons. Moreover, some coun-
tries, most notably Germany and Italy, interpret the criteria for listing
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unwanted third-country nationals rather widely and are therefore re-
sponsible for the majority of the data stored in this category (Baldaccini
2008: 39).
Table 5.1 Selected entries and hits in the SIS, 1999-2007
Year Entries Entries on
wanted persons
Entries on
art. 96
Hits on
art. 96
1999 8,687,950 795,044 703,688 21,711
2000 9,697,252 855,765 764,747 21,170
2001 9,856,732 788,927 701,414 26,363
2002 10,541,120 832,312 732,764 35,856
2003 12,274,875 874,032 775,868 32,856
2004 11,746,847 883,511 785,631 21,957
2005 13,185,566 818,673 714,078 21,090
2006 15,003,283 882,627 751,954 21,836
2007 17,615,495 894,776 752,338 NA
Sources: Bundesministerium des Innern 2002-2005; House of Lords 2007: 22;
CEU 2005b, 2007b
The hits on irregular migrants are relatively low and recently even
dropping. Over the years, the hits represent about 3 to 5 per cent of the
entries on irregular migrants. The last couple of years, some 21,000 ir-
regular migrants annually produce a hit in the SIS, which means that
they will be refused entry or a visa or, when they are inside a member
state, there may be an information exchange through SIRENE to make
expulsion possible. Van Kalmthout’s (2005: 158) research among 400
detained irregular migrants in the Netherlands indicates that of the to-
tal of 400 detainees, 144 were checked in the SIS database, 17 per cent
of whom turned out to be registered in the SIS. However, on the basis
of this study, it is not possible to ascertain if the detection in the SIS
led to an information exchange through SIRENE. In general, there are
no data available that document whether or not expulsion is effectuated
on the basis of an information exchange through SIS/SIRENE.
One needs to realise that the current version of the SIS was devel-
oped in a time when political minds were predominantly attuned to
the problem of border controls and the compensation for the ‘loss’ of
national borders. Internal migration control was not much of an issue
in the early Schengen years. Looking at the national figures on the hits
for article 96 for Germany and the Netherlands (see table 5.2), we can
make a distinction between internal and external hits. An internal hit
for Germany occurs when the German authorities check an individual
who has been registered by another country into the SIS under article
96. An external hit is the result of a check on an individual in another
member state who produces a hit because of a German entry into the
SIS under article 96. The German statistics indicate that the external
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hits have consistently been higher than the internal hits (though the
differences have been getting smaller in recent years). Roughly trans-
lated, this means that there are more migrants being refused at the EU
border and at European consulates in third countries, or expelled from
other member states because of information entered into the SIS by
Germany, than the other way around. In short, immigrants declared
‘unwanted’ by Germany are stopped at other member states’ borders
and consulates. For Germany thus the SIS contributes more to border
control than to internal migration control, in the sense of creating a
‘remote control’ (Zolberg 2002) or ‘moving the border outside of the
state’ (Lahav & Guiraudon 2000). It’s a preventive mechanism that ex-
tends the German border outwards.
Table 5.2 Internal and external hits on art. 96 in Germany and the Netherlands,
1999-2006
Germany The Netherlands
Internal hits1 External hits2 Internal hits1 External hits2
1999 1,650 4,275 421 126
2000 1,646 3,823 385 156
2001 1,879 4,911 334 146
2002 2,033 4,123 155 369
2003 2,224 3,718 218 330
2004 1,895 2,978 298 228
2005 1,589 2,702 388 368
2006 1,919 2,711 498 418
1 hits recorded internally in response to an alert entered abroad
2 hits recorded abroad in response to a national alert
Source: CEU 2007b
The distribution of internal and external hits for the Netherlands sug-
gests that use of the system for internal migration control is relatively
more important to the Dutch authorities. On the whole, the numbers
for both countries are relatively low and do not suggest a vital contribu-
tion to the internal migration control irregular migrants. The SIS has
distinct limits when judged from this perspective. These limitations
and a number of others, as well as new ambitions for the use of the
system have led to its redevelopment.
The SIS has also proved to be a popular instrument. The rapid
growth of the Schengen group, even outside the EU through associa-
tion agreements with Norway, Iceland and Switzerland and the pros-
pect of further enlargement of the EU, led to the decision to develop a
second generation of the system as early as December 1996. This so-
called SIS II should accommodate the new members and facilitate
new, additional functions (De Hert 2004). The system should have
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been up and running by now, but various delays have pushed the date
back a number of times. At the time of writing, SIS II is still not in op-
eration and the European Commission recently announced that its lat-
est scheduled ‘end of the test phase’ – which was set for September
2009 – will not be met (CEC 2009). In terms of options and functions
of the new system, the Justice and Home Affairs Council in 2003
made it very clear that SIS II would have to be a ‘flexible tool that will
be able to adapt to changed circumstances’ (CEU 2003: 18). The pros-
pect of a new generation of the system prompted member states to put
forward all kinds of suggestions to increase the possibilities and the
use of the system. The Joint Supervisory Authority of Schengen (2004:
14) signalled two major trends. It noted repeated moves to add new ca-
tegories of information, especially biometric data, and a second trend
to allow new organisations, such as Europol, access to the data held in
the SIS. Many of these proposals amount to a departure from the hit/
no hit character of the SIS, making it more of an ‘investigative’ system.
Suggestions to link the SIS II with other European systems are an even
bigger step further in the architecture of the European network of data-
bases and some documents even opted to integrate all systems into
one European Information System (Brouwer 2004: 5). Uncertainties
about the functionalities of the SIS II were dealt with in a ‘flexible
manner’. In 2003, the European Commission wrote in a communica-
tion that, pending the decision by the council:
SIS II must be designed and prepared for biometric identification
to be implemented easily at a later stage, once the legal basis, al-
lowing for the activation of such potential functionalities, has been
defined. (CEC 2003: 16)
In other words, politics would only have to follow the path laid out by
the technology. SIS II will not be a cheap system. Between 2001 and
2006, the European Commission spent about E 26 million on the de-
velopment of the central database and infrastructure of SIS II. Between
2007 and 2012 the EU budget will be charged a further E 114 million
to get the system up and running (House of Lords 2007: 15).
Since the definitive regulation on the establishment, operation and
use of the SIS II (EP and CEU 2006) entered into force in January
2007, the additions to and expansions of its functions are clear. Most
importantly, the new legislation provides for the inclusion of biometric
information into SIS II, more specifically the storage of fingerprints
and photographic data. In the future, it might even be possible for the
system to hold DNA profiles and retina scans, but this would require
amendments to the legislation (House of Lords 2007: 20, 43). The ad-
dition of biometrics makes new searches possible. The data can be
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searched in two ways. First, there is a ‘one-to-one’ search, using the
data to confirm a ‘known’ person’s identity, i.e. comparing Jim Jones’
fingerprints with the fingerprints in the SIS II that are registered to
Jim Jones. Second, there is a ‘one-to-many’ search, in which the finger-
prints of a person are fed into the SIS II to compare them to all stored
fingerprints. The possibility of making broad searches, or ‘fishing expe-
ditions’ on the basis of biometric data, changes the SIS into an investi-
gative tool for law enforcers and immigration authorities (Baldaccini
2008: 37-38). The ‘one-to-many’ searches, in particular, cause concern
among many observers as these ideally require a very high levels of ac-
curacy of the biometric data in order to prevent faulty hits. The Europe-
an Data Protection Supervisor warned in 2006 against a tendency to
overestimate the reliability of biometrics and their use as a unique
means of identification (see in House of Lords 2007: 21). The circle of
organisations that will have access to new generation of the SIS data-
base has also been significantly widened. Europol and Eurojust have
been granted access, and the list of national authorities with access to
parts of the database also grew longer (Balzacq 2008). Some authori-
ties are described in such general terms that there seems to be ample
room for expanding the list of organisations with access as well as for
a wide variation between member states. As Boswell (2007) has ar-
gued, these developments add up to security agencies utilising migra-
tion policy tools for counter-terrorism and other security aims, rather
than a securitisation of migration policies as such. The vast collection
of personal data on migrants is a tempting source of information for
security agencies in a time of global crime and terrorism. In sum, mov-
ing from the first to the second generation of the system has been
much more than a technological affair. The scope, functions and possi-
bilities of the system have changed and with it, its character.
5.5.2 EURODAC
A second important European database is the EURODAC system,
which is linked to the Dublin II regulation, and its predecessor, the
Dublin Convention. The objective of the Dublin Convention was to cur-
tail the possibilities for ‘asylum shopping’ – i.e. individuals entering
into the asylum procedure in more than one country successively –
and to determine which state is responsible for an asylum claim. In or-
der to do this the member states devised a system that could determine
whether or not an asylum claimant had already lodged an application
in another member state. To this end, they decided to create a commu-
nity-wide system for the comparison of fingerprints of asylum claim-
ants named EURODAC (an acronym that derived from European
Dactylographic system). The development of the system was a long
EUROPEAN TOOLS FOR DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 173
and politically rocky ride (see Aus 2006 for a detailed analysis). The de-
cision to set up the system may have been taken in 1991, but it would
take until January 2003 for the system to become operational. By then,
the scope of EURODAC was significantly widened. Originally, it was
meant to contain just the fingerprints of asylum seekers but, in 1998,
Germany pushed for the inclusion of irregular migrants, even threaten-
ing to veto EURODAC if the inclusion was not accepted (Aus 2006:
8). Irregular migrants were already following in the footsteps of asylum
seekers as the ‘most problematic’ group of immigrants. In 1997, the
Schengen Executive Committee had concluded:
that it could be necessary to take the fingerprints of every irregular
migrant whose identity could not be established without doubt,
and to store this information for the exchange with other member
states. (quoted in Brouwer 2002: 235)
As the SIS could not accommodate the registration of fingerprints the
member states had to look elsewhere. Mathiesen (2001: 18) asserts that
the ‘history of the issue of fingerprinting “illegal immigrants” shows
how Schengen and EURODAC concerns are intertwined’.
EURODAC became operational in January 2003 and started with an
empty database. Since this date, the database has been filled with three
categories of fingerprints. Category one comprises the prints of all indi-
viduals fourteen years and older who apply for asylum in one of the
member states. These are the prints that are necessary to detect cases
of ‘asylum shopping’ in light of the original goal of the Dublin Conven-
tion. Category two contains the fingerprints of irregular migrants ap-
prehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external bor-
der and who could not be turned back. Category three contains the fin-
gerprints of aliens found illegally present in one of the member states.
These last prints are checked against category one and two but are not
stored. Furthermore, the transmission of this category of data is op-
tional, member states can decide for themselves if they want to use this
option (CEC 2004). It is especially this category that is an indication
for the use of EU surveillance systems such as EURODAC for the de-
velopment of internal migration control on irregular migrants in the
individual member states of the EU. Like the SIS, EURODAC is a hit/
no hit system and the database contains only limited information: the
member state of origin, place and date of application for asylum, fin-
gerprint data, sex, reference number used by the member state of ori-
gin, date when the fingerprints are taken, and date on which the data
were transmitted to the central unit (Brouwer 2002: 237). The use of
the system in terms of entries and hits can be read from table 5.3.
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Table 5.3 Entries and hits in EURODAC (2003 -2006)
2003 2004 2005 2006
Category Entries Hits Entries Hits Entries Hits Entries Hits
Asylum claimants
(cat. 1)
246,902 19,247a 232,205 40,759a 187,223 31,636 a 165,958 27,014a
Aliens crossings the
external border
irregularly (cat. 2)
7,857 673b 16,183 2,846b 25,163 4,001b 41,312 6,658b
Aliens found illegally
present in a member
state (cat. 3)
16,814 1,181c 39,550 7,674c 46,229 11,311c 63,413 15,612c
Sources: CEC 2004, 2005a, 2006, 2007
a fingerprints of an asylum seeker sent in by a member state matched against the stored
fingerprints of an existing asylum applicant (cat. 1 against cat. 1)
b fingerprints of an asylum seeker sent in by a member state matched against the stored
fingerprints of an alien who illegally crossed the external border (cat. 1 against cat. 2)
c fingerprints sent in of an alien found illegally present within a member state matched
against the stored fingerprints of an existing asylum applicant (cat. 3 against cat. 1)
The EURODAC database filled up rather quickly in its first years of op-
eration. Most of the entries are related to asylum claimants and most
of the hits are ‘detections’ of double (or even multiple) asylum claims
filed by one individual (its main function for the Dublin system). More
significantly, the number of entries and hits on irregular migrants ap-
prehended inside a member state (cat. 3) are steadily rising as well.
The European Commission considers the entries in category 2 to be
too low when compared to the expectations and calls upon the member
states to ‘carry out their legal obligations’. Aus (2006: 12), in a less di-
plomatic phrasing, calls this category ‘a near complete failure’. Some
authors (Brouwer 2002; Aus 2003) point to the fact that fingerprinting
individuals who were apprehended while crossing the border illegally,
is hardly the logical ‘thing to do’ from the perspective of border states.
As this fingerprinting can only have as result that the person con-
cerned, who is later found in another member state, will be sent back
to the former member state; one can reasonably doubt if the authori-
ties of the first state will be very willing to execute this part of the
EURODAC Regulation (Brouwer 2002: 244).25
Through the use of category three data, the EURODAC system is
steadily becoming more important for the European fight against ille-
gal immigration. The number of hits for irregular migrants found in-
side member states went from 1,181 in 2003 to 15,612 in 2006. These
are fast-rising numbers considering that EURODAC contains only asy-
lum data from 2003 onwards which means that only irregular mi-
grants who have a recent asylum history will produce a hit in the sys-
tem. Many of the irregular migrants currently present in the member
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states will have an older asylum history – if they have an asylum his-
tory at all – and will not show up in a EURODAC search. As the
database fills up and holds information from a longer period of time,
the number of hits is therefore likely to increase. The main value of
the system for the member states lies in its contribution to solve the
problem of the lack of information on the identity and country of ori-
gin of irregular migrants, without which expulsion is practically impos-
sible. A hit in the EURODAC system can provide a link to a dossier on
an asylum application made in another member state that will contain
information and perhaps documentation on the identity and the coun-
try of origin of an irregular migrant who is silent about his identity. In
other words, it could ‘re-identify’ him (Broeders 2007). Just as the SIS
and SIRENE systems can be used to exchange supplementary informa-
tion to help make expulsion possible, EURODAC can function in a
similar way. It is primarily northern members states (Germany, the
Netherlands, the UK and the Czech Republic) that use this optional ca-
tegory for the identification of irregular migrants. Table 5.4 zooms in
on the German and Dutch use of the category three data, indicating
that these two countries are the most enthusiastic users of the EURO-
DAC system for identifying irregular migrants.
Table 5.4 Dutch and German entries and hits on domestically apprehended
irregular migrants (category 3 data) in EURODAC, 2003-2006
‘Entries’ ‘Hits’
Germany The
Netherlands
All
EURODAC
states
Germany The
Netherlands
All
EURODAC
states
2003 9,833 223 16,814 985 42 1,181
2004 16,082 1,805 39,550 3,884 1,102 7,674
2005 16,757 8,492 46,229 4,628 2,868 11,311
2006 16,295 15,166 63,341 4,648 4,092 15,621
Sources: CEC 2004, 2005a, 2006, 2007 (statistical annexes)
If we look at the data for 2006, we see that Germany and the Nether-
lands account for about half of the entries in category three (roughly
31,000 of a total of 63,000) and more than half of the hits on category
three data (almost 9,000 of a total of 15,621). Moreover, the hits are on
a steady increase, especially for the Netherlands, since the system has
been in operation. Again, there are no figures available that can directly
link category three hits to actual expulsions made possible by identifi-
cation data obtained through EURODAC. However, the increasing use
of EURODAC data by Germany and the Netherlands suggests that the
category three data are considered useful in helping to solve the do-
mestic identification problems. The popularity of the category three
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data among certain member states did not go unnoticed. In June
2007, the European Commission published an evaluation of the first
three years that the EURODAC system was in operation (CEC 2007)
which emphasised the future possibilities of this specific category of
data. The high use of this category led the European Commission to
propose that the data on irregular migrants found in member states
should in the future also be stored in the database, instead of just
checked against the data stored under the categories one and two. This
takes EURODAC another step into the direction of being a database on
irregular migrants in addition to an asylum related database. Further-
more, the European Commission intends to explore the possibilities ‘to
extend the scope of EURODAC with a view to use its data for law en-
forcement purposes and as a means to contribute to the fight against
illegal immigration’ (CEC 2007: 11). In short, EURODAC’s future –
like its past – is likely to be a textbook example of ‘function creep’.
5.5.3 Visa Information System
From the perspective of ‘the fight against illegal immigration’, the Visa
Information System (VIS) is the next logical step in the emergent net-
work of databases. Generally, irregular migrants have three possible
migration histories. They have crossed the border illegally (with or
without help), they were asylum seekers and stayed after the claim was
rejected or they came on a legal visa and stayed after its validity ex-
pired. The network of databases developed accordingly. Irregular immi-
gration itself defies registration, but irregular migrants found in mem-
ber states can be registered in the SIS II and, in the future, perhaps
also in EURODAC. Those who enter through asylum procedures will
be registered in EURODAC and those who enter on a legal visa will, in
the future, be registered by the VIS. Control over identity has taken a
central place in much EU discussion on illegal immigration, terrorism
and the perceived links between them. According to Guild (2003), this
emphasis on identity control has elevated visa to the prime, and in the
eyes of the member states, most trustworthy method of identification
of third-country nationals:
Documents issued by non-Member States are no longer definitive
for determining identity. (…) The Union takes over the task of
identifying all persons who seek to come to the Union and deter-
mines where they belong. (Guild 2003: 344)
Under the heading of ‘measures to combat illegal immigration’ the Eu-
ropean Council conclusions of Seville (June 2002) called for ‘the intro-
duction, as soon as possible, of a common identification system for
EUROPEAN TOOLS FOR DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 177
visa data’ (CEU 2002: 8). This new system became the Visa Informa-
tion System that is currently being developed. Unsurprisingly, the initi-
al proposal to develop a Visa Information System came from Germany
(Aus 2006b: 17).
In December 2004, the European Commission presented a proposal
for a regulation on the VIS to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment (CEC 2004b), which was amended and finally adopted by the
Council and the European Parliament in June 2007 (CEU 2007). With
regard to the use of this latest database in the fight against illegal im-
migration the phrasing has become more diplomatic, but the sub-
stance remains the same. In 2004, the VIS was ‘to assist in the identi-
fication and return of illegal immigrants’. In 2007, it is to ‘assist in the
identification of any person who may not, or may no longer fulfil the
conditions for entry, stay or residence of the territory of the Member
States’. The central importance of the system is for visa and immigra-
tion policy, but for the purpose of internal surveillance of irregular mi-
grants the VIS can serve as an instrument to detect and identify them
when found and apprehended on the territory of member states. It will
make it possible to identify those irregular migrants who travelled into
the EU legally at any border, and then ‘overstayed’. Once identified, the
system can facilitate the provision of travel documents for undocumen-
ted illegal residents, on the basis of the exchange of information
through the VIS (Samers 2004a). In this way, the VIS will also func-
tion as a system of re-identification for illegal aliens that travelled legal-
ly into the EU, but try to hide their identity when apprehended.
The VIS is a very ambitious project and requires a technically power-
ful system. On the basis of its feasibility study on the VIS, the Europe-
an Commission aimed for a system with a capacity to connect at least
27 member states, 12,000 VIS users and 3,500 consular posts world-
wide. This was based on the estimation that the Member States would
handle twenty million visa requests annually (CEC 2003: 26). In 2007,
the press release accompanying the political agreement on the adop-
tion of the VIS regulation stated that the VIS will store ‘data on up to
70 million people’. The technical setup of the system is an exact mirror
of the SIS II. Just like the SIS, the new Visa system will have a central
database (C-VIS), an interface at the national level (N-VIS) and local ac-
cess points (terminals) for the police, immigration authorities and con-
sular posts. The magic words in the development of SIS II and the VIS
are ‘interoperability’ and ‘synergy’. The systems are sharing in the de-
velopment costs and, more importantly, will share a common technolo-
gical platform so that the systems are compatible, interoperable and
able to cross-check, connect and maybe even exchange information.
The databases themselves will remain separate but at the functional le-
vel SIS users can – and will or must? – have their entries and queries
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checked against the VIS database and vice versa. The central systems
of the VIS and the SIS will be next-door neighbours in a physical and
geographical sense, as they are to be ‘hosted in the same location’,
which means they will both be housed in the SIS bunker in Stras-
bourg. The political wish of an increased interoperability also includes
the EURODAC system, as was clearly set out in the so-called The Ha-
gue Programme, which is the agenda for the next five years for EU po-
licies on Justice and Home Affairs the council agreed upon in 2005.
Article 1.7.2 of this new agenda calls for maximisation of the ‘effective-
ness and interoperability of EU information systems in tackling illegal
immigration’ and specifically names EURODAC alongside the SIS II
and the VIS (CEU 2005; see also CEC 2005b). As with the SIS II the
European Council already proposed to grant ‘internal security authori-
ties’ access to the system. This new example of function creep caused
the European Data Protection Supervisor (2006: 2) to remind the
member states that the VIS was developed in ‘view of the European
visa policy, not as a law enforcement tool’. As with EURODAC, the
member states agreed that the VIS should start with an empty data-
base. The data to be stored in the VIS have a broad scope. In the first
place there are the so-called alphanumeric data on the applicant (a digi-
tal version of the application form) and data on visas requested, issued,
refused, annulled, revoked or extended. The alphanumeric information
also includes the details of the person or company that issued an invi-
tation or is liable for the cost of living during the stay. This means that
family members and companies who vouch for the visa recipient – and
who may be held accountable should he or she overstay the visa – are
also registered. For these groups, registration by the Panopticon Eu-
rope may well have a direct disciplining effect. By making it more diffi-
cult for irregular migrants to use their networks to gain access, the sys-
tem contributes to the first logic of exclusion. Secondly, the system will
include biometric data: each applicant will be fingerprinted for all ten
fingers and will have his photo entered into the VIS. This will make
the VIS the largest ten fingerprint system in the world. The use of bio-
metrics on such an unprecedented scale will bring the system, accord-
ing to a 2003 feasibility study by the European Commission, into a
new and largely unknown dimension, both technically and financially
(CEC 2003: 26). In a best scenario – optimal synergy with the SIS II –
along with the inclusion of biometrics and supporting documents, the
development investment will amount to almost E 157 million and the
annual operating costs will be around E 35 million CEC 2003: 29-30).
The European Commission intends to make the VIS operational in
2009 (CEU 2007: 3).
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5.6 Conclusions
In recent years, the EU’s fight against irregular migration has been ta-
ken to a new level. The real progress is found at the level of EU instru-
ments, rather than common EU policies. In terms of policies, there
have been only some minor breakthroughs in the negotiations of read-
mission agreements and the development of a rudimentary return pol-
icy. However, EU readmission agreements suffer from the same struc-
tural flaw as those negotiated at the national level (see chapter four).
The inherently uneven distribution of benefits in these agreements be-
tween the contracting parties turns ‘readmission’ in practice often into
a paper reality rather than improved cooperation. Furthermore, the ad-
vantage of negotiating with the full weight of the EU seems to be un-
done by the insistence of the member states to not just negotiate read-
mission agreements with their neighbours in their role as countries of
origin but also in their role as countries of transit. Having to take
‘back’ transit migrants in addition to their own citizens gives some of
these countries the (well-founded) impression that the EU tries to ex-
ternalise its migration problems. The fact that the EU refuses to bring
valuable stakes such as visa facilitation agreements to the negotiation
table further reduces the chances of effective readmission agreements.
Frustrated with formal negotiations at both the national and the EU le-
vel some member states have now turned to ‘informalising’ the issue
of readmission. The negotiation of a common return policy also shows
every sign of national states hanging on to sovereignty and at the same
time looking for new instruments to curtail and manage migration.
Common elements, such as agreeing to limit the administrative deten-
tion of irregular migrants, are stretched up to the point where even the
strictest member states, such as Germany and the Netherlands, hardly
have to adjust their legislation. Restrictive elements such as the five-
year re-entry ban are enthusiastically embraced. In short, progress is
slow and does not stray much from the domestic agendas of those
states where irregular residence is politically considered a problem.
In terms of instruments, the EU’s fight against illegal immigration
is being equipped with state-of-the-art database technology. The analy-
sis of the SIS II, EURODAC and the VIS shows that once all systems
are online they will operate on an unprecedented scale that is likely to
grow even further as a result of technological advancements and the
political desire to increase the interoperability of the systems. Steps to-
wards linking the various databases have been taken and have not met
with substantial resistance. For example, EURODAC’s goals have been
significantly ‘broadened’ along the way. Though originally devised for
the prevention of ‘asylum shopping’, the German intervention in 1998
made the system just as important for the internal control on irregular
180 BREAKING DOWN ANONYMITY
migrants. The active use of EURODAC for internal migration control
by a small number of member states, first and foremost Germany and
the Netherlands, underlines the value of this EU database for domestic
use. The fact that all of the EU migration databases include biometric
identifiers signifies a crucial new step in the internal surveillance of ir-
regular migrants. The biometric database turns ‘internal migration
control’ into ‘internal migration control 2.0’, so to speak. The second
generation of the SIS will include biometric identifiers and the VIS will
even become the largest ‘ten fingerprint’ database in the world. The
amount of data stored on potential irregular migrants is enormous and
is set to grow at great speed as the EURODAC database fills up and
the VIS and the SIS II will go online. These European databases seek
to register as many immigrants from a ‘suspect’ legal category such as
asylum applicants and from ‘suspect’ countries of origin, such as
countries that require a visa to travel into the EU as possible, in order
to get at the much smaller group of immigrants who crosses the line
into irregularity at a later stage. These systems can be used to re-identi-
fy irregular migrants who try to conceal their identity in order to avoid
expulsion and thus contribute to solving the main problem of domestic
expulsion policies. However, the more effective these systems will turn
out to be, the more likely irregular migrants are to adapt to changing
circumstances. If the ‘identity routes’ of asylum and visa will be cut off
due to a high risk of identification by the new network of migration da-
tabases, this might provoke a counter-reaction. A possible side effect
may be an increasing dependence of irregular migrants on smuggling
and trafficking organisations (Broeders & Engbersen 2007). More re-
cent proposals for a PNR system, an Entry-Exit System and the intro-
duction of the biometric EU passport are testimony of the member
states continuing on the path of making biometric identification the
cornerstone of EU policies on mobile populations. This proposed sec-
ond generation of migration databases casts the digital dragnet out
even wider and will take in data from nearly all travellers entering and
exiting the EU territory.
In theoretical terms, the European efforts in readmission and return
and the development of a European network of migration databases
primarily point in the direction of national governments ‘going Europe-
an’ to serve national, rather than common agendas. So far the Europe-
an level has primarily served the interests of the member states and
truly common policies have, by and large, been avoided. It can be ar-
gued that national authorities, especially those of the interior and im-
migration, have ‘gone European’ to achieve what they could not achieve
at the national level. In part, they could not achieve their goals because
the scale of the problem had become truly European (common external
borders, common visa policy) and so the solution had to be found there
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as well. For another part, the EU level provided a convenient venue to
negotiate new initiatives and instruments that suit national agendas
but lack national constrains: a policy laboratory for new migration con-
trol measures far away from national democratic and public scrutiny.
The ‘pick and choose’ approach to EU instruments according to na-
tional agendas can also be seen from the selective use of the EURO-
DAC database in its first years of operation: member states that consid-
er irregular migrants a serious domestic policy problem use the system
heavily for detection and identification, while member states that are
relatively unconcerned about the presence of irregular migrants on
their territory do not actively use the system. So far, instrumentalisa-
tion of the EU by national actors seems to be the norm when it comes
to internal migration control.
In terms of the two logics of control, development of the three data-
bases follows and confirms the paradigm shift that identification, i.e.
the second logic, is a vital issue for internal migration policy that has
to supplement the first logic. Whereas the SIS was an instrument of
external border control, primarily meant to exclude at the border, the
EURODAC system, on German insistence, already caters to domestic
needs: exclusion at the border and identification to facilitate expulsion
for the internal part of migration control. The SIS II and the VIS are
set up from the outset as instruments that also serve the second logic
of exclusion, in addition to their functions for external border control.
For those member states that are serious about the internal migration
control on irregular migrants, SIS II, VIS and EURODAC are valuable
instruments to execute both ‘logics of exclusion’ domestically. For ex-
ample, the VIS will also register companies and family members that
vouch for the applicant which may have a disciplining effect on their
willingness to act as guarantor. Here registration is aimed at the net-
works irregular migrants need for travel and residence and follows the
logic of exclusion from documentation. But the introduction of bio-
metric identifiers in all systems is a killer application for internal mi-
gration control, especially for the second logic of exclusion, that of ex-
clusion through documentation and registration. The migration data-
bases are massive efforts to identify irregular migrants themselves in
their capacity as an irregular migrant, i.e. confirming at the same time
their irregular status and re-connecting them to the legal identity they
often successfully try to hide. The swift increase in the use of the
EURODAC system for internal migration control – the only biometric
system operational at the time of writing – in Germany and the Nether-
lands is an important indication that the immigration authorities in
these countries are more than likely to become ‘heavy users’ of the
new systems when they come online. The inclusion of more informa-
tion in the system that can link an irregular migrant with formal
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documentation, such as a visa application or a dossier of an asylum re-
quest, and the overall application of biometric identifiers to make the
link as watertight as possible, illustrates the European preoccupation
with identification of irregular migrants, especially in some of the
northern member states.
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6 Conclusion: breaking down anonymity
If nothing else, the preceding chapters have proven that the border is a
social fact in this so-called borderless Europe. Though this book is not
about the border in the sense of territorial lines demarcating countries,
the various translations of that border in terms of eligibilities and
rights, and the translations of border patrol into registrations, internal
control and surveillance are its core objects of study. The border is in-
deed everywhere (Lyon 2005) and can therefore be crossed anywhere.
Irregular migrants often do not even cross the territorial border ille-
gally, a useful reminder of the often missing link between ‘illegal im-
migration’ and ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’ resident migrants. Some only cross
the border of ‘legality’ when their visa expires or when they choose to
remain in the country after their asylum application has been rejected.
Once over the border of ‘illegality’, they must cross various other bor-
ders and boundaries illegally because of the direct link between legal
residence and all but the barest rights in contemporary Dutch and Ger-
man society. He who is without legal residence also has no legal right
to work, to be housed, to pay taxes, to receive benefits or more than
just the basic healthcare. Legally, the state expects nothing more of ir-
regular migrants than to fulfil their only legal obligation to their coun-
try of residence: the imperative to leave the country.
Of course, most irregular migrants are not willing to fulfil that legal
obligation. They have usually come for a reason. Most have come in
search of a better life and with the belief they can find that in Europe.
Though their exact numbers are unknown, most European states that
consider the residence of irregular migrants a problem are now con-
vinced that bringing down their numbers requires active state policies.
To get irregular migrants to leave the country, the state has developed
policies aimed at exclusion and discouragement. These are meant to
cut off access to the institutions, resources and networks that irregular
migrants need to sustain and prolong their irregular residence. Being
cut off from work, the housing market and institutional and social net-
works should force them to give up their irregular stay in Germany or
the Netherlands. Both countries have been implementing policies of
internal migration control on irregular migrants for a long time and
they have stepped up their efforts since the mid-1990s. Elaborate
schemes of registrations and documentary requirements have been de-
vised to guard the access to the most important societal institutions.
Blocking an irregular migrant’s access to the legal documents and re-
gistrations that would give him access to these institutions has been la-
belled ‘the first logic of exclusion’ in this study. This is in fact the ‘tradi-
tional’ policy of internal migration control on irregular migrants. Over
the years, the effectiveness of this strategy has proven limited. Even un-
der the condition of being unable to count irregular migrants, it is
clear that their presence is still a fact of life in most European coun-
tries. If exclusion and discouragement do not get irregular migrants to
leave the country and try their luck elsewhere, another strategy is
needed, one that involves taking irregular migrants physically across
the border. This time, it is the territorial border that is on the mind of
state officials. This means that the state will have to invest in a ‘second
logic of exclusion’, one that leads to the actual expulsion of irregular
migrants from the country. Given the impossibility to expel anon-
ymous irregular migrants the central notion in the second logic is iden-
tification. This study has documented a paradigm shift in the internal
migration control on irregular migrants in countries such as Germany
and the Netherlands. In this shift, the more traditional policies follow-
ing the first logic of exclusion are increasingly supplemented with poli-
cies meant to put the second logic of exclusion into effect.
A crucial factor in this shift is the role that modern systems of sur-
veillance and, in particular, database technology play in this develop-
ment. Internal migration control on irregular migrants is expected to
be a prime site for the use and development of new technological sur-
veillance instruments focused on documenting and registering access
and eligibility. It is also important for the identification of irregular mi-
grants. Information and communication technology can serve both lo-
gics of exclusion. For the first logic, it is an indispensable tool to guard
and shield off the institutions of the welfare state to anyone who is la-
belled as ‘not belonging’. For the second logic, database technology, in-
creasingly equipped with biometric identifiers, is used to identify irreg-
ular migrants. Connecting them with their correct legal identity is a vi-
tal link in the process of expulsion. Without a proper identification,
expulsion is impossible and the expulsion order is likely to remain a
dead letter. However, the two logics make very different and almost op-
positional demands of the database systems that the state uses. The
first logic merely requires the systems to recognise irregular migrants
as ‘not belonging’, while the second logic requires them to be able to
identify and document the individual irregular migrant. These consid-
erations about the intensification and the direction in which internal
migration control in the Netherlands and Germany will develop and
about the role that modern technologies of surveillance are expected to
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play, led to the formulation of the following research questions in chap-
ter one, which will be answered in this chapter.
How do national and EU policies of internal migration control aimed
at the exclusion of irregular migrants develop? Do states increasingly
supplement more ‘established’ policies of societal exclusion with policies
of exclusion focused on identification and expulsion? And what is the
role of modern systems of information and surveillance in the construc-
tion of these policies of exclusion and control?
As explained in chapter one, Germany and the Netherlands were se-
lected on the assumption that they are comparable cases when it comes
to internal migration control. However, the focus is on the develop-
ment of state surveillance of irregular migrants itself, not in comparing
the two cases per se. In three empirical chapters central issues of policy
intensifications, a shift towards policies operating under the second lo-
gic of exclusion and the use of modern techniques of surveillance and
database technology were analysed. Chapter three dealt with ‘Guarding
access to the labour market’, which is the most classic site for internal
migration control following especially the first logic of societal and in-
stitutional exclusion. Chapter four on ‘police surveillance, detention
and expulsion’, focused on the chain of government agencies charged
with the organisation of the expulsion process. There the emphasis
shifts to the organisation and implementation of the second logic of ex-
clusion. Chapter five took the issue of the internal migration control
on irregular migrants to the level of the EU. In a ‘borderless’ Europe,
instruments must be invented to create – and patrol – new borders
that will enable its member states to separate the ‘ins’ from the ‘outs’.
EU solutions are especially expected to help with the issue of immi-
grant identification, contributing to the second logic of exclusion.
6.1 A new regime of internal migration control
In the field of labour market controls the dominant trend is one of in-
tensifying policies of internal migration control, summarised by Vogel’s
(2006) characterisation ‘higher, faster, more’. The main emphasis in
this intensification is on fine-tuning the first logic of exclusion.
The turn towards the second logic in this policy sector can be seen
at the level of political priorities, but hardly shows in the available data
on the implementation of policy. At the level of implementation the
facts and figures gathered in this chapter can only give indications for
certain developments, some more clear than others. Both countries are
rather similar in their political determination to fight the problem of
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irregular migrant labour and have intensified policies aimed at block-
ing irregular migrants’ access to the labour market (policies following
the first logic of exclusion). There is also a minor trend towards incor-
porating the second logic of exclusion, aimed at the irregular migrant
himself, into the labour market control system. In the Netherlands, the
government seems more explicit in its stated aim to target the irregular
migrant himself. Both trends are characterised by an increasing use of
database technology and the creation and refinements of digital bound-
aries: more registration is combined with networked registration.
Blocking access to documents and institutions has also increased the
role of employers (for controls and information) and the general public
(for information and tips) for labour market controls. This trend is il-
lustrative for the shift ‘out of the state’. Political priorities have also
been translated into increased funding and staffing: the labour market
control agencies have definitely been on the receiving end of Dutch
and German government spending. These intensifications have re-
sulted in more controls, greater fines and more arrests. The main em-
phasis is on the demand side of irregular migrant labour and hence on
employers. For policies aimed at the irregular migrant himself the
trend is to invest in new databases aimed at identification, fighting
identity fraud and establishing the authenticity of documents and
identities.
When it comes to the second logic of exclusion it becomes more diffi-
cult to see how political priorities are translated into day-to-day surveil-
lance. Identification has become a more central feature of the control
system. In the Netherlands the police are supposed to be more in-
volved in the labour market control regime and in Germany the Cus-
toms authorities – solely responsible for labour market controls since
2004 – even have been given police-like duties and competences. How
this translates into a control regime that functions along the lines of
the second logic of exclusion, and thus aimed at the irregular migrant,
his apprehension and ultimately expulsion, is, however, not so clear.
The data on the apprehension of irregular migrants as a result of la-
bour market controls – which would indicate a turn towards the second
logic in the labour market control regime – display very low percen-
tages and/or may not be adequately registered. It is therefore impossi-
ble to distinguish between irregular migrants apprehended during
worksite controls and those apprehended during the course of some
other form of control. The ‘real’ number of labour market apprehen-
sions is anywhere between the officially registered very low percentage
and the unknown percentage that may be hidden in the figures regis-
tered under general breaches of the Aliens or Residence Acts. In either
case, the authorities apparently do not feel the need or the political
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pressure to register these figures more accurately. And yet, the steadily
mounting political pressure in recent years and the investments in
identification procedures and databases suggest that the control regime
targets – or will target – the individual irregular migrant now more
than it did in the past. But to what extent is impossible to say, as the
numbers are simply not gathered and calculated.
The policy developments within the chain of government agencies
responsible for the expulsion of irregular migrants (police, detention
and immigration authorities) show both a marked intensification of
their tasks and budgets, as well as a distinct turn towards the second
logic of exclusion. In this realm of internal migration control, the ship
of state is clearly turning towards identification. There is an intensifica-
tion and professionalisation of policies for the identification of irregu-
lar migrants with the aim of expulsion. Both countries are investing in
the identification process in all parts of the bureaucratic chain leading
to expulsion. The police and immigration authorities introduce proce-
dures and instruments that make identification possible and foreign
policy is aimed at diplomatic relations with important countries of ori-
gin and the negotiation of readmission agreements. The detention ca-
pacity for the ‘administrative detention’ of irregular migrants has been
increased, resulting in a fast growth of this part of the prison popula-
tion. Furthermore, both countries are exploring the possibilities pro-
vided by the ‘brave new world’ of modern surveillance techniques. In-
creasingly, the immigration authorities turn to EU database systems
for the identification of irregular migrants. The newer database sys-
tems, once online, will work with biometric identifiers that can link
immigrants to their legal identity and other personal data without
needing the active cooperation of migrants themselves. Given the enor-
mous problem of uncooperative irregular migrants hiding their iden-
tity or lying about it to the immigration authorities, biometrics may
make it possible to skip over the immigrant himself in terms of identi-
fication. A tempting prospect for the immigration authorities. A ‘sur-
veillant assemblage’ aimed at regular and irregular migrants is clearly
emerging at both the domestic level, as well as at the European level.
Germany and the Netherlands are increasingly operating their policies
of internal migration control as ‘factories of identification’ for irregular
migrants. The desired end products of these ‘factories’ being a rise in
the number of identified and successfully expelled irregular migrants.
However, notwithstanding the investments in policies of identifica-
tion and exclusion, an increase in the number of expulsions is not
achieved. If anything, the numbers are declining rather than rising.
The intensification in policing and especially the rising incarceration
rates are not translated into more expulsions. This important contra-
indication for a policy development in the direction ‘identification and
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exclusion’ has a number of possible explanations. For example, expul-
sions may vary with the general volume of migration that can lead to
irregular residence. This is however only part of the story. The fact that
irregular migrants are well aware of ‘the importance of not being earn-
est’ is one of the main reasons for the dropping expulsion rates. An-
other reason is the tough stance taken by many countries of origin con-
sidered sources of irregular migration: a disinclination to take back mi-
grants who cannot be identified beyond a doubt as their own citizens.
Taking back these immigrants is rarely in their political or economic
interests and, especially in the case of transit migrants, they refuse to
get stuck with what they consider ‘European problems’. Both the irreg-
ular migrant and the country of origin are well aware of this Achilles’
heel of identification in the expulsion procedure and use this politico-
legal restriction on the deporting state to their advantage. In turn, this
frustration of expulsion policies strengthens deporting countries in
their resolve to find new means of identification. Thus, dropping expul-
sion rates are also the prime motivation for further investment in sol-
ving the problem of identification of irregular migrants. In the case of
Germany and the Netherlands, the state does not just look for domestic
solutions: many new initiatives and investments in the ‘factory of iden-
tification’ take place at the European level.
As the internal borders between the Schengen member states have
been dropped, the entry of irregular migrants into the EU – be it legal
or illegal – may be at any border in any member state. The fact that an
irregular migrant is apprehended in Germany or the Netherlands does
not say anything about his entry into the EU or the bureaucratic
‘places’ where he or she may have left documented traces of his entry,
identity, origin and itinerary. Irregular migration is a phenomenon of
European scale. This means that internal migration control on irregular
migrants can benefit from initiatives and instruments applied at the
EU level. In recent years, thus, the EU’s fight against irregular migra-
tion has been taken to a higher policy level. In terms of policies, there
have been some breakthroughs in the negotiations of readmission
agreements and the development of a rudimentary return policy. How-
ever, the uneven distribution of benefits between the contracting par-
ties in EU readmission agreements often turns actual readmission into
a mere paper reality, not enhanced cooperation. The advantage of nego-
tiating with the political mass of the EU is undone by the insistence of
the member states to negotiate readmission agreements not just for
the return of nationals, but also for the ‘return’ of transit migrants.
Again, the issue of transit migrants gives some of these countries the
(well-founded) idea that the EU tries to externalise its migration pro-
blems. The negotiation of a common return policy shows every sign of
national states hanging on to sovereignty and at the same time looking
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for new instruments to curtail migration. Common elements, such as
agreeing to limit the maximum length of administrative detention of ir-
regular migrants, are stretched up to the point where even the strictest
member states, such as Germany and the Netherlands, hardly have to
adjust their legislation. Restrictive elements such as the five-year re-en-
try ban are enthusiastically embraced. These initiatives are however un-
likely to tip the balance in the EU and domestic fight against illegal
immigration.
The real progress can be found on the level of EU instruments.
Especially the development of a network of EU migration databases,
equipped with state of the art biometric database technology, will be an
enormous push for the internal migration control on irregular mi-
grants. These systems are, potentially, the newly installed turbines of
the Dutch and German factories of identification, or those of any other
member state that is developing policies of internal migration control
following the second logic of exclusion. The SIS II, EURODAC and the
VIS will operate on an unprecedented scale that is likely to grow even
further as a result of technological advancements and the political de-
sire to increase the ‘interoperability’ of the systems. Steps towards link-
ing the various databases have been taken and have not met with sub-
stantial resistance. These systems will block access for some migrants
at the border (as registration may lead to a refusal at the border or at a
consulate when trying to obtain a visa) serving an EU-wide version of
the first logic of exclusion. They will, however, be of highest value for
the internal migration control at the member state level, as these sys-
tems may be able to re-identify parts of the irregular migrant popula-
tion apprehended and detained in EU member states. The use of these
systems for internal migration control is the result of political pressure
from those member states that consider ‘irregular migrants’ an impor-
tant policy problem. For example, even though EURODAC was origin-
ally devised for the prevention of ‘asylum shopping’, the German inter-
vention in 1998 made the system just as important for the internal
control on irregular migrants. The active use of EURODAC for internal
migration control by a small number of member states, first and fore-
most Germany and the Netherlands, underlines the value of this EU
database for domestic use. The fact that all of the EU migration data-
bases will include biometric identifiers signifies a crucial new step in
the internal surveillance of irregular migrants. The biometric database
turns ‘internal migration control’ into ‘internal migration control 2.0’,
so to speak. The second generation of the SIS will include biometric
identifiers and the VIS will even become the largest ten-fingerprint da-
tabase in the world. The amount of data stored on potential irregular
migrants is enormous and is set to grow at great speed as the EURO-
DAC database fills up and the VIS and the SIS II will go online. These
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European databases seek to register as many immigrants from ‘sus-
pect’ legal categories (e.g. asylum applicants) and from ‘suspect’ coun-
tries of origin (e.g. those requiring a visa to travel into the EU) as possi-
ble. This will help get at the much smaller group of immigrants who
cross the line into irregularity at a later stage. These systems can be
used to re-identify irregular migrants who try to conceal their identity
and thus contribute to solving the main bottleneck of domestic expul-
sion policies. However, the more effective these systems will turn out
to be, the more likely irregular migrants are to adapt to changing cir-
cumstances. Cutting off the ‘identity routes’ of asylum and visa applica-
tion, due to high risk of identification through the new network of mi-
gration databases, might provoke a counter-reaction. A possible side ef-
fect may be irregular migrants’ greater dependence on smuggling and
trafficking organisations (Broeders & Engbersen 2007).
In sum, Germany and the Netherlands – with a little help from their
European partners – are constructing a policy approach to internal mi-
gration control that is ultimately meant to break down the anonymity
of irregular migrants. The intensifications of policies of societal and in-
stitutional exclusion are supplemented with the new policy priority of
immigrant identification, for which new policies and instruments have
been developed. Surveillance by means of database technologies and
biometrics are set to become an integral aspect of internal migration
control over the years to come, making it harder and harder for irregu-
lar migrants to keep their identity a secret once they are apprehended
by the police. Information and exclusion were always kindred phenom-
ena and the digital age has greatly enlarged the information base of
the modern state. It now stretches far beyond its own borders encapsu-
lating the citizens of other nations instead of ‘just’ its own.
However, there is a classic distinction between information and
knowledge. Information is just raw date that has been structured and
made accessible; it becomes knowledge only after it has been selected,
validated and interpreted (WRR 2002: 38). That means that vast
amounts of data can be both a valuable source of information and
knowledge, but can also lead to an information overload. It takes well-
organised procedures and often the input of the human factor to make
good use of the information stored. It remains to be seen if and to
what extent state authorities will be able make useable knowledge of
the information gathered. The information gathered in this study gives
only limited insight into this question for the systems currently avail-
able. However, the rather early stage of digitalising borders with a view
to internal migration control combined with the already heavy use of
the EURODAC data system makes it likely that the Netherlands and
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Germany will push through to make these systems ‘work’ for them:
producing knowledge to increase expulsions.
Throughout this study it has been noted that the information that
government agencies publish, even in combination with the various
academic studies that provide data for smaller or larger parts of the pol-
icy process, do not add up to a picture that enables one to get a full
view of policy implementation or a clear view of its effectiveness. The
gathering of data, or at least those data that are published, does not al-
low for more than indications of developments and effectiveness of pol-
icy. This lack of reliable data means that governments themselves are
‘dancing in the dark’ even though they are bound to have more infor-
mation than is out in the open. However, it also means that scientists,
journalists and parliament for that matter, have no way of evaluating
the control system and the recent changes in its operation in any real
empirical sense.
6.2 Policy gaps: ‘white spots’ and ‘black holes’
Even though it is clear that internal migration control in Germany and
the Netherlands is developing into an increasingly active policy ap-
proach that takes both logics of exclusion on board, it is certainly not a
development without setbacks and limitations. Cornelius et al.’s
(2004) statement that the policy gap in immigration policy has to be
seen as a fact, rather than a hypothesis, does not need to be questioned
on the basis of this study. The translation of political agendas into pol-
icy programmes and, finally, into the daily practices and activities of
government control agencies permits many opportunities for the frus-
tration or watering down the original intent of policymakers. Even
though a policy gap is hardly an unexpected empirical finding, the na-
ture of this gap or, more accurately, gaps, can offer insight into the
flaws of the policy programmes or into the flaws of the political choices
behind those policy programmes. After all, not every frustration of pol-
icy has to be considered a loss for a democratic, constitutional state.
These policy gaps will be discussed below under the headings of ‘white
spots’ and ‘black holes’. The white spots can be likened to the blank
spaces on old maps indicating that this was unchartered and un-
mapped territory. Strictly speaking, black holes are, to a large degree,
unchartered too. However, in the context of this study, black holes are
policy venues chosen and maintained by the government even though
there is not much light at the end of the tunnel. These are policies in
which governments stretch their own legal framework to get the job
done, even though the chances of achieving policy goals remain slim
and the costs may be considered high. Black holes then are usually
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harsh on policy subjects although it should be realised that those white
spots on old maps also came with a caution for danger: hic sunt dra-
gones! Being outside government control – in a white spot – also means
being outside government protection. The fact that governments resort
to strategies that lead to black holes has much to do with the fact that
their fight against irregular migration is a fight in which action and re-
action follow each other at a fast pace. New policy initiatives are often
quickly countered by innovations on the side of irregular migrants and
the formal and ‘bastard’ institutions that help them sustain their irreg-
ular residence. The results may often be a stalemate between govern-
ment agencies and irregular migrants.
White spots are those sectors of society and the economy where irregu-
lar migrants are to be expected, but which are left unchartered or even
left alone altogether. In this study they are mostly found on the labour
market. From the perspective of the state, white spots can be the result
of policy choices or of circumstances. It is no secret that irregular mi-
grant workers are especially found in specific sectors of the economy
and there are some indications that governments have turned a blind
eye in some cases (for example, the construction sector during the Ber-
lin’s building boom). Furthermore, there are notorious ‘white spots’
where the authorities cannot and/or will not intervene with controls.
Governments are restricted as well as reluctant to control private
households, thereby de facto – and knowingly! – consenting to wide-
spread fraudulent domestic work, including domestic work by irregular
migrant workers. This lack of control also places domestic workers in a
vulnerable position in a potentially exploitative environment. White
spots are not necessarily safe places. White spots also develop simply
because the state’s resources are too limited in comparison to the pro-
blem it tries to counter. In spite of intensifications in funding and
manpower, leading to more controls with higher fines, policy gaps can-
not altogether be avoided: there are simply too many companies to con-
trol. The Dutch government now estimates that it annually controls
less than 2 per cent of all Dutch companies. That is after the ranks of
the Labour Inspectorate have been doubled in the past two decades.
The 2007 European Commission proposal to control 10 per cent of all
companies every year would require beefing up staff levels from the
current 180 inspectors to 930, hardly something that can be achieved –
politically or practically – in the short term. White spots are therefore
inevitable and result in a certain degree of labour market segmentation
in the Dutch and German economies. There is a demand for irregular
migrant labour in parts of the economy that is de facto left alone. Even
though labour market segmentation is not the intention of policy, some
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foreseeable segmentation results from the policy choices that are made,
or in some cases simply cannot be avoided.
Black holes are those instances where policies take on elements of the
‘state of exception’, in which the law is stretched up to, and sometimes
even over its limits. The main example of a black hole in the develop-
ment of internal migration control in Germany and the Netherlands is
the functioning of the system of administrative detention. Given the
difficulties with identification, immigrant detention cannot optimally
function as a clearinghouse for irregular migrants, i.e. being a short
stopover preparing them for expulsion. This is especially noteworthy in
light of the fact that the data strongly suggest that the overall majority
of successful expulsions in both countries are effectuated in the first
weeks and months of detention. The longer detention lasts, the less
likely that the outcome will be expulsion. Still, both governments keep
significant numbers of irregular migrants in a lengthy, harsh and very
costly detention regime. Considering that these irregular migrants will
eventually end up on the streets again makes it an irrational policy ap-
proach in terms of expulsion policy, whereas making detention capacity
available for newly apprehended irregular migrants with a higher
chance of being deported would seem a more effective and rational ap-
proach. It seems, however, that the Dutch and German governments
place much value on the idea that the long and harsh detention regime
may serve as a deterrent for current and future irregular migrants.
‘Undeportable’ irregular migrants are held for a long time in a deten-
tion system that is essentially not meant for long stays. The regime is
usually harsher than that of normal prisons as the facilities and cir-
cumstances are well below normal prison standards. Overcrowding, a
lack of medical and legal aid, poorly or even unqualified staff and a
lack of all preparatory activities and education that prepare regular pris-
oners for their return to society add up to a harsh regime, especially
considering the long period irregular migrants can be legally detained
in Germany and the Netherlands. The detention regime should there-
fore also be considered a black hole. One might speculate how authori-
ties hope that the harsh detention regime will encourage these irregu-
lar migrants to try their luck elsewhere once put back on the streets.
The de facto functioning of the detention system as a deterrent brings
the notion of the state of exception to mind. Both countries are stretch-
ing their policies to adapt to the problems they face in order to increase
effectiveness. The length and conditions of immigrant detention
(especially in the Netherlands where illegal residence is not even a
criminal offence) and some of the efforts of immigration authorities to
expel irregular migrants (such as presenting aliens to various embas-
sies and the German approach of ‘informalising’ diplomatic relations
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to increase expulsion rates) all brush up against the limits of the legal
system and allow degrees of exception.
With the intensification of internal migration control policies, irregular
migrants have responded with what can be called evasive manoeuvres.
Closing off the formal labour market and access to certain institutions,
such as education and the housing market, led to a turn towards the
informal economy and the ‘creation’ of new informal institutions and
networks paralleling those in the ‘formal’ labour market and society.
The intensifications of labour market controls in those sectors of the
economy where analysis showed irregular migrant labour to be a com-
mon phenomenon, seems to lead to sectoral shifts, in which irregular
migrants migrate to other, less controlled sectors of the economy. In
the Netherlands there is evidence that the increase in the control re-
gime and the overall societal exclusion resulting from internal migra-
tion control leads to an increasing resort to crime, especially petty
crime, among irregular migrants. With other avenues closed to them
this subsistence crime helps them to get the money they need to en-
able their stay in the Netherlands. The most important ‘weapon of the
weak’ irregular migrants have is the ability to destroy or hide their le-
gal identity so as to avoid expulsion. Despite all efforts of the police,
the detention and immigration authorities and the diplomatic corps, a
simple lie still goes a long way in frustrating government policy. The
latest bid by the state to outwit the irregular migrant is an overall appli-
cation of biometric identifiers in the new systems of digital surveillance
that are being set up at both the national and the international levels.
These biometric databases aim to break to the anonymity that now so
often shelters irregular migrants from expulsion. Even though these
systems cannot cover all irregular migrants, they will make the ‘iden-
tity routes’ into Europe (irregular migrants who originally came on a le-
gal visa or through the asylum procedure) a dangerous route for mi-
grants who wish to avoid expulsion. Biometrics may prove to be a ‘kill-
er application’ in the struggle between the state and the irregular
migrant. Only time can tell what the situation will look like in a few
years from now when the application of biometrics in immigration
procedures is rolled out and the stored data available for the identifica-
tion of irregular migrants increases. No doubt, a new evasive man-
oeuvre will follow and it will most likely follow the direction of pre-
vious moves: deeper down into irregularity.
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6.3 Follow the leader?
This study draws its empirical material from the cases of Germany and
the Netherlands. Those countries were chosen on the assumption of
being most likely cases in light of the developments in internal migra-
tion control. Obviously, that does not mean that these are the only two
countries that could be fitted into the mould of likely cases. Just as
there are relevant differences between Germany and the Netherlands,
there are relevant similarities between these two countries and other
EU member states. Though nothing can be said about developments
in the internal migration control on irregular migrants in other coun-
tries in any empirical sense, there are some reasons to assume that pol-
icy innovations in some countries, such as Germany and the Nether-
lands, may spread to other countries if they come to be regarded as
possible solutions for their problems with irregular resident migrants.
Immigration policy is a policy area in which EU member states have
take a keen interest in each other’s policies and copied them when
deemed successful. Particularly during the 1990s, when asylum migra-
tion to Europe was at its height, member states copied policy innova-
tions of each other (that is, those geared to restricting access to asylum
procedures) out of fear of becoming the most attractive country for asy-
lum seekers. The large numbers of asylum applicants primarily af-
fected the northern member states, which subsequently tried to shift
the burden to one another by competing with restrictive policy innova-
tions. It is not unlikely that states will also look over one another’s
shoulders to see what is being done about the problem of irregular mi-
grants. Successful policy innovations are always of interest to govern-
ment agencies and policymakers working on the same problem. The
European Commission’s reaction to the successful use of EURODAC
for the domestic surveillance of irregular migrants is a case in point.
As the figures indicated a success in the domestic fight against illegal
migration, the primary reaction was to increase the effectiveness and
spread the success by making the use of category three data obligatory
for all member states. If the new digital infrastructure will increase
identifications and expulsions in Germany and the Netherlands, it is
also likely that the use of digital infrastructure itself will spread wider
over Europe.
6.4 Breaking down anonymity, marginalising citizenship?
Immigration, whether it is legal or illegal, and immigration policy are
directly linked with citizenship. As Torpey wrote in 2000, nation states
are both territorial associations and membership associations, indicating
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that there are always geographical and bureaucratic lines that separate
those that belong from those that do not. So far, nothing new: immigra-
tion policy was always about exclusion, and exclusion – at the level of na-
tion states – was always about citizenship. However, in much of the con-
temporary debate on citizenship the focus has been on the positive side
of citizenship; on the build up of rights and on the active citizenry. An
important strand of migration studies literature has focused on the de-
velopment of denizen’s rights – despite government attempts to limit
rights – and the positive influence of international legal norms and their
constitutional translations on the acquisition of immigrant rights.
Though these studies document a very real development, there are also
studies that document developments that are less about expanding
rights and more about marginalising the value of the citizenship of
third-country nationals. This study, dealing with the presence of the ‘ul-
timate’ non-citizen in the eyes of the state where he has taken up resi-
dence, also documents such a development. Particularly in the context
of detention and expulsion, the concept and legal status of citizenship
emerges as a central but Janus-faced status. In essence the lack of a
known citizenship of irregular migrants both facilitates the ‘exceptional’
handling of these immigrants by the state, as well as severely restricts
the state in achieving its policy aims. Firstly, the fact that irregular mi-
grants willingly hide their legal identity and citizenship makes them all
the more vulnerable vis-a`-vis the state. Lack of citizenship is often also a
lack of legal/diplomatic representation, which gives the detaining state
authorities more leverage in their dealings with irregular migrants. The
immigrant’s valuable lie comes at a high cost. With the growing impor-
tance of immigrant detention in countries such as Germany and the
Netherlands, the individual irregular migrants finds himself increas-
ingly cornered between the rock of prison and the hard place of expul-
sion. And yet, the lack of citizenship puts the state authorities in an im-
possible position at the international level, as the lack of citizenship
blocks the state’s possibilities to deport irregular migrants. This is the
stalemate between third-country nationals and Western states today. The
question remains what the digitalisation of internal migration control
will do to the already vulnerable status of the citizenship of irregular
third-country nationals. What does the breaking down of anonymity
mean for their citizenship?
The new digital reality has altered many aspects of citizenship – and
not just for irregular migrants. The new digital environment we all use
and have grown accustomed to has produced new rights and opportu-
nities, but also new vulnerabilities. This goes especially for citizenship
in the sense of a legal identity – registrations proving who you are and
codifying which rights are granted to you by the state and other institu-
tions. The fact that identity theft is one of the fastest rising crimes in
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the US underscores how the digital environment does not just serve
the interests of citizens, but also comes with new vulnerabilities. Citi-
zenship has become identity management (Muller 2004). It is increas-
ingly about being in control of the many data doubles of personal legal
identity in the registrations and databanks of government agencies and
private companies. Most citizens of the Western world have at least a
certain level of control over their own data doubles or are backed by
public and private institutions and procedures that may help them cor-
rect faulty information or the misuse of their digital identities. But
even for them, control over their various digital identities, often built
upon their legal citizenship, is becoming harder and harder. For irregu-
lar migrants, there is no personal identity management or control over
their data doubles. They can manipulate their identity through main-
taining silence or telling lies about it – a poor man’s version of identity
management – but they do not have ‘administrator access’ to most of
the data stored about them. Control over their data doubles is in the
hands of government authorities, mostly those of European states.
Moreover, their data doubles were often created with the proclaimed
purpose of exclusion. This is of course more a result of the political
choices made in internal migration policies, then a result of the digital
techniques used. There are, however, also consequences for the citizen-
ship of irregular migrants that come as the direct result of using new
database technology that aims to break down irregular migrants’ anon-
ymity. For one thing, the breaking down of their legal anonymity
through biometric identifiers linking them back to their legal identity
may lead to further anonymity in many other aspects in the process of
migration control. The use of these large databases makes the indivi-
dual in the process of migration control and identification, to a large
extent, irrelevant. If surveillance systems are ‘in charge’ of identifica-
tion this leads to a double de-personalisation in the identification pro-
cess (Broeders 2009b). There is no point in asking a migrant who he
is and what his story is, if you can just run his fingerprints through
the system to get the answer. There is no point in giving any thought
to a migrant whom the SIS says should be refused at the border, as
this decision was already made when he was entered into the system.
Personal elements, both on the side of the migrant as well as on the
side of the immigration official, are taken out of the equation. The offi-
cial ‘becomes’ the procedure (as delivered to him by the system) and
the migrant ‘becomes’ what the system says he is. To a certain extent,
this is a logical development: digitalising the border is a reaction to the
immigrant’s successful identiy-hiding strategy. The marginalization of
immigrant citizenship, adding a new layer to their ‘alienation’, is how-
ever a sad and worrisome side effect.
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Return to sender…
In a paradoxical evolution, the second logic of exclusion puts the spot-
light on the individual irregular migrant, while the new technologies
used to do so depersonalise and de-individualise him. The second logic
of exclusion requires an exact legal identity, as only a documented ir-
regular migrant can be expelled, whereas the first logic broadly ex-
cludes everyone that cannot prove he has a right of access. At the same
time, the second logic takes the narrowest focus on individual identity
possible. All that matters is the required identification and documenta-
tion that will make expulsion possible. Hindress (2000: 1487), writing
about citizenship and immigration, characterised citizenship as a vital
marker in the international system ‘advising state and nonstate agen-
cies of the particular state to which an individual belongs’. The current
development in the internal migration control on irregular migrants
using database technology for identification and expulsion may take
the value of citizenship even a step further down and reduce it to an
international address label.
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Dutch summary/Nederlandse samenvatting
Irreguliere migranten, of illegalen zoals ze in het Nederlands meestal
worden aangeduid, worden in een aantal West-Europese landen steeds
meer gezien als een belangrijk politiek en beleidsmatig probleem. Met
name in de jaren negentig, als het probleem van de asielmigratie zich
enigszins stabiliseert, neemt de beleidsaandacht voor illegalen sterk
toe. Naast maatregelen aan de grens en in het immigratiebeleid, ont-
wikkelen sommige landen een beleid van interne migratie controle. Im-
mers, illegalen die de horde van grens genomen hebben en zich in een
Europees land vestigen, zullen dat land niet snel ‘spontaan’ verlaten.
Het migratiebeleid richt zich naar binnen, resulterend in een ‘illegalen-
beleid’ dat kan worden gekarakteriseerd door het centrale principe van
uitsluiting. Illegale migranten horen juridisch niet te zijn waar ze zijn
en dienen bijgevolg uitgesloten te worden van alle mogelijkheden,
bronnen van inkomsten en diensten die een illegaal verblijf kunnen
verlengen. Dit beleid van uitsluiting heeft twee mogelijke vormen. Een
meer ‘traditionele’ vorm van uitsluiting van maatschappelijke institu-
ties en een tweede vorm van uitsluiting die zich richt op de identifica-
tie van illegalen teneinde ze uit te kunnen zetten. Gezien de politieke
aandacht voor illegalenbeleid kan worden verwacht dat het illegalenbe-
leid zich intensiveert. Tegen een achtergrond van snelle technologische
ontwikkelingen en de brede toepassing van ICT in het overheidsbeleid
kan bovendien worden verwacht dat de overheid daarbij steeds vaker
gebruik zal maken van digitale registratie- en identificatiesystemen.
Deze overwegingen leiden tot de volgende onderzoeksvragen voor dit
proefschrift:
Hoe verloopt de ontwikkeling van het beleid voor interne migratie con-
trole op nationaal en op EU niveau? Vullen staten het meer ‘traditio-
nele’ beleid van maatschappelijke uitsluiting in toenemende mate aan
met uitsluitingbeleid gericht op identificatie en uitzetting? En wat is
de rol van (moderne) informatie- en surveillancesystemen in de vorm-
geving van dit beleid van uitsluiting en controle?
Om deze vragen te kunnen beantwoorden is gekeken naar het beleid
in twee EU-lidstaten, te weten Nederland en Duitsland, en naar de
ontwikkelingen op het Europese niveau. Het onderzoek richt zich op
de vraag of er een bepaalde ontwikkeling in het beleid waar te nemen
is en hoe deze eruit ziet. Daarom zijn de cases geselecteerd op basis
van relevante politieke, economische en beleidsmatige overeenkomsten
die het waarschijnlijk maken dat als de ontwikkeling zich voordoet, die
bij deze landen waarschijnlijk het eerst te zien zal zijn. Nederland en
Duitsland zijn dus zogenaamde most likely cases. De Europese dimen-
sie is voornamelijk van belang vanwege de ontwikkeling van een
nieuwe infrastructuur van immigratiedatabanken die in het nationale
illegalenbeleid kan worden ingezet.
Het theoretische raamwerk voor deze studie (hoofdstuk twee) is ont-
leend aan twee wetenschappelijke disciplines: ‘immigratie studies’ en
de opkomende discipline van de ‘surveillance studies’. De immigratie
studies literatuur geeft inzicht in de redenen waarom grenscontrole
steeds meer aangevuld wordt met ‘binnenlands’ migratie beleid en gaat
in op de politieke preoccupatie van overheden met het controleren, of
minimaal het schijnbaar controleren, van migratiestromen. De surveil-
lance literatuur geeft inzicht in de wijze waarop bureaucratiee¨n door
middel van documentatie en registraties de bevolking inzichtelijk en
controleerbaar probeert te maken. In een digitaliserende wereld nemen
de mogelijkheden voor het registreren, opslaan en bewaren van per-
soonlijke data exponentieel toe. Overheden maken dankbaar gebruik
van deze mogelijkheden en het immigratiebeleid is daarop beslist geen
uitzondering. Het tegendeel is eerder waar; in toenemende mate zijn
juist immigranten het onderwerp van de registraties van verschillende
overheden. Vanuit het perspectief van interne migratie controle zijn er
twee redenen voor deze ‘migranten administratie’ die samenhangen
met twee verschillende logica’s van uitsluiting die in dit proefschrift
worden bestudeerd.
De eerste logica is die van ‘uitsluiting van documentatie en registratie’.
Onder deze logica wordt surveillance ingezet om migranten uit te slui-
ten van de kerninstituties van de samenleving, zoals de formele ar-
beidsmarkt, het onderwijs, de woningmarkt en de regelingen van de
verzorgingsstaat. Dit zijn de meer ‘klassieke’ vormen van het illegalen-
beleid, met in Nederland als belangrijke ijkpunten de koppeling tussen
een legale verblijfstitel en het verkrijgen van een Sofinummer en de in-
voering van de koppelingswet. Door het migranten onmogelijk te ma-
ken zekere documenten of registratienummers te bemachtigen, terwijl
deze als voorwaarde gelden om toegang te krijgen tot bepaalde institu-
ties, is het nettoresultaat de uitsluiting van die instituties. De staat trekt
een muur op van documenten en juridische regels en vereisten ron-
dom zijn maatschappelijke instituties en ‘patrouilleert’ deze met mo-
derne identificatie- en datasystemen. Het doel is de ontmoediging van
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illegaal verblijf, het middel is rigoureuze maatschappelijke uitsluiting.
Illegalen die zich niet laten ontmoedigen, zullen door de overheid zelf
echter over de grens gebracht moeten worden. In recente jaren staat
daarom het uitzettingsbeleid centraler in de interne migratie controle.
Omdat anonieme illegalen praktisch en juridisch onuitzetbaar zijn,
vereist dit een andere bureaucratische aanpak. Deze aanpak volgt de
tweede logica van uitsluiting, die van de ‘uitsluiting met behulp van docu-
mentatie en registratie’. De tweede logica wordt van belang als de eerste
niet optimaal werkt en ongewenste migranten zich niet laten ontmoe-
digen en illegaal (ver)blijven. De aandacht verschuift dan naar de onge-
wenste migrant zelf. Beleid dat deze logica volgt, probeert de migrant
zelf juist te registreren en documenteren om hem met behulp van die
informatie uit te sluiten. Deze logica stelt alles in het werk om de ano-
nimiteit, die illegalen relatief effectief beschermt tegen uitzetting, af te
breken. De twee logica’s zijn complementair in termen van hun bij-
drage aan het illegalenbeleid, maar stellen heel verschillende eisen aan
de inrichting, dataverzameling, werking en gebruik van de datasyste-
men die voor interne migratie controle aangesproken worden. Bij het
klassieke illegalenbeleid, volgens de eerste logica, doet het er niet toe
wie de illegaal is, zolang het systeem maar aangeeft dat hij geen recht
op toegang heeft. Dat is eenvoudig te bepalen als iemand niet de juiste
papieren heeft of niet kan laten zien dat hij op de juiste plaats geregis-
treerd staat. Bij de tweede logica van uitsluiting gaat het erom dat een
onbekende illegaal geı¨dentificeerd kan worden en verbonden kan worden
met officie¨le registraties en documenten die zijn identiteit en land van
herkomst bewijzen en documenteren. Identificeren, in tegenstelling tot
blokkeren, vereist een ander soort informatie en deels een ander soort
databank, namelijk databanken die migranten kunnen traceren en
identificeren. Ook ‘de bureaucratie’ zal daarmee, deels, anders georga-
niseerd moeten worden.
In drie empirische hoofdstukken is gekeken naar de ontwikkeling van
de interne migratie controle op illegale migranten in Nederland en
Duitsland om te zien of, hoe en in welke mate zich een ontwikkeling
voltrekt waarbij de eerste logica van uitsluiting wordt aangevuld met
beleid en instrumenten die zich op de tweede logica richten. Daarbij is
gekeken naar de politieke en beleidsmatige ontwikkelingen en zoveel
als mogelijk naar de ontwikkelingen in de implementatie van het
beleid.
In het arbeidsmarktbeleid (hoofdstuk drie) staat traditioneel de eerste
logica centraal. De arbeidsmarkt is immers de grootste ‘magneet’ voor
illegale migranten. De afgelopen jaren is het beleid aangaande illegalen
op de arbeidsmarkt sterk aangescherpt: de budgetten van de overheids-
instanties die verantwoordelijk zijn voor arbeidsmarktcontroles zijn
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sterk gestegen. De personeelssterkte is sterk toegenomen en de techno-
logische toepassingen en systemen om werkgevers en werknemers te
controleren en traceren zijn behoorlijk uitgebreid. De politiek verkon-
digde prioriteit om illegale arbeid aan te pakken heeft zich dus vertaald
in een flinke (financie¨le) injectie in het systeem en de capaciteit van de
autoriteiten op het gebied van arbeidsmarktcontroles. De nadruk ligt
daarbij overduidelijk bij het investeren in de eerste logica van uitslui-
ting: meer controles, meer en hogere boetes, ‘slimmere’ controles – ge-
baseerd op een analyse van risicosectoren – en een bredere aanpak door
de controletaak ook steeds te beleggen bij partijen buiten de overheid,
met name de werkgever (de werkgever als hulpsheriff). De politieke
wens om de arbeidsmarktcontroles ook bij te laten dragen aan de
tweede logica van uitsluiting, is in de uitvoering nog niet of nauwelijks
terug te zien. Aangezien de arbeidsmarkt e´e´n van de meest gecontro-
leerde sectoren is, zou het een logische sector zijn om niet alleen te con-
troleren op illegale arbeid, maar ook om gecontroleerde illegalen daad-
werkelijk aan te houden over te dragen aan de autoriteiten die verant-
woordelijk zijn het uitzettingsbeleid. Dit zou betekenen dat
arbeidsmarktcontroles zich sterker dan voorheen ook op identificatie
van illegalen zouden richten en, nog belangrijker, dat bij controle aan-
getroffen illegalen aan de politie worden overgedragen met als doel ver-
dere identificatie en uiteindelijk uitzetting. De in de officie¨le registraties
aangetroffen percentages voor illegalen die zijn aangehouden voor over-
tredingen van de arbeidswetgeving voor vreemdelingen zijn in beide
landen echter extreem laag. Dat betekent dat deze aanhoudingen of zeer
beperkt zijn of dat ze schuil gaan onder de bredere categorie van aan-
houdingen die worden geregistreerd onder de algemene noemer van
overtredingen van de vreemdelingenwetgeving (illegaal verblijf). Voor
dat laatste zijn weliswaar aanwijzingen, maar het zicht op wat dan wel
een realistisch percentage is, ontbreekt. Dat gebrek aan inzicht geldt
echter ook voor de politiek die de prioriteit van meer aanhoudingen zelf
heeft geformuleerd.
In de keten die loopt van toezicht door de politie, via vreemdelingen-
detentie naar uitzetting (hoofdstuk 4) is de tweede logica van uitslui-
ting dominant, zeker naarmate men meer aan het einde van de keten
komt. De politieke nadruk op het uitzettingsbeleid als het sluitstuk van
het illegalenbeleid mist zijn uitwerking niet op de organisatie en de in-
zet van de politie, het detentiewezen en de autoriteiten die verantwoor-
delijk zijn voor het uitzettingsbeleid. Waar de politie (traditioneel) nog
betrekkelijk veel ruimte heeft om eigen prioriteiten te destilleren uit de
vele claims op hun operationele inzet, geldt dat veel minder voor deten-
tie- en uitzettingsautoriteiten. De procedures, technieken en systemen
die in de gehele keten zijn geı¨ntroduceerd om identificatie van illega-
len mogelijk te maken, wijzen erop dat de vreemdelingendetentie – als
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spil in het proces – steeds meer gaat functioneren als een ‘identificatie-
fabriek’. De capaciteit van de vreemdelingendetentie is bovendien in de
afgelopen jaren spectaculair toegenomen. Juridisch gaat het hierbij om
een administratieve detentie die in principe bedoeld is om uitzetting
voor te bereiden. De omstandigheden in dit detentieregime zijn echter
beduidend slechter dan in reguliere gevangenissen, hetgeen nog verer-
gerd wordt door het feit dat vreemdelingendetentie in Nederland en
Duitsland zeer lang kan duren (in Duitsland maximaal achttien maan-
den, in Nederland in theorie niet beperkt in duur). Al deze investerin-
gen in detentie en identificatie leveren echter niet het resultaat op waar
men op ingezet had. Het aantal uitzettingen loopt eerder terug dan op.
De overheid loopt stuk op het verzet van landen van herkomst (die hun
onderdanen vaak liever niet zien terugkomen en geen papieren ter
beschikking stellen) en met name op de illegaal zelf, die met leugens
over of het verzwijgen van identiteit en land van herkomst het uitzet-
tingsbeleid zeer effectief weet te frustreren. Deze zeer effectieve frus-
tratie van het uitzettingsbeleid ligt ten grondslag aan het teruglopende
aantal uitzettingen. Maar hij ligt ook ten grondslag aan een reeks van
doorgaande en nieuwe investeringen door nationale en Europese over-
heden in nieuwe systemen van identificatie die tot doel hebben om
steeds minder afhankelijk zijn van de illegalen zelf voor informatie
over identiteit en herkomst.
De volgende stappen in de strijd om identificatie en uitzetting wor-
den gezet op het niveau van de Europese Unie (hoofdstuk vijf). Sinds
het einde van de jaren negentig zijn de Europese lidstaten bezig met
de opbouw van een netwerk van migratiedatabanken die in de toe-
komst een groot belang kunnen krijgen voor de interne controle op il-
legalen in landen als Nederland en Duitsland. Door aanpassing, uit-
breiding en het oprekken van functies gedurende de ontwikkelingsfase
van het Schengen Informatie Systeem (SIS), zijn opvolger het SIS II,
EURODAC en het Visa Informatie Systeem (VIS) heeft de Europese
Unie straks nieuwe digitale grenzen die de identificatie van grote delen
van de illegalenpopulatie mogelijk sterk vereenvoudigen. Een illegaal
kan op drie manieren in Nederland terecht gekomen zijn: hij reist ille-
gaal in (de ‘ware’ illegale migrant), hij vraagt asiel aan en wordt illegaal
als hij in Nederland blijft nadat zijn verzoek is afgewezen of hij reist le-
gaal in op een toeristenvisum en wordt illegaal als de geldigheid daar-
van verloopt (de zogenaamde overstayers). In een Europa zonder gren-
zen kan natuurlijk ook een andere lidstaat de asielaanvraag in behan-
deling hebben gehad of het visum hebben verleend. Deze drie
achtergronden van illegaliteit vormen de bauwdruk voor het netwerk
van Europese immigratie databanken.
Wie bij de grens, of later in bijvoorbeeld Nederland aangehouden
wordt, kan worden geregistreerd in het Schengen Informatie Systeem
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(SIS). De andere twee routes van asielaanvraag en de visumaanvraag la-
ten sporen na in de administraties van de immigratie- en asielautoritei-
ten van de lidstaten van de EU. Deze zogenaamde identiteitsroutes
worden vastgelegd in twee nieuwere systemen: het EURODAC systeem
en het Visum Informatie Systeem (VIS). Alle asielaanvragen die in de
Europese Unie worden gedaan worden sinds 2003 in het EURODAC
systeem geregistreerd en in de toekomst zullen alle toegewezen en af-
gewezen aanvragen voor een visum voor de Europese Unie worden ge-
registreerd in het VIS. Deze systemen zijn voor alle lidstaten toeganke-
lijk. Het doel is dat deze databanken de onidentificeerbare en dus
onuitzetbare illegalen kunnen ‘re-identificeren’ op basis van de digitale
voetsporen die ze hebben achtergelaten in de Europese bureaucratiee¨n.
Al deze databanken zijn technische hoogwaardige systemen die van
alle geregistreerde migranten ook biometrische identiteitskenmerken –
meestal de vingerafdrukken – vastleggen. Een illegaal die is opgeno-
men in deze systemen, is strikt genomen niet meer ‘nodig’ voor zijn ei-
gen identificatie: een vingerafdruk volstaat. Met name voor de tweede
logica van uitsluiting kan de toepassing van biometrie op een Europese
schaal gerust een ‘killer application’ genoemd worden, aangezien het
in potentie grote delen van de voorheen onidentificeerbare populatie
via een vingerafdruk naar een asieldossier of een visumaanvraag kan
herleiden.
In het slothoofdstuk (hoofdstuk zes) wordt de balans opgemaakt van
de ontwikkelingen in het nationale en Europese ‘illegalenbeleid’. Er
wordt geconstateerd dat het schip van staat in het interne migratiebe-
leid steeds meer in de richting van identificatie en uitsluiting draait.
Met andere woorden: naast de intensiveringen in de ‘uitsluiting van
documentatie en registratie’ wordt er in toenemende mate geı¨nvesteerd
in het operationaliseren van de ‘uitsluiting met behulp van documenta-
tie en registratie’. Dat geldt het minst voor het arbeidsmarktbeleid, veel
sterker voor het detentieregime en potentieel het meest voor de toe-
komstige integratie van de nieuwe Europese databanken in de natio-
nale uitvoering van het interne toezicht op illegalen. Daarnaast worden
nog enkele kanttekeningen geplaatst bij de voorziene en onvoorziene
gevolgen van deze beleidsontwikkelingen. Door politieke keuzes en
(gebrek) aan capaciteit ontstaan op de arbeidsmarkt zogenaamde ‘witte
vlekken’: sectoren waarvan bekend is dat er veel illegale tewerkstelling
is, maar die desondanks met rust gelaten worden. Ook ontstaan er
‘zwarte gaten’ als gevolg van het overheidsbeleid. Met name de lang-
durige administratieve detentie van onuitzetbare illegalen is vanuit het
perspectief van het uitzettingsbeleid in hoge mate irrationeel en gaat
gepaard met hoge humanitaire en economische kosten. In het beleid
en de praktijken rondom detentie en uitzetting stuit de overheid tegen
de grenzen van zijn eigen wetgeving en rekt deze soms zelfs
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doelbewust op. Tot slot werpt de ontwikkeling in het illegalenbeleid die
in deze studie wordt gedocumenteerd een bijzonder licht op het begrip
burgerschap dat in zaken van immigratie en immigratiebeleid zo’n
centrale rol speelt. Enerzijds is burgerschap – in de juridische zin van
nationaliteit – de cruciale variabele in het uitzettingsbeleid die bepaalt
of uitzetting mogelijk of onmogelijk is. Anderzijds heeft de jacht op de
identiteit van de illegaal tot gevolg dat zijn burgerschap tot op de
kleinst mogelijk noemer wordt uitgekleed: de overheid is slechts nog
geı¨nteresseerd in die informatie die een uitzetting mogelijk kan ma-
ken, alles daarenboven wordt in toenemende mate irrelevant geacht.
De wetenschap waar iemand naar teruggestuurd kan worden is vol-
doende. Het burgerschap van illegalen devalueert daarmee tot het ni-
veau van een adreslabel.
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Notes
1 See Jandl (2004) for a brief overview of research on estimates of illegal immigration.
2 Invited immigration at the top end of the labour market has been common practice
throughout the years and many European countries have recently even reinstated re-
cruitment policies for certain segments of the labour markets, most notably the ICT
sector (see for example De Lange et al. 2003).
3 Justice and Home Affairs is known as the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
since the entry into Force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
4 The ‘pedagogic’ element of the panopticon is not so much correction as it is preven-
tion. The construction of the panopticon, just as that of the fortress is meant to dis-
courage wouldbe immigrants and, through discouragement, prevent their arrival.
5 Cyrus and Vogel (2003: 226) define formal discretion as ‘the scope of choices fore-
seen by law and administrative regulations’ and informal discretion as ‘the use of
choices that are not explicitly allowed by law or are even forbidden’.
6 These countries have followed a strategy of selective inclusion of specific categories
of illegal migrants through regularisation programmes. An increasing number of Eu-
ropean countries have adopted such regularisation programmes over the past decade.
Such programmes bring undocumented persons out of the shadows and provide in-
formation to governments on their numbers and characteristics. It also transforms
them into regular denizens with corresponding rights and duties (e.g. to become a
taxpayer).
7 For the Netherlands, the ‘hidden city’ research project is especially noteworthy. This
project on irregular migrants in the city of Rotterdam resulted in a number of
(Dutch) publications, such as Burgers & Engbersen (1999); Engbersen, Van der
Leun, Staring & Kehla (1999); Staring (2001) and Van der Leun (2003). In Germany
a number of researchers, both university- and NGO-based, have undertaken research
projects focussing on the position and living conditions of irregular migrants in Ger-
many or specific German cities. Examples are Anderson (2003) on Munich, Alt
(2003) on Munich and Leipzig and Stobbe (2004).
8 The terms ‘government’ and ‘business’, though useful to make the point clear, makes
them both look much more monolithic and single-minded than they actually are. A
Dutch multinational like Shell has different interests and viewpoints than that of a
small- or medium-sized firm. Government can also be subdivided in different layers
and institutions that have different and sometimes conflicting interests.
9 Literally: ‘The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the
common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’ (Marx & Engels 1990/1888: 15).
10 Starting January 2004, the tax authorities limited the number of offices that could is-
sue SoFi numbers to sixteen. This decision was taken to counter the possibilities for
identity fraud (Minster van Justitie 2004: 6).
11 See www.lto.nl under ‘projecten’: ‘certificering van uitzendbureaus’. Or see www.kies-
ria.nl (both accessed 10 January 2008).
12 www.zoll.de/d0_zoll_im_einsatz/b0_finanzkontrolle/l0_statistik/index.html
(accessed 15 January 2008).
13 There are of course exceptions. Private carriers, such as airlines and shipping compa-
nies, have especially been deputised on at least two counts: checking documents and
refusing passengers if they are found lacking (an immigration task) and transporting
irregular migrants back to their countries of origin (expulsion policies).
14 The increased effectiveness is of course also likely to be the result of a selection ef-
fect: the police will be asked to participate in those controls where the labour market
authorities expect the largest groups of irregular migrant workers.
15 There may be overlap in these figures as the statistics count offences rather than in-
dividual persons.
16 In Berlin, which is one of three German city state Bundesla¨nder, the senate is the
state’s executive body or government.
17 Besides the fact that the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay were not held on American
soil (and could hence not claim access to the American legal system), it was the legal
definition of the prisoners themselves that placed them outside the law. They were
neither ‘prisoners of war’ nor ‘criminal suspects’ – if they were, they would have, to a
certain degree, had access to due process and legal protection – but they were named
‘enemy combatants’, a status beyond the law (Loader & Walker 2007: 89).
18 In Cornelius and Tsuda’s view there can be no real answer to a policy gap. Even
though they discuss the policy gap under the heading of ‘the gap hypothesis’, they
immediately pose that policy gaps are in reality an empirical fact, as there are no im-
migration policies that are perfectly implemented or do not have unintended conse-
quences (Cornelius & Tsuda 2004: 4-5).
19 The number of apprehensions does not equal the number of irregular migrants as
one irregular migrant may be apprehended more than once or for different viola-
tions. Engbersen et al. (2002: 23) corrected their dataset of police statistics for the
time period of 1997-2000 for this fact. In the timeframe 1997-2000, they counted
53,733 apprehensions, but only 47,764 individual irregular migrants (roughly 89 per
cent). This may be used as a rule of thumb when looking at the figures presented in
table 4.1.
20 Besides Germany, these countries are Finland, Ireland, France and Cyprus.
21 Parts of this chapter are based on two earlier studies: Broeders (2007) and Broeders
(forthcoming).
22 France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg.
23 Justice and Home Affairs matters in the first pillar were not fully brought under the
community framework with the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. They
became subject to a special transitional regime of five years in which the European
Council continued to take decisions unanimously and in which the Community insti-
tutions (European Commission, European Parliament and the European Court of
Justice) do not have their usual role and rights. The ending of this transition period
requires a unanimous decision thereto by the European Council (see WRR 2003).
24 This is the first test case of the recently introduced co-decision procedure in matters
on illegal immigration. The European Parliament, which has been pretty much struc-
turally ignored in the past when it only had the right of advice, is not going to make
the negotiations on this directive easy. The proposed European Return Fund (that
will contain E 676 million for the timeframe 2008-2013) is basically being held hos-
tage by the EP that has coupled the decision on the fund to that on the directive
(Canetta 2007: 447-449).
25 Aus (2006: 12) points out that, even though the overwhelming majority of the entries
in category two are from the southern border states Greece, Italy and Spain, the inter-
esting thing is not their high share but the overall low volume of data transmitted to
Eurodac. Furthermore, the problem of late transmission of data to Eurodac is also
primarily caused by the Greek and Italian authorities, a logical and convenient delay
from their national perspective because queries on transit migrants found in other
member states do not yield results as long as they are not registered in EURODAC.
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